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Chapter 1
Introduction to the Dissertation
The critical role of the state in the development process has long since been established.
What remains less clear, is how best to motivate and incentivise the front-line public sector
employees tasked to deliver public services. In recent years, many low-income developing
countries have sought to establish more productive, effective and equitable organisational
structures. This has been motivated by the desire to foster growth by overcoming the
inefficiency and low quality of service provision that have long since been associated with
public service delivery. To this end, many such countries have sought to reform the rigid
and formulaic civil service wage structures, traditionally based on education, seniority and
rank with limited scope to reward performance (Finan et al., 2017). This reform has come
in two common forms. The first, whose goal has been to enhance productivity, has in-
volved augmentation of existing incentive structures through the use of performance-based
financial incentives, which have been traditionally associated with the efficiency, produc-
tivity and profitability that exist in the private sector. The second, whose goal has been
to enhance equity, has involved augmentation of existing incentive structures through the
use of unconditional hardship-related pay increases, granted based on geographic location
decisions to less attractive geographic regions.
While also having already inherent equity concerns, many low income developing coun-
tries have in recent years, also sought to enhance the productivity of one sector in particular
- the health sector. Indeed, the relatively lower quality of healthcare in low income de-
veloping countries, has also been linked to low levels of healthcare provider morale, effort
and a so called ’know-do gap’, in which healthcare providers ’do’ far less in the provision
of healthcare that they ’know’ through their training (Das and Hammer, 2014; Gertler
and Vermeersch, 2012). The ultimate aim of these efforts has been to improve health out-
comes in line with the global development agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs). This has implied that the health sector in many low income developing countries
has been among the sectors that have implemented both types of public sector incentive
structure reform at a rapid pace. Given the pace at which these reforms have been un-
dertaken, several critical questions have remained unanswered: Are performance-based
financial incentives more productive relative to other types of financial incentives in the
health sector? Could they be associated with adverse unintended effects? How do these
high-powered financial incentives interact with the pro-social and other regarding nature
of preferences in the health sector? What is the impact of unconditional pay increases
granted to healthcare providers based on geographic location decisions?
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This doctoral thesis is a cumulative thesis comprising three individual research articles.
Taken both individually as well as together, they present evidence-based, rigorous answers
to the above, as well as other related questions. This thesis thus contributes to several
strands of the literature, with a focus on enhancing our collective understanding of the
promises and pitfalls of incentivising healthcare providers.
In the discussion that follows, I provide a bird-eye view of each of the chapters of this
thesis, particularly highlighting details on authorship, taking special care to highlight
my own contribution. After this, I synthesize the contributions of the chapters to the
literature.
Chapter one is titled, ”The Dark Side of Financial Incentives in Healthcare - Experimen-
tal Evidence from Zambia.” In the study underlying this chapter, we conduct a ‘health-
framed’ field experiment with Zambian medical doctors and medical students, utilising two
novel experimental tasks; a health-framed real-effort task and a medicine allocation task.
The main contributions of this article to the literature come in the form of documenting the
productivity and distortion effects of performance-based financial incentives and contrast-
ing these effects with those of unconditional financial incentives all within a field experi-
ment. Results-based Financing (RBF) health programmes, that have been implemented in
close to 35 developing countries worldwide, have assumed that performance-based financial
incentives yield a productivity effect, arising from greater healthcare provider motivation
due to the performance-based financial incentives. The potential for a distortion effect
between incentivised and non-incentivised aspects is assumed to be non-binding or incon-
sequential. The study, sought to establish whether a performance-based financial incentive
could indeed lead to a productivity effect, without being accompanied by a distortion effect
on healthcare provider decision making, all within the context of a low-income develop-
ing country such as Zambia that has implemented an RBF programme. We document
three separate sets of results. Firstly, a strong distortion effect due to the performance-
based financial incentive. This implies that the performance-based financial incentive is
interpreted by healthcare providers as a payoff maximising incentive, distorting provider
decision-making in favour of an incentivised medicine in the medicine allocation task. The
second result is the absence of a productivity effect of the performance-based financial
incentive. This arises because the performance-based financial incentive is not interpreted
as a signal to compensate for the distortion effect with commensurately higher effort lev-
els in the health framed real effort task. Owing to this fact, productivity levels in the
health-framed real-effort task due to performance-based and unconditional financial in-
centives are virtually identical. Thirdly, three separate nudge treatments are unable to
counteract the distortion effect of the performance-based financial incentive, nor do they
support the productivity effect. These findings have important implications, both for the
literature and for public policy dealing with the design of health programmes that use
performance-based financial incentives to motivate healthcare providers.
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Chapter one is jointly authored with Peter Hangoma and Menusch Khadjavi. I con-
tributed to this article at all stages of its development, from conception of the research
idea, design of the experimental tasks and data collection tools, securing of funding, imple-
mentation of the field experiment in Zambia, data analysis and preparation and revision
of draft versions of the article. In addition to appearing in summarized form on the
International Growth Centre (IGC) website, this article was presented at several inter-
national conferences. In 2019, these included; the 12th JDMX Meeting for Early Career
Researchers; the TIBER Symposium on Psychology and Economics; the Economic Science
Association (ESA) European meeting and the Health Economics Seminar, Erasmus Uni-
versity Rotterdam. In 2021, this article was presented at the Working Group on African
Political Economy (WGAPE), Africa Evidence Summit.
Chapter two of the thesis is titled, ”Comparing the Productivity of Performance-based
and Unconditional Financial Incentives in Improving Infant Birthweight in Zambia.” The
aim of the study upon which chapter two is based is to complement the insights from
chapter one by comparing the productivity effect of performance-based and unconditional
financial incentives in improving health outcomes in the ’real world,’ outside a field ex-
perimental setting. The study utilises a difference-in-differences research design, com-
plemented with triple difference, event study and regression discontinuity designs and
four waves of nationally representative Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data from
Zambia. It leverages an actual real world RBF programme, the Zambia RBF pilot, imple-
mented between 2012 and 2014 and compares districts where healthcare providers were
randomised to receive either performance-based or unconditional financial incentives and
those that conducted business as usual under the Zambia RBF pilot.
The key contributions of chapter two are threefold. First, it documents that the weak
productivity effect of performance-based financial incentives may also extend into the
real world. This is evident from the fact that performance-based and unconditional fi-
nancial incentives are found to have comparable effects in improving infant health out-
comes. Secondly, the study shows that despite results revealing that performance-based
financial incentives have marginally stronger effects, the fact that they are also by far
more costly, implies that unconditional financial incentives should be given more attention
by policymakers. This is evident from the fact that a cost-effectiveness exercise reveals
that the unconditional financial incentives are considerably more cost-effective, relative
to performance-based financial incentives. Thirdly, the study also documents evidence
suggestive of a distortion effect in the performance-based financial incentive treatment
condition. This is evident from the fact that, the number of Ante-natal Care (ANC) vis-
its, a health service delivery indicator with a performance-based financial incentive of $1.6
per visit attached to it, increases strongly under the performance-based financial incentive
treatment condition. The quality of the ANC visits, composed of indicators not directly
attached to the performance-based financial incentive, does not improve as strongly as
the number of ANC visits do. This suggests that healthcare providers focus more on the
visits and not to the same extent on the quality of the visits owing to the effects of the
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performance-based financial incentive.
Chapter two is single authored. It has been presented at the 2020 WGAPE Berlin virtual
conference 2020 and the Poverty Reduction Equity and Growth Network (PeGNet) virtual
PhD conference 2021. I also acknowledge for helpful comments and feedback received from
Willa Friedman, Jennifer Okonkwo and Patrick Nuess in refining the article.
Chapter three is titled, ”Public Sector Compensation and Rural-Urban Gaps in Service
Delivery: Evidence from Zambia.” The study upon which this chapter is based evaluates
the impact of the rural hardship allowance, an unconditional salary supplement of 20%
paid by the Zambian government to public sector employees stationed in Zambian rural
areas. The allowance aims to compensate public sector employees stationed in rural areas
of Zambia for the lack of modern amenities in such areas. The study assesses the impact
of the allowance on healthcare provider staffing levels in health facilities eligible to receive
the allowance. It exploits spatial discontinuities in eligibility for the allowance to estimate
fuzzy regression discontinuity models. Some studies in the literature exploit exogenous
variation in wages created withing the context of field experiments (Dal Bó et al., 2013;
De Ree et al., 2018; Deserranno, 2019). However, this study contributes to the literature by
leveraging administrative data from the universe of public healthcare providers in Zambia
to study defacto health facility staffing levels. Additionally, the study contributes novel
evidence of the effects of a hardship based unconditional financial incentive in the health
sector within the context of a low income developing country such as Zambia. Most studies
in the literature estimate the effects of similar hardship-based unconditional financial
incentives on education outcomes (Neilson et al., 2021; Chelwa et al., 2019; Cabrera and
Webbink, 2020; Pugatch and Schroeder, 2014).
The article documents evidence of substantial increases in health facility staffing on
the eligible side of the allowance threshold for the allowance. The number of healthcare
providers in health facilities eligible to receive the allowance increases by 57% once facilities
meet the eligibility criteria to receive the allowance. Once the number of healthcare
providers is adjusted for quality, the study finds that the quality-adjusted number of
healthcare providers increases by 60% once facilities meet the eligibility criteria to receive
the allowance.
Chapter three is jointly authored with Torsten Figueiredo Walter. I contributed to this
article at all stages of its development, from conception of the research idea, securing of the
administrative data from the Zambian government, analysis of the data and preparation
and revision of draft versions of the article.
Taken in it’s entirety, this thesis contributes to several strands of the literature. I outline
these contributions in the discussion below:
Firstly, this thesis contributes to a nascent literature on the personnel economics of
the public sector in developing countries, a literature concerned with attracting, retaining
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and motivating public sector employees. This literature has established, for instance, that
public sector employees may be motivated by the mission of the organisation (Besley and
Ghatak, 2005), by career incentives (Ashraf et al., 2020) or indeed by pro-social motiva-
tions such as reciprocity and intrinsic motivation(Ashraf and Bandiera, 2018; Besley and
Ghatak, 2014). Dal Bó et al. (2013) and Deserranno (2019) have investigated the role of
financial incentives on the applicant pool at the recruitment stage in Mexico and Uganda,
respectively, finding strong effects of the incentives in attracting high quality applicants for
public sector positions. While these papers focus on the extensive or recruitment margin,
this thesis contributes to this literature at both the intensive and extensive margins of the
effects of financial incentives in the public sector.
At the intensive margin, the contribution of this thesis comes in the form of utilising
various rigorous methodological approaches to show that evidence for the productivity
effect of performance-based financial incentives in the health sector may actually be much
weaker than previously thought. Similarly, this thesis further shows that unconditional
financial incentives to healthcare providers may actually be more productive than pre-
viously thought. This implies that greater consideration should be given to their usage,
especially in low income developing country settings where resource constraints may be
more binding, but where productivity increases in public service delivery may be even
more critical. This contribution differs from studies in the education literature, which
have revealed weak productivity effects of unconditional financial incentives in that sector
(De Ree et al., 2018; Chelwa et al., 2019). This contribution, however parallels Ashraf
et al. (2014) who find that non-financial incentives elicit higher productivity levels relative
to performance-based financial incentives in Zambia. This implies that other incentive
types such as unconditional financial incentives can be especially productive in the health
sector, but not necessarily elsewhere.
At the extensive margin, this thesis provides novel evidence showing that an uncondi-
tional hardship-related financial incentive, can actually succeed in increasing the number
of healthcare providers in under-served rural areas that are eligible to receive it. Such gains
are, in-turn, critical in ensuring a more equitable distribution of healthcare providers be-
tween rural and urban areas that are characterised by inequalities in access to essential
services such as high quality healthcare.
This thesis contributes to a strand of the economics literature on the signalling effects
of incentives. In this literature, incentives may either crowd-in or crowd-out pro-social
preferences by transmitting signals about the intentions of the principal providing the
incentives, the ability of the agent performing the task, or indeed the ease or difficulty of
the task itself (Bowles and Polania-Reyes, 2012; Benabou and Tirole, 2003; Deserranno,
2019). The contribution of this thesis to this literature is to show that performance-
based financial incentives to healthcare providers may also contain a payoff maximising
signal dominating the effort enhancing signal the incentives are usually thought to convey.
However, unconditional financial incentives may not convey this same payoff maximising
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signal and in this way, productivity levels owing to the two types of incentives may end
up being quite comparable in a setting in which performance-based financial incentives
would have been thought to be more productive.
This thesis also contributes to a strand of the literature in health economics which is
concerned with RBF health programmes, implemented mostly in low income developing
countries. Indeed, this literature is concerned with the implementation of these health
programs, which have involved the provision of performance-based financial incentives to
healthcare providers in an attempt to enhance their productivity and ultimately improve
health outcomes. However, the sustainability and suitability of performance-based finan-
cial incentives to healthcare providers has been seriously questioned (James et al., 2020). A
key contribution of this thesis to this literature is to show that more cost-effective incentive
options other than performance-based financial incentives, should also be considered by
policymakers in their quest to improve health outcomes. Similarly, given the predictions of
agency theory on incentives in a multitasking framework (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991;
Sherry, 2016) as regards the potential for multitasking effects, this thesis contributes evi-
dence to this literature regarding the existence of this distortion effect among healthcare
providers in a low income developing country setting such as Zambia. This distortion
effect arises because healthcare providers are likely to interpret the performance-based
financial incentive as a payoff maximising signal and not as an effort enhancing signal. An
additional contribution of this thesis to the RBF literature is to generate evidence on the
effects of a real world RBF programme on actual health outcomes. Indeed, most of this
literature focuses on assessing the impact of RBF performance-based financial incentives
on indicators of health service provision and not actual health outcomes (Basinga et al.,
2011; Friedman et al., 2016; Paul et al., 2018; Bonfrer et al., 2014; Gage and Bauhoff,
2021). Generating evidence and shifting the policy discussion to also consider the effects
of these programmes on health outcomes is critical, because the ultimate aim of these
programmes is to actually improve population health outcomes.
Finally, this thesis also makes several contributions to the behavioural economics liter-
ature. Firstly, the incentivised experimental measures of healthcare provider pro-social,
other-regarding preferences within the context of a low income developing country such
as Zambia are, to the best of my knowledge, novel. Evidence existing in this literature
has mainly come from subject pools in high income, developed country settings (Godager
and Wiesen, 2013; Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2011). Secondly, the two experimental tasks at
the heart of the field experiment in chapter one: the health-framed real-effort task and
medicine allocation task, also represent a contribution of the thesis. These novel experi-
mental tasks, are modified versions of effort tasks as well as the dictator game commonly
used in the experimental economics literature. The novelty comes in the form of adapt-
ing these tasks so as to permit healthcare provider treatment decisions regarding real
medicines that in-turn, affect the health of real patients in a rural Zambian clinic. Such
an incentivised healthcare provider treatment decision making situation is, to the best of
my knowledge, novel in the behavioural and experimental economics literature.
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resources for health crisis in zambia. Washington (DC): World Bank .
Holmstrom, B. and P. Milgrom (1991). Multitask principal-agent analyses: Incentive
contracts, asset ownership, and job design. JL Econ. & Org. 7, 24.
Hoynes, H., D. Miller, and D. Simon (2015). Income, the earned income tax credit and
infant health. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 7 (1), 172–211.
Hoynes, H., M. Page, and A. H. Stevens (2011). Can targeted transfers improve birth
outcomes?: Evidence from the introduction of the wic program. Journal of Public
Economics 95 (7-8), 813–827.
Imbens, G. W. and T. Lemieux (2008). Regression discontinuity designs: A guide to
practice. Journal of Econometrics 142 (2), 615–635.
James, N., K. Lawson, and Y. Acharya (2020). Evidence on result-based financing in
maternal and child health in low-and middle-income countries: A systematic review.
Global Health Research and Policy 5 (1), 1–15.
Kaarboe, O. and L. Siciliani (2011). Multi-tasking, quality and pay for performance.
Health Economics 20 (2), 225–238.
Kesternich, I., H. Schumacher, and J. Winter (2015). Professional norms and physician
behavior: Homo oeconomicus or homo hippocraticus? Journal of Public Economics 131,
1–11.
Kramer, M. S. (1987). Determinants of low birth weight: Methodological assessment and
meta-analysis. Bulletin of the World Health Organization 65 (5), 663.
Kramer, M. S. (2003). The epidemiology of adverse pregnancy outcomes: An overview.
The Journal of Nutrition 133 (5), 1592S–1596S.
11
Lagarde, M. and D. Blaauw (2014). Pro-social preferences and self-selection into jobs:
Evidence from south african nurses. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 107,
136–152.
Lagarde, M. and D. Blaauw (2017). Physicians’ responses to financial and social incentives:
A medically framed real effort experiment. Social Science & Medicine 179, 147–159.
Lazear, E. P. (2000). Performance pay and productivity. American Economic Re-
view 90 (5), 1346–1361.
Lee, D. S. and T. Lemieux (2010). Regression discontinuity designs in economics. Journal
of Economic Literature 48 (2), 281–355.
Lemiere, C., C. Herbst, N. Jahanshahi, and E. Smith (2011). Reducing geographical
imbalances of health workers in sub-saharan africa: A labor market perspective on
what works, what does not, and why. world bank; 2011.
Mbiti, I., K. Muralidharan, M. Romero, Y. Schipper, C. Manda, and R. Rajani (2019).
Inputs, incentives, and complementarities in education: Experimental evidence from
tanzania. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 134 (3), 1627–1673.
McCoy, D., S. Bennett, S. Witter, B. Pond, B. Baker, J. Gow, S. Chand, T. Ensor, and
B. McPake (2008). Salaries and incomes of health workers in sub-saharan africa. The
Lancet 371 (9613), 675–681.
McCrary, J. (2008). Manipulation of the running variable in the regression discontinuity
design: A density test. Journal of Econometrics 142 (2), 698–714.
Miller, G. and K. S. Babiarz (2013). Pay-for-performance incentives in low-and middle-
income country health programs. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Re-
search.
Miller, G., R. Luo, L. Zhang, S. Sylvia, Y. Shi, P. Foo, Q. Zhao, R. Martorell, A. Medina,
and S. Rozelle (2012). Effectiveness of provider incentives for anaemia reduction in rural
china: A cluster randomised trial. Bmj 345.
Mullen, K. J., R. G. Frank, and M. B. Rosenthal (2010). Can you get what you pay
for? pay-for-performance and the quality of healthcare providers. The Rand Journal of
Economics 41 (1), 64–91.
Muralidharan, K. and N. Prakash (2017). Cycling to school: Increasing secondary school
enrollment for girls in india. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 9 (3),
321–50.
Neilson, C., M. Bobba, T. Ederer, G. Leon-Ciliotta, and M. Nieddu (2021). Teacher
compensation and structural inequality: Evidence from centralized teacher school choice
in peru. Working paper, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Ohlsson, A. and P. Shah (2008). Determinants and Prevention of Low Birth Weight: A
Synopsis of the Evidence. Institute of Health Economics.
12
Olken, B. A., J. Onishi, and S. Wong (2014). Should aid reward performance? evidence
from a field experiment on health and education in indonesia. American Economic
Journal: Applied Economics 6 (4), 1–34.
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The Dark Side of
Performance-Based Financial





The productivity of healthcare providers in a context with low quality of healthcare and
weak healthcare outcomes in low-income developing countries remains a great concern.
In response, health programmes try to improve productivity by using performance-based
financial incentives. The payment of such incentives is based on performance on particular
healthcare services. We employ a health-framed field experiment with medical students
and doctors in Zambia to investigate the productivity and distortion effects of such incen-
tives. We do not find evidence for the productivity effect, however, a significant distortion
effect emerges. Three nudge treatments we employ in an effort to counteract the distor-
tion effect, including allocation observability and emphasising medical norms, all fail to
counteract it. Our findings highlight that performance-based incentives may signal payoff
maximising behaviour to healthcare providers, without signalling commensurate produc-
tivity enhancement and should thus be used with caution. Policymakers are thus advised
to explore the role of unconditional financial incentives, that may not signal distorting
payoff maximising behaviour but lead to comparable levels of productivity.
Keywords: Performance-based financial incentives; Framed-field experiment; Decision
making, Medical doctors; Zambia
JEL Codes: C93, I12, I15
2.1 Introduction
An effective healthcare system is crucial for the prosperity of a society and the function-
ing of its economy. This is evident in the focus of United Nations’ Sustainable Development
Goal 3 on ensuring ‘good health and well-being’. In the midst of the current COVID-19
pandemic, an effective healthcare system is even more crucial. Numerous factors deter-
mine the effectiveness of healthcare systems. Beyond the level of funding and governance,
the availability of infrastructure, medical supplies and equipment, the effectiveness of
healthcare systems also crucially depends on the performance of public sector employees
and medical staff. It is thus not surprising that the relatively lower quality that charac-
terises healthcare in low income developing countries, has also been linked to low levels
of healthcare provider effort and a so called ’know-do gap’, in which healthcare providers
’do’ far less in the provision of healthcare that they ’know’ through their training (Das
and Hammer, 2014; Gertler and Vermeersch, 2012). This has resulted in the popularity
of Results Based Financing (RBF) health programmes in which healthcare providers are
paid performance-based financial incentives with the ultimate goal of increasing their pro-
ductivity. However, the appropriateness and sustainability of performance-based financial
incentives for low income developing countries have been questioned (James et al., 2020).
Similarly, performance-based financial incentives have also been linked to the potential for
detrimental effects such as multitasking effects in the literature (Holmstrom and Milgrom,
1991; Sherry, 2016).
In this study we investigate the potential for a performance-based financial incentive to
have two separate effects on healthcare provider decisions. A productivity effect, which
may occur when a healthcare provider increases effort due to a performance-based financial
incentive and a distortion effect, which may occur if a healthcare provider does not increase
effort, but redirects decision-making solely towards the service that is incentivized. To this
end, we implement a health-framed field experiment among medical students and current
medical doctors in Zambia. Our experimental design incorporates two experimental tasks
and six between-subjects treatments. Three aspects of our results are important to high-
light. First, we do not find evidence of the productivity effect on healthcare provider
decisions. Second, a substantial distortion effect on healthcare provider decisions emerges.
Third, the distortion effect is unresponsive to three counteracting measures implemented.
Our results imply that in certain instances, a performance-based financial incentive may
be interpreted by healthcare providers as a pure payoff maximising incentive as opposed
to an effort enhancing incentive. Our findings have important implications for real world
health programmes aiming to use financial incentives to improve healthcare provider pro-
ductivity. In such programmes, performance-based financial incentives should be used
with caution, owing to the payoff maximising signal they send. Similarly, the use of un-
conditional financial incentives that do not contain this pure payoff maximising signal,
should be considered.
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Low income developing countries have among the weakest health outcomes worldwide.
For example, approximately 99% of the 303,000 maternal deaths reported in 2015 occurred
in these countries (Alkema et al., 2016). These challenges are even more evident in low
income developing countries in Africa and are exemplified by the fact that rates of un-
der age five mortality are eight times higher than those of OECD countries. Indeed, like
many low-income developing countries in Africa, Zambia has been grappling with the chal-
lenges of improving the performance of its healthcare system and ultimately the health and
productivity of its citizens (Zambia Ministry of Health, 2011). Stakeholders have acknowl-
edged the problem of low productivity of the health sector and have implemented RBF
programmes aimed at enhancing both health personnel effort and productivity (Friedman
et al., 2016). One key distinguishing aspect of such productivity enhancement programmes
is the earmarking of performance-based financial incentives to reward health facilities and
individual health providers in these facilities for their performance. The performance-
based financial incentives are tied to pre-agreed performance targets which are attached
to a subset of specific health indicators (Basinga et al., 2011; Bonfrer et al., 2014; Friedman
et al., 2016).
In this study we investigate whether such performance-based incentives can result in a
productivity effect and whether they lead to a distortion effect on the allocation decisions
of 359 healthcare providers, i.e. medical doctors and medical students at Zambia’s largest
medical school. We employ a health-framed field experiment in which the health providers
can exert real-effort and make real medical resource allocation decisions. We systemati-
cally vary how effort and allocation decisions are incentivized and test possible ways to
counteract distortionary allocations.
Our experimental design employs two intertwined tasks: a health-framed real-effort task
and a medicine allocation task. In the first step, the effort task, participants generate an
effort-dependent medicine allocation budget. In the second step, the medicine allocation
task, participants use their effort-dependent budgets to allocate essential medicines to a
real rural Zambian health clinic. Participants use real health resource requirement data
from the same rural clinic as a basis for their own medicine allocation decisions.
Our framed field experiment consists of six between-subjects treatments. In the Baseline
treatment participants receive a fixed payment independent from their effort in the effort
task and their decisions in the medicine allocation task. The Baseline treatment serves
as a comparison group absent performance-based incentives. In two Incentive treatments
participants receive a performance-based financial incentive: the greater the effort exerted
in the effort task and the greater the monetary share allocated to purchase units of one
incentivised medicine, relative to four non-incentivised medicines, which also results in
a greater personal monetary payment. The two Incentive treatments each incentivise a
different medicine to assess if allocation decisions depended in any way on which medicine
was incentivised. Comparison of the two Incentive treatments with the Baseline thus helps
us identify the presence of the productivity effect: whether participants’ effort could be
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enhanced owing to the performance-based financial incentive. This comparison also helps
us identify the presence of the distortion effect: whether allocation decisions would be dis-
torted by the performance-based financial incentive, in favour of the incentivised medicine,
at the expense of the non-incentivised medicines. Participating healthcare providers in the
two Incentive treatments are thus presented with a decision situation in which they can
either be consistent with what the rural Zambian health clinic needs or deviate from this
and maximise their own monetary payoff.
Three separate nudging treatments investigate how the distortion effect of the performance-
based financial incentive on medicine allocation decisions, can be counteracted. These
treatments do so by combining the incentive component with the following elements re-
spectively; (1) potential observability of medicine allocation decisions, i.e. there is a low
chance that others learn your decision, (2) priming emphasising norms of professionalism
and (3) information making the importance of a non-incentivised medicine very salient.
In our results, we do not find evidence for a productivity effect owing to the performance-
based financial incentive. This implies that we do not see an increase in effort in the two
Incentive treatments relative to the Baseline treatment, when effort is incentivized in the
real-effort task. We, however, find evidence of a substantial distortion effect. This implies
that healthcare provider medicine allocation decisions in the two Incentive treatments
relative to the Baseline, are distorted in favour of the incentivised medicine at the expense
of the non-incentivised medicines. Participating healthcare providers in the two Incentive
treatments thus deviate from the requirements of the rural Zambian health clinic in such
a way that their own monetary payoff is maximised. We also find that this distortion
effect is remarkably unresponsive to the counteracting measures we implemented in three
nudging treatments. The distortionary effect is also rationalised medically by many of our
participants, suggesting a self-serving bias. Interestingly, the medical justifications in the
two Incentive treatments also change accordingly, when a different medicine is incentivised.
Our findings may imply that performance-based financial incentives signal payoff max-
imising behaviour as opposed to productivity enhancement to healthcare providers (Bowles
and Polania-Reyes, 2012; Deserranno, 2019). This is evident from the fact that the dis-
tortion effect overshadows the productivity effect in our field experiment. This evidence
implies that performance-based financial incentives in healthcare settings should be used
with caution, owing to this payoff maximising signal they send to healthcare providers.
Similarly, policymakers implementing health programmes may need to explore the role
of other incentive types that do not signal payoff maximisation to healthcare providers.
Indeed, our field experiment reveals that healthcare providers in the Baseline treatment,
receiving a financial incentive independent of their effort are able to achieve a level of
productivity similar to the productivity level arising in the two Incentive treatments.
While healthcare providers in the real world may not necessarily distinguish patients
who arrive in their facilities to receive care based on whether their disease condition is
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financially incentivised or not, we believe that our findings are most relevant and applicable
to provider decisions related to demand creation and outreach activities. Indeed, for the
latter set of situations, healthcare providers must initiate the provision of healthcare.
Thus, if some health conditions are attached to performance-based financial incentives for
the providers while others are not, then the decision making of healthcare providers may
be distorted to focus unequally on those health outcomes to which the financial incentives
are attached, to the detriment of the non-incentivised health outcomes. An increase in
provision productivity and overall healthcare cannot be expected – which questions the
use of precious resources for such incentives, especially in low-income countries.
We provide evidence on the decision making of actual medical doctors and medical
students in a health-framed field experiment with real health outcomes all in the context
of a low income developing country, that has implemented an RBF programme. Our
experiment further allows us to investigate the magnitudes of the productivity effect and
the distortion effects. In this way, our paper makes contributions to several strands of
the literature. First, our paper is connected to a strand of the literature on behavioural
experiments in health economics.1 The closest paper to ours in this literature is (Brosig-
Koch et al., 2013), who investigate behavioural responses to performance-based payment in
a laboratory setting. However, they do not investigate the interplay between a productivity
effect and a distortion effect as we do. Our paper is also connected to another strand of the
health economics literature investigating RBF programmes, implemented mostly in low
income developing countries (Friedman et al., 2016; Basinga et al., 2011; Bonfrer et al.,
2014).
Our paper is also connected to a strand of the literature investigating so-called mul-
titasking effects (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Sherry, 2016; Eggleston, 2005).2 This
strand of the literature is concerned with job-design within principal-agent contexts and
specifically, with the interplay between incentivised and non-incentivised aspects of agents
job profiles. The distortion effect we investigate thus shares some similarities with this
literature. We contribute to this literature using a field experiment to investigate a pro-
ductivity and distortion effect of a performance-based financial incentive on healthcare
provider decision making, taking a broader Judgement Decision-making (JDM) perspec-
tive.
1In this strand of the literature, laboratory and laboratory-in-the field experiments with medical and
non-medical students as well as in artefactual field experiments with doctors, all performed in developed
country settings, have provided numerous insights on physician behaviour. These studies find that health
care workers provide more services when paid via fee-for-service relative to other payment mechanisms
such as capitation. Medical doctors are equally behaviourally responsive based on payment mechanism
(Brosig-Koch et al., 2016, 2013; Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2011; Lagarde and Blaauw, 2017; Green, 2014).
Our findings are thus in line with this strand of the literature.
2The health sector presents an interesting case study of multitasking effects, given that multitasking
has been noted to be especially prevalent in this setting (Eggleston, 2005). In fact, the exact channels
through which it can occur have been modelled theoretically (Sherry, 2016; Eggleston, 2005; Kaarboe and
Siciliani, 2011). The empirical literature is however mixed as to whether multitasking effects do indeed
occur in health settings in practice. Some studies align with theoretical expectations (Feng Lu, 2012;
Lagarde and Blaauw, 2017; Dumont et al., 2008), while others do not (Mullen et al., 2010; Sherry et al.,
2017).
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Finally, our paper is also connected to a strand of the literature investigating the sig-
nalling effect of financial incentives (Bowles and Polania-Reyes, 2012; Deserranno, 2019).
In this literature, in a setting with limited information, financial incentives can signal cer-
tain attributes of the task being performed, the intentions of the principals or indeed, the
agents perception of the principals intentions (Deci, 1971; Deci et al., 1999; Bowles and
Polania-Reyes, 2012). Our contribution is to show that performance-based financial in-
centives, used within a health setting, can signal payoff maximising behaviour in a manner
that leads to an additional effect on provider decision making - a distortion effect.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows, section 2.2 presents details of the exper-
imental design, including the experimental tasks, treatments and procedures employed.
Section 2.3 presents descriptive statistics of the data utilised in the study. Section 2.4
presents the descriptive and regression results of the study. Section 2.5 provides a discus-
sion and concludes.
2.2 Experimental Design
In this section we present the experimental design, including the two tasks, six treat-
ments and procedures of the data collection at the University of Zambia.
2.2.1 Tasks 1 and 2
The study was implemented as a health-framed field experiment with a between-subjects
design (Harrison and List, 2004). All participants were requested to complete two tasks; a
health-framed real effort task, labelled to participants as Task 1 and a medicine allocation
task, Task 2.
We used Task 1 to measure participants’ effort with and without a financial incentive.
All participants were given exactly eight minutes within which to complete as many sum-
mations as possible in a sample Health Information Aggregation 1 (HIA.1) form. This is
a commonly used form in the Zambian health system. In completing the HIA.1 form, par-
ticipants were asked to sum data on the number of Out-Patient Department (OPD) First
Attendances, In-Patient Department (IPD) Discharges and Deaths. Figure 2.1 depicts the
HIA.1 form used in the health-framed real effort task.
Before beginning Task 1, instructions informed participants that the number of correct
entries determined each participant’s variable allocation budget for Task 2, labelled to
participants as ‘Budget 2’. Each correctly summed entry in the HIA.1 form added 50
Zambian Kwacha (ZMW), approx. 3.7 Euros to each participant’s Budget 2.3 Given that
there were 60 possible entries in the HIA1 form, the size of each participant’s Budget 2
could thus potentially fall between ZMW 0 and ZMW 3,000, approx. 220 Euros, with the
exact amount depending on each participant’s score in Task 1, multiplied by ZMW 50.
Before the beginning of Task 1, instructions informed the participants that (1) the higher





Disease Aggregation Form:  HIA.1          


























DISEASES                         
Acute flaccid 
paralysis 12 29 87   61 24 69   89 72 64   
Cholera 47 20 46   50 2 47   4 58 38   
Measles 92 25 32   84 52 23   18 59 83   
Meningitis 5 45 72   44 71 11   100 34 43   
Neonatal 
tetanus  50 45 8   47 50 27   22 64 83   
Plague  14 12 46   99 63 2   29 67 61   
Rabies 78 87 91   96 93 63   79 26 54   
Dysentery  44 75 3   12 35 38   9 54 85   
Typhoid fever  90 33 0   85 97 22   99 54 2   





outbreak 34 72 27   37 40 76   87 73 90   
SELECTED 
DISEASES                         
Ear Diseases  25 11 49   74 2 19   75 39 67   
Nose Diseases  33 31 69   89 56 0   62 71 87   
Throat 
Diseases  95 2 12   63 76 74   62 2 44   
Chronic 
Diseases 62 95 31   15 31 51   83 33 80   
Asthma  17 63 75   89 98 1   46 73 53   
Cardio-vascular 
diseases 68 44 93  6 59 28  82 5 47  
Diabetes 34 99 50  63 46 70  96 79 11  
Hypertension 23 12 46  29 93 17  5 11 13  
Eye diseases 36 15 35  35 35 35  31 72 6  
Figure 2.1: Health-Framed Real Effort Task Tool
Notes: This figure shows the data collection tool for Task 1, the health-framed real effort task. The design
of the tool is based on the Health Information Aggregation 1 (HIA.1) form, a form commonly used to
collect healthcare provision data in the Zambian health system. In the health-framed real effort task,
participants filled in the grey-shaded regions of the form by summing the entries in the corresponding rows
within exactly eight minutes. The number of correct entries out of the 60 possible entries was multiplied
by ZMW 50 to generate each participants variable allocation budget, Budget 2. Budget 2, in-turn, was
used as a variable allocation budget in the medicine allocation task, Task 2.
a participant’s score the greater Budget 2 and, thus, the more money they could allocate
for medicines to a real Zambian Rural Health Centre (RHC) and (2) in all treatments but
Baseline a larger Budget 2, ceteris paribus, implied a larger payment for the participant
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herself (below we will describe exactly how). While the chance to generate money to buy
medicine for the RHC itself can be an incentive to exert effort in Task 1, we expected that
the additional incentive to generate money for oneself at the same time, and not at the
expense of the RHC, will result into even greater scores in all other treatments compared
to Baseline. We regard it as crucial that both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation can play
a role in Task 1, as they can both be important for effort of medical staff when working
with patients as well. This set-up thus, allowed us to test for a productivity effect, in the
form of higher participant scores in all other treatments relative to Baseline in Task 1.
In Task 2 participants were presented with a list of the consumed essential medicines
in a real Zambian Rural Health Centre, namely Lubwa RHC, as well as an estimate of
the percentage of the cost that each medicine represented (see the decision sheet in Figure
2.2). This medicine consumption data, which also presented a picture of the underlying
disease burden in the catchment area of Lubwa RHC, represented a realistic picture of
health resource needs in the RHC and was thus labelled as an ‘optimal allocation of health
resources’ to this specific RHC.
We decided on Lubwa RHC as the recipient of the allocated medical supplies for several
reasons: it is located in a very rural and remote area, a 12-hour drive away from Zambia’s
capital Lusaka and there is no city and major infrastructure close to it, it is very unlikely
that the medical students and doctors participating in our study have personal affiliations
with the RHC and, given its remote location, it is common knowledge for our participants
that there is typically a lack of the most basic medical supplies in a remote RHC like
Lubwa RHC. These circumstances made the medicine allocation task to Lubwa RHC a
high-stakes task regarding its economic and ethical impact.
In the process of completing Task 2, we provided participants with information from
Lubwa RHC for them to base their own individual level allocation decisions on i.e. to
choose their own percentage allocations. These allocation decisions were made as regards
how to allocate their two budgets: Budget 2, determined in Task 1 of the experiment, and
Budget 1 which was fixed at ZWM 1,000, approx. 74 Euros, to each of the medications in
Figure 2.2.
To ensure incentive compatibility, all participants across all treatments were informed
that the allocation decisions of one randomly drawn participant would actually be bought
and donated to Lubwa RHC by the research team, exactly as per their own allocation
decisions.4 In this way, participants’ decisions in the experiment could affect the health
of real patients in the real world – in a vastly under-financed health care system – and
this ensured that there were actual costs to a distortion of allocation decisions. To this
4The Baseline, Incentive-Amoxil and Observability treatments were implemented in October 2018.
The Incentive-Flagyl, Prof-Norms and Need-ORS treatments were implemented in June 2019. Budget
constraints prevented the implementation of all participants’ resource allocation decisions. Given the
under-financing and immediate need of the RHC to receive medications, we still regard the stakes as
relevant.
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                                                                                   Table: Percentages of Costs per Month for Five Consumed Medicines 












Percentage of Total Cost per 
Month 
Paracetamol 12% 
Oral Rehydration Salts 50 % 
Amoxil 21 % 
Piriton 3 % 
Metronidazole (Flagyl) 14 % 
 Total: 100% 
Medication Your Allocation Choice 
Paracetamol           % 
Oral Rehydration Salts           % 
Amoxil           % 
Piriton           % 
Metronidazole (Flagyl)           % 
 Total: 100% 
Medication Your Allocation Choice 
Paracetamol           % 
Oral Rehydration Salts           % 
Amoxil           % 
Piriton           % 
Metronidazole (Flagyl)           % 
 Total: 100% 
Budget 1:  
K 1,000 
Budget 2:  
K ______ 
Optimal allocation 
of health resources 
to Lubwa RHC 
based on the 
prevailing disease 
burden in the 
catchment area. 
Figure 2.2: Medicine Allocation Task Tool
Notes: This figure shows the decision sheet used in the medicine allocation task, Task 2. In Task 2,
participants made individual decisions as to how to allocate their Budget 1 and Budget 2, which was
determined in the health-framed real effort task, Task 1, respectively. Participants decided on how to
allocate Budgets 1 and 2 respectively, to each the five medications, using the data from Lubwa RHC
on requirements for the same five medications, as a point of reference. Decisions were made when each
participant filled-in their own percentages in the bottom two tables, allocating their Budgets 1 and 2,
respectively across the five medicines.
end, we worked closely with the Zambian Ministry of Health, to purchase the medicines
on the list of most consumed medicines and donate them to the RHC (see Figure 2.A.1 in
appendix 4.A.2 for a picture of Lubwa RHC receiving the medicines).
2.2.2 Treatments
As noted above, participants completed Task 2 with experimental variation made salient,
depending on which treatment they had been randomly allocated into. Table 2.1 presents
a summary of the six treatments and how they correspond to the two experimental tasks
discussed above. Instructions for all the treatments are shown in appendix 3.A.4.
As described above, participants in Baseline only received a fixed participation fee of
ZMW 50 for completing both Task 1 and 2.
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Table 2.1: Summary of Experimental Tasks and Treatments
Treatment Task 1 Task 2 N
Financial Incentive Nudge Nudge Nudge
Amoxil Flagyl Obs. decisions Prof. norms ORS Info.
Baseline X 48
Incentive-Amoxil X X 50
Incentive-Flagyl X X 42
Observability X X X 56
Prof-Norms X X X 50
Need ORS X X X 49
Notes: This table contains a summary of the experimental tasks and treatments used in the field experiment. The
symbol Xrepresents ’Yes’ while empty cell represents ’No’. N shows the number of participants per treatment.
Task 1 refers to the health-framed real effort task, while Task 2 refers to the medicine allocation task. ’Financial
Incentive’ refers to a performance-based financial incentive participants could receive, based on the percentage of
Amoxil or Flagyl allocated to Lubwa RHC. ’Obs. decisions’ refers to a nudge making the observability of alloca-
tion decisions salient. ’Prof. norms’ refers to a nudge making norms of the medical profession salient. ’ORS info.’
refers to a nudge making information on the importance of the non-incentivised medicine Oral Rehydration Salts
(ORS) salient.
The participation fee was designed to mimic a fixed salary incentive scheme that Zam-
bian health workers would ordinarily receive in the absence of a performance-based finan-
cial incentive. Participants’ Task 1 scores in Baseline nevertheless still generated Budget
2 in Task 2 which was then used to allocate medicines.
Participants in all of the other five treatments also received a fixed participation fee of
ZMW 50 and an additional performance-based payment. This performance-based payment
depended on the score in Task 1 and on their allocation decisions to one of the five
medications in Task 2. For the treatments in which Amoxil was incentivized, the following
paragraph illustrates how we communicated the earnings functions to participants in the








Equation 2.2 below, thus represents the payoff function participants in all treatments








where πi represents the monetary earnings of participant i, α represents the fixed partici-
pation fee of ZMW 50, µ represents Budget 1, the fixed allocation budget, σi represents the
percentage of Budget 1 participant i allocated to either Amoxil or Flagyl, the incentivised
5As per the instructions shown in appendix 3.A.4, sample calculations and control questions were are
also provided to the participants to help them understand the earnings formula. The formula was not
shown to participants in the Baseline treatment
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medicines. γi represents the size of the score-dependent Budget 2 while θi represents the
percentage of Budget 2 participant i allocated to the incentivised medicine. ε is a scaling
constant and equal to 4000 as shown in equation 2.1 above. In the Baseline treatment, σi
and θi are both equal to zero as participants only earned the fixed participation fee α.
Instructions for both Task 1 and Task 2 were provided and read out aloud to all par-
ticipants in each session. Hence, participants in all treatments except Baseline, knew
that a greater score in Task 1 would directly translate into a larger Budget 2 for alloca-
tions to the RHC and more earnings for themselves at the end of the experiment. In the
four treatments Incentive-Amoxil, Observability, Prof-Norms and Need-ORS this payment-
relevant medication was Amoxil, while Flagyl was the payment-relevant medication in the
Incentive-Flagyl treatment.6
This implies that participants could personally earn additional money in all treatments
but Baseline when they scored higher in Task 1 and the more Amoxil (Flagyl in Incentive-
Flagyl) they allocated to the RHC in Task 2. All treatments but Baseline therefore
mimicked a salary plus performance-based incentive scheme. Our experimental design
hence permits an investigation of whether the performance-based component in these
treatments motivates higher effort and scores in Task 1 (i.e. more productivity) and
distorts allocation decisions towards Amoxil (or Flagyl) in Task 2 – all compared to the
Baseline treatment. We therefore formulate;
Hypothesis 1, Productivity Effect: The average score in Task 1 is higher in
all the performance-based incentive treatments compared to Baseline.
Similarly, the treatments Incentive-Amoxil and Incentive-Flagyl allow us to test for a
distortion effect in Task 2 compared to Baseline. We therefore also formulate;
Hypothesis 2, Distortion Effect: The average share of Amoxil allocated to
Lubwa RHC in Task 2 is greater in Incentive-Amoxil compared to Baseline
(Flagyl in the Incentive-Flagyl treatment).
In the light of our expectation of a distortion effect, we added three nudge treatments
to our design to investigate what measures can be taken in order to curb a potential
distortion effect cost-effectively.
First, the Observability treatment had all of the features of Incentive-Amoxil with one
critical difference. Participants were also informed that there was a chance that their allo-
cation decisions to the RHC would be made public to other participants in the experiment,
i.e. persons with medical training, able to identify a distorted resource allocation. The
chosen allocation decisions would be published on the central announcement board of the
Department of Public Health, which students check for information frequently. This could
6This treatment served as a robustness check on whether medical (mis)allocation decisions were sensi-
tive to which medicine was incentivised.
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occur if their allocation decision was randomly selected for distribution to the RHC. In
this way, their allocation decisions, but not their identity, were potentially observable to
other participants. This additional observability component allowed the investigation of
whether the distortion effect of the financial incentive could be counteracted through a
potential public observability nudge, while keeping anonymity.
Second, the Prof-Norms treatment had all of the features of Incentive-Amoxil with
another important difference. We tried to nudge participants with norms emphasising
professionalism and patient regard before they made their allocation decisions in Task
2. Specifically, participants in Prof-Norms read a one page document that contained
statements adapted from a publicly accessible Health Professionals Council of Zambia
document7 emphasising norms of professional medical ethics and patient regard. The
one-pager also requested each participant to personally composed one sentence containing
their personal reflections on the statements. The one page document contained statements
such as:
”A health professional should allocate available resources to the promotion of good med-
ical practice and the maintenance of such health practitioner’s professional competence,”
”A health professional should undertake to discharge his/her professional duties dili-
gently and in a manner that best considers the welfare of the patient/client,”
“A health practitioner should not only choose but shall also be seen to be choosing the
drug, appliance or goods which, in his/her independent professional judgement and having
due regard to economy, will best serve the medical/health interest of his/her patient/client.”
Third, the Need-ORS treatment also contained all the features of Incentive-Amoxil,
with one difference. We aimed to nudge participants with information that emphasised
the salience of one of the non-incentivised medicines – oral rehydration salts (ORS).8
Participants were presented with information on ‘knowledge of ORS’ as well as ‘usage of
ORS,’ generally for Zambia, as well as for Muchinga Province, the province in which Lubwa
RHC is located. This information was obtained from the Zambia Demographic and Health
Survey (Zambia Ministry of Health and IFC, 2019). The information rationalised the
relatively larger allocation to ORS evident from Figure 2.2 and tried to nudge participants
on the clinic’s need for ORS, based on the relatively lower provision of ORS to under age
five children in Muchinga Province, relative to the national average.
We implemented the three nudge treatments in an attempt to counteract a potential
distortion effect in Incentive-Amoxil compared to Baseline. We therefore also formulate;
7Health Professions Council of Zambia (HPCZ), Professional Code of Ethics and Discipline: Fitness
to Practice (2014). The HPCZ is legally mandated to register health practitioners in Zambia and regulate
their professional conduct.
8ORS was chosen for this purpose because it was identified as the non-incentivised medicine participants
distorted their allocations away from based on the data collected in October 2018.
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Hypothesis 3, Nudge Effect: The average share of Amoxil allocated to Lubwa
RHC in Task 2 is lower in Observability, Prof-Norms and Need-ORS compared
to Incentive-Amoxil.
2.2.3 Procedures
We conducted our experiment in Lusaka, Zambia, at the University of Zambia Ridgeway
Campus, within the vicinity of the University Teaching Hospital (UTH).9 UTH is Zambia’s
largest tertiary hospital and it also serves as a teaching hospital for the University of
Zambia’s medical students. Being both Zambia’s premier teaching hospital and also the
highest referral hospital, UTH handles a portfolio of disease that is representative of the
disease burden in the country. Ridgeway campus therefore gives us a unique opportunity
for conducting this study.
Participants were informed about the study through announcements distributed to their
medical student association, through social media platforms and hard copy posters dis-
tributed at Ridgeway campus. Participation was voluntary and interested students indi-
cated their willingness to participate through Whatsapp, email and text messages. Par-
ticipants were then randomly allocated into a session and informed as to the day and time
they had been scheduled.
In total, 295 medical students were randomly allocated into one of the six treatments
shown in table 2.1 above, while 64 participating medical doctors were randomised into two
of the six treatments.10 In October 2018, 154 medical students participated in 20 exper-
imental sessions conducted while a different set of 141 medical students and 64 medical
doctors participated in 15 experimental sessions conducted in May 2019. Each session
lasted approximately 90 minutes and all sessions were conducted in a purpose fitted ex-
perimental laboratory in the School of Public Health within UTH. All experimental tasks
were completed using paper forms.
As described above, all participants were given strictly and exactly eight minutes to
complete Task 1. After this, Task 1 sheets were collected and corrected to determine
the number of correct entries and the size of each participant’s Budget 2. Thereafter,
participants received the decision sheets for Task 2, indicating the respective sizes of
Budgets 1 and 2. Participants in the Prof-Norms treatment read the page containing the
nudge text before they completed Task 2. Once Task 2 had been completed, participants
completed a questionnaire collecting demographic and socio-economic characteristics.11
9Our experiment received ethical approval from ERES in Zambia, reference number 2018-Aug-021,
before conducting it.
10In our sample of medical doctors, only the Incentive-Amoxil and Need-ORS treatments were im-
plemented as a robustness check of our main sample of medical students. The results presented below,
replicate among the medical doctors and are available upon request from the authors.
11Summary statistics of participant demographic and socio-economic characteristics are shown in table
2.2 below.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics of Covariates
Treatment
Variable All Baseline Incentive-Amoxil Incentive-Flagyl Observability Prof-Norms Need ORS p-value
Age 25.1 25.5 25.8 25.1 25.4 24.4 24.4 < 0.00
Male 75.9 83.3 84.0 71.4 87.5 64.0 63.2 0.12
Dist. to Lubwa 713.2 677.1 775.1 687.7 692.5 726.7 719.2 0.74
Year of study 5.5 5.8 5.6 5.5 5.5 5.3 5.2 0.03
Math grade 3.9 4.4 3.9 4.0 3.8 3.7 3.6 0.01
Physics grade 3.9 4.1 3.8 4.1 3.8 3.9 3.8 0.48
Experience 1.09 1.10 1.04 1.12 1.10 1.18 1.04 0.99
Alcohol use 1.65 1.77 1.76 1.71 1.63 1.56 1.47 0.70
Perceived relative income 2.52 2.63 2.50 2.55 2.48 2.60 2.37 0.87
Pro-social motivation 3.58 3.58 3.48 3.55 3.63 3.74 3.49 0.58
Residence 2.14 2.08 1.97 2.10 2.35 2.05 2.20 0.59
Smoke 4.07 8.33 2.00 4.76 5.36 2.00 2.04 0.99
Observations 295 48 50 42 56 50 49
Notes: This table shows participants’ mean demographic and socio-economic characteristics for the entire sample and by treatment. The p-values in the last
column are based on Kruskal-Wallis tests including all six treatments, with p-values below 0.1 in bold. The variable distance to Lubwa reports the driving
distance between Lubwa RHC and each participant’s district of origin in Kilometers. The variable age is measured in years. The variable male reports the
percentage of the sample that is male. The variable year of study categorises years of study, from second to seventh year. The variables Grade math and grade
physics report each participants university mathematics and physics grades and are measured on a 6 point scale from low to high. The variable experience
categorises the number of years, if any, that the participants have worked in the health sector, outside their studies, on a four point scale from low to high.
The variable alcohol is represents each participants self-reported alcohol consumption and is measured on a five point scale from low to high. The variable
’perceived relative income’ categorises each participants relative perception of their income level and is measured on a five point scale from low to high. The
variable ’pro-social job motivation’ categorises participants’ self-reported beliefs about whether their choice of profession in the medical field will make a differ-
ence in people’s lives, on a four point scale from low to high. The variable residence categorises socio-economic status of each participants area of residence on
a four-point scale from low to high income. The variable smoke reports the percentage of participants that smoke.
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Each participant then received her or his payment in private in Zambian Kwacha (ZMW).
On average, participating medical students earned ZMW 83 (approx. 6 EUR) across all
treatments while medical doctors on average earned ZMW 249 (approx. 18 EUR). These
stakes were attractive for the respective groups.
2.3 Data
Table 2.2 provides summary statistics of participant demographic and socio-economic
characteristics across all six treatments. It shows that most characteristics are balanced
across the treatments, with the exception of age, years of study and math grades. While
the magnitudes of differences for all three variables do not appear economically large,
we will control for all the characteristics by using them as covariates in the regression
analysis in section 2.4 below to ensure the robustness of findings. The table also reveals
that the average participant was male, 25 years old, has studied medical studies for 5.5
years, perceived his income to be low, drank some alcohol, did not smoke and reported
being intrinsically motivated to become a medical professional.
2.4 Results
In testing for hypothesis 1 on the productivity effect, we first begin by examining the
distribution of Task 1 scores across all six treatments graphically in figure 2.3. Recall
that the maximum achievable score in Task 1 was 60.12 The figure thus reveals that
Task 1 scores are well distributed between zero and the maximum score of 60, with most
participant scores falling between approx. 20 and 30 and very few scores falling at the
extremes. This implies that Task 1 successfully mimicked real world effort and was neither
too easy nor too difficult for participants to complete and as with most real world tasks,
the bulk of participants achieve a score close to the mean.
To further test the productivity effect, we compare average Task 1 scores among the
six treatments. As noted in section 2.2 above, the greater the score in Task 1, the greater
the personal earnings participants could receive in all treatments except Baseline, ceteris
paribus. Of course, Task 1 scores still yielded a greater Budget 2 to allocate medicine
to Lubwa RHC in Baseline as in all other treatments. However, this effect can only be
explained by an intrinsic motivation to exert effort to generate more money to purchase
more medicine for Lubwa RHC. Figure 2.4 depicts the mean Task 1 scores in all six
treatments. We employ a series of pairwise two-sided Mann-Whitney tests to test whether
we can find evidence for a productivity effect of the performance-based financial incentive
in this task across the treatments. The pairwise Mann-Whitney tests yield only one out
of five significant difference (p < 0.05): greater Task 1 scores in Incentive-Flagyl than in
Baseline (an average score of 28.64 vs. 25.43, respectively). Hence, there is only limited
evidence for a productivity effect and in the majority of cases we cannot reject the null
12Before conducting the experiment, we pretested Task 1 with a number of volunteering colleagues.
As with most of our colleagues, the eight-minute time-frame appeared successful in yielding a somewhat
normal distribution and avoiding scores of 0 and 60.
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Figure 2.3: The Distribution of Task 1 Scores
Notes: This figure shows the distribution of participant scores in the health-framed real effort task, Task
1.
hypothesis. It may be that the intrinsic motivation of the participants is sufficient to
motivate greater effort in Task 1. Thus, addition of the performance-based incentive in
all other treatments, appears largely ineffective in increasing effort, relative to Baseline.
Figure 2.4: Health-Framed Real Effort Task Scores by Treatment
Notes: This figure shows mean participant scores by treatment in the health-framed real effort task, Task
1.
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Next, we test for evidence for hypothesis 2, i.e. whether there is a distortion effect
for the allocation of medicines towards the incentivized Amoxil and Flagyl (in Incentive-
Amoxil and Incentive-Flagyl respectively) compared to Baseline.13 Two Mann-Whitney
tests clearly reject the null hypotheses in favor of greater Amoxil allocations for both
Budgets 1 and 2 in Incentive-Amoxil compared to Baseline (approx. 55% vs. 32%, p
< 0.000 for both tests). Likewise, two further Mann-Whitney tests show that there are
greater allocations of Budgets 1 and 2 to Flagyl in Incentive-Flagyl compared to Baseline
(66-70% vs. 15%, p < 0.000 for both tests). Hence, we find clear evidence in favor of
hypothesis 2, i.e. that there is indeed a statistically and economically large distortion effect
by the pay-for-performance incentives. Figure 2.5 graphically depicts the mean allocations
of both Budget 1 and 2 to the medicines, across all six treatments in percentages.
Figure 2.5: Medicine Allocations by Treatment
Notes: This figure shows the mean allocations across the incentivised and non-incentivised medicines by
treatment in the medicine allocation task, Task 2.
Next, we assess whether any of the three nudge treatments are able to counter the
distortion caused by the performance-based incentive as hypothesis 3 postulates. As Figure
2.5 suggests, this is not the case. When testing the average share of allocated Amoxil in
Observability, Prof-Norms and Need-ORS pairwise against the average share in Baseline,
the three respective two-sided Mann-Whitney tests reject hypothesis 3 at p < 0.000.
That is, the three nudges are not able to counter the distortion effect of the performance-
based incentive. Comparing the three nudge treatments, again pairwise, against Incentive-
Amoxil, the mean shares of Amoxil in Observability and Need-ORS are not different from
Incentive-Amoxil with p > 0.1 for all tests and even higher in Prof-Norms with p < 0.01
for both Budget 1 and 2.
13For this analysis we excluded 37 participants whose allocation percentages for Budget 1 and 2 did not
add to 100%.
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Table 2.3: Regressions of Task 1 Score and Amoxil Allocations
(1) (2) (3)
Task 1 score % Amoxil Budget 1 % Amoxil Budget 2
Baseline -1.146 (1.730) -16.559 (5.016)*** -20.461 (4.951)***
Incentive-Flagyl 2.924 (1.818) -43.595 (5.366)*** -46.635 (5.282)***
Observability -0.214 (1.651) 4.982 (4.803) 4.595 (4.704)
Prof-Norms 1.757 (1.763) 25.259 (5.091)*** 24.896 (5.041)***
Need ORS -0.495 (1.776) 14.866 (5.212)*** 9.784 (5.315)*
Task 1 score 0.201 (0.178) 0.293 (0.181)
Age -0.807 (0.290)*** 1.761 (0.854)** 2.062 (0.851)**
Male -3.608 (1.312)*** 0.295 (3.937) 5.201 (3.823)
Distance to Lubwa -0.001 (0.001) < 0.000 (0.004) < 0.000 (0.004)
Year of study 1.305 (0.532)** -3.128 (1.605)* -3.603 (1.543)**
Math grade 1.836 (0.577)*** -2.420 (1.719) -2.052 (1.666)
Physics grade 0.129 (0.644) 3.720 (1.848)** 2.141 (1.823)
Experience -2.586 (1.064)** 0.915 (3.234) 0.382 (2.981)
Alcohol use -0.174 (0.530) -1.384 (1.535) -1.014 (1.484)
Perceived relative income 0.426 (0.556) -2.602 (1.595) -2.838 (1.605)*
Pro-social job motivation 0.629 (0.816) -1.218 (2.348) -1.467 (2.319)
Smoke -2.100 (2.806) -4.401 (8.124) -3.977 (8.052)
Constant 34.273 (7.617)*** 25.050 (22.743) 23.674 (23.257)
Observations 276 256 257
Notes: This table shows Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions of the impact of each treatment on
participant score in the health-framed real effort task, Task 1, in column 1 and participant allocations to
Amoxil, in percentages, from Budgets 1 and 2, in columns 2 and 3, respectively. Incentive-Amoxil is the
omitted reference treatment. Fewer than 295 observations, are shown in some regressions due to missing
questionnaire answers and participant allocation percentages not summing to 100%. Standard errors are
reported in the parentheses. p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Hence, the three nudge treatments are ineffective to counter the distortion effect of the
pay-for-performance incentive and the professional norms nudge even backfires and causes
a greater distortion effect.
Next, we perform regression analyses based on equation 2.3 below. Recall that the
Kruskal-Wallis tests for the balance of covariates revealed differences for age, year of study
and math grades between treatments, as reported in Table 2.2 above. We thus control for
all participant characteristics in the regressions, a move that also permits us to investigate
correlations with the covariates.
yi = β0 + β1vTreatv + β2iXi + γt + θs + τi (2.3)
In this equation, yi represents our outcomes of interest, the score in Task 1 and the
shares of Amoxil in Task 2, from Budgets 1 and 2 respectively, for participant i. Treatv is
a treatment indicator, with Incentive-Amoxil being the omitted reference treatment. Xi
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are the participant characteristics shown in table 2.2 above.14 γt and θs denote a time
fixed effect for the second data collection period and session fixed effects, respectively,
while τi is the error term.
Table 2.3 below reports the results. In column 1, Task 1 score is the dependant variable,
while in columns 2 and 3, the allocations to Amoxil from Budgets 1 and 2 respectively, in
percentages, are the outcome variables. Column 1 of the table reveals no treatment effects
of the various treatments on the Task 1 score. This is in line with the observations based
on figure 2.4. However, rather interestingly, column 1 also reveals that older and male
participants appear to have lower Task 1 scores, while more years of study and higher
math grades predict higher scores in Task 1. Both positive correlations appears intuitive
to us. Similarly, columns 2 and 3 show the the allocations of Amoxil of Budgets 1 and
2 and largely confirm the treatment effects discussed above based on the Mann-Whitney
tests and figure 2.5 above.
One notable difference is that while the Mann-Whitney tests did not detect any differ-
ences in Amoxil allocations between Incentive-Amoxil and Need-ORS, regression models 2
and 3 indicate treatment effects in the direction of greater distortion in Need-ORS – in the
same direction as in Prof-Norms. Hence, we find further evidence that two out of three
nudges backfired. Covariates show positive correlations of a participant’s age with the
percentage of Amoxil and negative correlations for years of study. It is likely that these
two effects cancel out mechanically for many students as they progress, so we refrain from
speculating about the underlying mechanisms.
In order to explore the nuances in participants’ allocation decisions based on the quan-
titative results above, we turn to an examination of the qualitative results. Recall from
section 2.2 that at the end of each session, each participant completed an ex-post question-
naire collecting their demographic and socio-economic characteristics. In addition to this
information, participants were also asked to explain the rationale behind their resource
allocation decisions, in the event they decided to make resource allocation decisions that
differed from the optimal allocation of resources data from Lubwa RHC as depicted in
figure 2.2. This was an open-ended question to which participants were free to explain
their decision making rationale and provide as many justifications as they wished.
Participant responses to this question were then transcribed and categorised into broad
categories of justifications;15
1. Same allocations being chosen as in the optimal allocation data obtained from Lubwa
RHC (‘Same as optimal budget’),
14We exclude the variable ’residence’ given that many observations would drop from the analysis.
15These coded responses were then converted to dummy variables for each category, equalling 1 when
a participant mentioned a specific category and 0 otherwise. The written responses are available from
the authors upon request. Our coding also included the reasons ‘ORS can be made at home’, ‘Budget
sizes’ and ‘Other medicines for disease burden’. We see no differences between treatments regarding the
prevalence of these reason categories.
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2. The financial incentive,
3. Amoxil being important given the disease burden in the catchment population of Lubwa
RHC (‘Amoxil for disease burden’) and,
4. Flagyl being important given the disease burden in the catchment population of Lubwa
RHC (‘Flagyl for disease burden’).
Figure 2.6 below presents these results. It shows that between 13% and 16% of par-
ticipants explicitly mentioned the financial incentive as a justification for their allocation
decisions in all treatments apart from Baseline. This justification seems to clearly reflect
the performance-based framework built into the five treatments. The figure also reveals
another noteworthy observation: medical justifications for allocation to the incentivised
medications, Amoxil and Flagyl, respectively. Indeed more participants justify their allo-
cations to Amoxil (Flagyl in Incentive-Flagyl) by mentioning that the disease burden at
the clinic justifies their own increased allocation to Amoxil (Flagyl). The shares of partic-
ipants providing this justification is significantly greater in all other treatments compared
to Baseline, with p < 0.05 for all cases. The Incentive-Flagyl treatment allows us to see
how this self-serving justification clearly changes from one medicine to another, simply
because the performance-based financial incentive is attached to that medicine. Hence,
we detect self-serving justifications in all treatments with performance-based incentives.
Figure 2.6: Participant Justifications for Medicine Allocations
Notes: This figure shows the proportion of participants providing each category of justification for their
allocations across the incentivised and non-incentivised medicines by treatment in the medicine allocation
task, Task 2.
We therefore find that increased allocations and medical justifications simply follow the
medicine that is incentivised and it is not necessarily the characteristics of the medicine
that determine increased allocations. The qualitative findings thus reveal a mechanism
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steering the distortion effect: medical decision makers trying to convince others and po-
tentially also themselves that their distorted decisions are medically justified.
2.5 Conclusion
The effectiveness of healthcare systems depends to a large extent on the performance
of its healthcare providers. Health programmes in which healthcare providers are paid
performance-based financial incentives have thus become common in low income develop-
ing countries. The goal of such programmes is increasing productivity, improving health
outcomes and ultimately ensuring prosperity in such countries. However, evidence on the
effects of performance-based financial incentives on healthcare providers decision making
in low income developing country settings has remained scarce.
In this study, we investigate whether such performance-based incentives can result in two
effects: a productivity effect, due to an increase in effort and a distortion effect, in which
effort does not increase but decision making is solely redirected towards an incentivised
service. We utilise a health-framed field experiment, with six between-subjects treatments,
two experimental tasks and a sample of 359 Zambian medical students and medical doctors.
In our field experiment, we create an incentivised decision-making situation involving the
allocation of real and much-needed medicines to an actual rural health clinic. Healthcare
providers in some treatment conditions thus face a decision situation in which they can
either be consistent with the needs of a real rural Zambian health clinic or deviate from
these needs so as to maximise their own payoff with the distortion effect being the result.
We find no evidence for a productivity effect, but a statistically and economically sig-
nificant distortion effect. The distortion effect is remarkably unresponsive to counteract-
ing measures in the form of three nudge treatments using observability of the allocation
decision, emphasising norms of professionalism and flagging the importance of a non-
incentivised health resource. The latter findings in particular, differ with evidence in the
literature revealing that making the professional norms in the Hippocratic Oath salient
is associated with enhanced altruism of participating medical student in dictator games
(Kesternich et al., 2015).
Our findings therefore imply that the use of performance-based financial incentives in
the healthcare sector should be cautious. This is owing to the fact that they may signal
payoff maximising behaviours to healthcare providers, without signalling commensurate
productivity enhancement. This payoff maximising behaviour may lead to a pure dis-
tortion effect towards the aspects attached to the performance-based financial incentives
and away from those aspects to which no such incentive is attached. This is particu-
larly important as the distortion effect in our experiment was not accompanied by greater
productivity than attained by an unconditional fixed payment. This also implies that pol-
icymakers wishing to use financial incentives in their health programmes, are advised to
explore the role of unconditional financial incentives, that do not signal distorting payoff
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maximising behaviour, but also lead to comparable levels of productivity as performance-
based financial incentives. The observation that the distortion effects of the financial
incentive are so pervasive that the allocation decisions are unresponsive to counteracting
nudging measures is noteworthy. It is also worrying that participants in our experiment
give self-serving medical justifications for their distorted allocation decisions.
In our field experiment, participants made decisions concerning the allocation of essen-
tial medicines. Through the donation to Lubwa RHC their decisions relate to real health
resources that have an effect on real patients outside the experimental setting. We do
not believe that our findings imply that medical doctors necessarily distinguish arriving
patients receiving urgent care in their facilities based on whether their disease condition is
associated with a performance-based financial incentivised for themselves or not. We do,
however, believe that our findings are relevant for medical staff’s actual behavior. Specifi-
cally, our findings may be applicable to decision situations related to demand creation and
outreach activities. For such situations, health care providers must take steps to initiate
the provision of healthcare in their catchment areas. The presence of performance-based
financial incentives in such situations may imply that healthcare providers may focus on
payoff maximisation at the expense of catering to the most pressing health problems in
their catchment areas by creating demand for health conditions attached to the incentives.
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2.A Appendix to Chapter Two
2.A.1 Lubwa Receives Medicines





ID #  __________ 
 
 
General Instructions for the Participants 
 
 
You are now taking part in an economic and health-related study. For this, it is important that you 
read the following instructions carefully.  
The instructions you were given are exclusively for your private information and have to be given 
back after the study. During the study it is strictly forbidden to talk. If you have any questions, 
please raise your hand, and then one of the researchers will come to you and answer your questions 
in private. 
Please be aware that your mobile phone and all other electronic devices have to be switched off. 
Any violation of these rules will lead to the exclusion from the study and from any payments. 
All your decisions in the study are made anonymously. No other participant will be able to match 
your decisions with your identity. 
For your participation in the study you will get a guaranteed show-up fee of 50 Kwacha. 
There will be two decision-making tasks in this study, Task 1 and Task 2. These two tasks are 
interrelated and a budget that you generate in Task 1 will be carried over for the decision-making 
in Task 2. There is a chance that your decision in Task 2 will result in an actual, real allocation of 
medicine to a Rural Health Centre, so we ask you to pay close attention to the following 
instructions. 
After all participants have made their decisions, we will ask you some questions in a questionnaire. 








There are two budgets in this study, Budget 1 and Budget 2. In Task 2 you will use these two 
budgets to allocate actual medicine to a real rural health centre: Lubwa Rural Health Centre in 
Chinsali District, Muchinga Province. 
Budget 1 is always fixed at 1,000 Kwacha. 
However, you are able to determine the size of Budget 2 in this Task 1. 
Task 1 involves a sample Health Information Aggregation 1 (HIA.1) form. In completing the 
HIA.1 form, you will be asked to sum the entries in each row of the form and enter the total 
into the respective grey-shaded boxes. 
Each correctly summed row of entries in the HIA.1 form will add 50 Kwacha to your Budget 
2. That is, the number of all correctly summed entries will determine your Budget 2. 
Example 1: If you fill in 15 grey-shaded boxes correctly, your Budget 2 will be 15*50 Kwacha = 
750 Kwacha. 
Example 2: If you fill in 41 grey-shaded boxes correctly, your Budget 2 will be 41*50 Kwacha = 
2050 Kwacha. 
In the example in Table 1, the correctly summed row total is 2+6+3=11. This one correctly 
summed row would add 50 Kwacha to your Budget 2. The more rows you sum correctly in the 
given time, the greater will be your Budget 2. 
Table 1. Short Sample HIA.1 Form. 
  OPD First Attendance 
DIAGNOSES Under 1 year 1-5 years 6+ Years Total 
          
NOTIFIABLE DISEASES         
Acute flaccid paralysis 2 6 3 11 
Cholera 23 10 22  
… … … …   
 
Each participant will be given exactly 8 minutes within which to complete as many summations 
as she/he likes and can manage. 
Exercise: 
Question 1: How large will Budget 1 be if you sum 19 rows correctly? Answer: K ________ 







In Task 2, you will be presented with a list of consumed medicines in a Zambian Rural Health 
Centre (RHC), as well as an estimate of the proportions (in %) of the costs of these medicines. 
Below we present you actual medicine consumption data from Lubwa RHC (catchment 
population: 9,500), Chinsali District, Muchinga Province, Zambia, in one month (Table 2). 
Please be aware that the distribution below represents an optimal allocation of health 
resources to Lubwa RHC based on the prevailing disease burden in the catchment area. 
 







In Task 2 we are asking you to make your own allocation decisions (choose your own 
percentages) to Lubwa RHC for the medicine items in Table 2, which could be the same as the 
optimal allocation in Table 2 or whatever you deem better. Note that your allocation may be 
randomly selected, actually bought and sent to Lubwa RHC in October 2018. 
Recall from Task 1 that there are two budgets for which we ask you to make your allocation 
decisions: Budget 1 and Budget 2. You can freely allocate between 0% and 100% of the 
respective budget to any of the five medicines on the list, with the restriction that all percentages 
for a given budget need to sum to exactly 100%. 
Important: At the end of all the sessions of this study, we will randomly draw one of the 
participants’ ID numbers. We will then actually buy and send the corresponding allocated 
medicine of both Budget 1 and Budget 2 to Lubwa RHC. The RHC is located in a rural area 
whose catchment population has very limited access to medical services. Your allocation choice 
will therefore have a real impact on the available medicine in Lubwa RHC. 
All participants will be invited via e-mail or SMS to watch this random draw.  
Medication 
Percentage of Total Cost per 
Month 
Paracetamol 12% 
Oral Rehydration Salts 50 % 
Amoxil 21 % 
Piriton 3 % 
Metronidazole (Flagyl) 14 % 
 Total: 100% 
51
 
To this end, the research team will work closely with the Ministry of Health, to purchase the 
medicines on the list and donate them to the Lubwa RHC exactly as per the randomly chosen 
participant’s allocation decisions. An official letter from the Ministry of Health will be available 
for all participants to see at the notice board of the School of Public Health (UTH). 
This donation will be financed from research funds provided by German Academic Exchange 








General Instructions for the Participants 
 
 
You are now taking part in an economic and health-related study. Depending on your decision-
making and chance you can earn a substantial amount of money. For this, it is important that you 
read the following instructions carefully.  
The instructions you were given are exclusively for your private information and have to be given 
back after the study. During the study it is strictly forbidden to talk. If you have any questions, 
please raise your hand, and then one of the researchers will come to you and answer your questions 
in private. 
Please be aware that your mobile phone and all other electronic devices have to be switched off. 
Any violation of these rules will lead to the exclusion from the study and from any payments. 
All your decisions in the study are made anonymously. No other participant will be able to match 
your decisions with your identity. 
For your participation in the study you will get a guaranteed show-up fee of 50 Kwacha. Any 
additional payments depend on chance and your own decision-making. 
There will be two decision-making tasks in this study, Task 1 and Task 2. These two tasks are 
interrelated and a budget that you generate in Task 1 will be carried over for the decision-making 
in Task 2. There is a chance that your decision in Task 2 will result in an actual, real allocation of 
medicine to a Rural Health Centre, so we ask you to pay close attention to the following 
instructions. 
After all participants have made their decisions, we will ask you some questions in a questionnaire. 








There are two budgets in this study, Budget 1 and Budget 2. In Task 2 you will use these two 
budgets to allocate actual medicine to a real rural health centre: Lubwa Rural Health Centre in 
Chinsali District, Muchinga Province. 
Budget 1 is always fixed at 1,000 Kwacha. 
However, you are able to determine the size of Budget 2 in this Task 1. 
Task 1 involves a sample Health Information Aggregation 1 (HIA.1) form. In completing the 
HIA.1 form, you will be asked to sum the entries in each row of the form and enter the total 
into the respective grey-shaded boxes. 
Each correctly summed row of entries in the HIA.1 form will add 50 Kwacha to your Budget 
2. That is, the number of all correctly summed entries will determine your Budget 2. 
Example 1: If you fill in 15 grey-shaded boxes correctly, your Budget 2 will be 15*50 Kwacha = 
750 Kwacha. 
Example 2: If you fill in 41 grey-shaded boxes correctly, your Budget 2 will be 41*50 Kwacha = 
2050 Kwacha. 
In the example in Table 1, the correctly summed row total is 2+6+3=11. This one correctly 
summed row would add 50 Kwacha to your Budget 2. The more rows you sum correctly in the 
given time, the greater will be your Budget 2. 
Table 1. Short Sample HIA.1 Form. 
  OPD First Attendance 
DIAGNOSES Under 1 year 1-5 years 6+ Years Total 
          
NOTIFIABLE DISEASES         
Acute flaccid paralysis 2 6 3 11 
Cholera 23 10 22  
… … … …   
 
Each participant will be given exactly 8 minutes within which to complete as many summations 
as she/he likes and can manage. 
Exercise: 
Question 1: How large will Budget 1 be if you sum 19 rows correctly? Answer: K ________ 







In Task 2, you will be presented with a list of consumed medicines in a Zambian Rural Health 
Centre (RHC), as well as an estimate of the proportions (in %) of the costs of these medicines. 
Below we present you actual medicine consumption data from Lubwa RHC (catchment 
population: 9,500), Chinsali District, Muchinga Province, Zambia, in one month (Table 2). 
Please be aware that the distribution below represents an optimal allocation of health 
resources to Lubwa RHC based on the prevailing disease burden in the catchment area. 
 







In Task 2 we are asking you to make your own allocation decisions (choose your own 
percentages) to Lubwa RHC for the medicine items in Table 2, which could be the same as the 
optimal allocation in Table 2 or whatever you deem better. Note that your allocation may be 
randomly selected, actually bought and sent to Lubwa RHC in October 2018. 
Recall from Task 1 that there are two budgets for which we ask you to make your allocation 
decisions: Budget 1 and Budget 2. You can freely allocate between 0% and 100% of the 
respective budget to any of the five medicines on the list, with the restriction that all percentages 
for a given budget need to sum to exactly 100%. 
Let us explain how you can earn extra money in Task 2. In addition to the 50 Kwacha 
participation fee, you will have the opportunity to earn extra money, depending on your 
allocation decisions of medicines. There are two factors which influence your earnings: 
(1) First, your earnings depend on the size of Budget 2 – that is, the larger Budget 2 which 
you generated in Task 1, the more money you can potentially earn.  
(2) The more Amoxil you allocate to the RHC, the more money you will earn. 
Medication 
Percentage of Total Cost per 
Month 
Paracetamol 12% 
Oral Rehydration Salts 50 % 
Amoxil 21 % 
Piriton 3 % 
Metronidazole (Flagyl) 14 % 




The exact formula for your additional earnings is 
(𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 1)
4000
∗ % 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 1 +
(𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 2)
4000
∗ % 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 2 = 𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 
 
Example 1: Let’s assume that your Budget 2 is 2,000 Kwacha. If you allocate 10% of Budget 1 






∗ 20 = 2.5 + 10 = 𝟏𝟐. 𝟓 𝑲𝒘𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒂 
 
Example 2: Let’s assume that your Budget 2 is 3,000 Kwacha. If you allocate 70% of Budget 1 






∗ 20 = 17.5 + 15 = 𝟑𝟐. 𝟓 𝑲𝒘𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒂 
 
Important: At the end of all the sessions of this study, we will randomly draw one of the 
participants’ ID numbers. We will then actually buy and send the corresponding allocated 
medicine of both Budget 1 and Budget 2 to Lubwa RHC. The RHC is located in a rural area 
whose catchment population has very limited access to medical services. Your allocation choice 
will therefore have a real impact on the available medicine in Lubwa RHC. 
All participants will be invited via e-mail or SMS to watch this random draw. 
To this end, the research team will work closely with the Ministry of Health, to purchase the 
medicines on the list and donate them to the Lubwa RHC exactly as per the randomly chosen 
participant’s allocation decisions. An official letter from the Ministry of Health will be available 
for all participants to see at the notice board of the School of Public Health (UTH). 
This donation will be financed from research funds provided by German Academic Exchange 
Service (DAAD), Germany. 
Exercise: Assume your Budget 2 is 2,000 Kwacha. In addition to the 50 Kwacha for participation, 
how much extra money will you earn if you allocate 40% of Budget 1 to Amoxil and 10% of 
Budget 2 to Amoxil? 
Please fill in the blanks:  
(                 )
4,000
∗ (             ) +
(                 )
4,000







General Instructions for the Participants 
 
 
You are now taking part in an economic and health-related study. Depending on your decision-
making and chance you can earn a substantial amount of money. For this, it is important that you 
read the following instructions carefully.  
The instructions you were given are exclusively for your private information and have to be given 
back after the study. During the study it is strictly forbidden to talk. If you have any questions, 
please raise your hand, and then one of the researchers will come to you and answer your questions 
in private. 
Please be aware that your mobile phone and all other electronic devices have to be switched off. 
Any violation of these rules will lead to your exclusion from the study and from any payments. 
All your decisions in the study are made anonymously. No other participant will be able to match 
your decisions with your identity. 
For your participation in the study you will get a guaranteed show-up fee of 50 Kwacha. Any 
additional payments depend on chance and your own decision-making. 
There will be two decision-making tasks in this study, Task 1 and Task 2. These two tasks are 
interrelated and a budget that you generate in Task 1 will be carried over for the decision-making 
in Task 2. There is a chance that your decision in Task 2 will result in an actual, real allocation of 
medicine to a Rural Health Centre, so we ask you to pay close attention to the following 
instructions. 
After all participants have made their decisions, we will ask you some questions in a questionnaire. 








There are two budgets in this study, Budget 1 and Budget 2. In Task 2 you will use these two 
budgets to allocate actual medicine to a real rural health centre: Lubwa Rural Health Centre in 
Chinsali District, Muchinga Province. 
Budget 1 is always fixed at 1,000 Kwacha. 
However, you are able to determine the size of Budget 2 in this Task 1. 
Task 1 involves a sample Health Information Aggregation 1 (HIA.1) form. In completing the 
HIA.1 form, you will be asked to sum the entries in each row of the form and enter the total 
into the respective grey-shaded boxes. 
Each correctly summed row of entries in the HIA.1 form will add 50 Kwacha to your Budget 
2. That is, the number of all correctly summed entries will determine your Budget 2. 
Example 1: If you fill in 15 grey-shaded boxes correctly, your Budget 2 will be 15*50 Kwacha = 
750 Kwacha. 
Example 2: If you fill in 41 grey-shaded boxes correctly, your Budget 2 will be 41*50 Kwacha = 
2050 Kwacha. 
In the example in Table 1, the correctly summed row total is 2+6+3=11. This one correctly 
summed row would add 50 Kwacha to your Budget 2. The more rows you sum correctly in the 
given time, the greater will be your Budget 2. 
Table 1. Short Sample HIA.1 Form. 
  OPD First Attendance 
DIAGNOSES Under 1 year 1-5 years 6+ Years Total 
          
NOTIFIABLE DISEASES         
Acute flaccid paralysis 2 6 3 11 
Cholera 23 10 22  
… … … …   
 
Each participant will be given exactly 8 minutes within which to complete as many summations 
as she/he likes and can manage. 
Exercise: 
Question 1: How large will Budget 1 be if you sum 19 rows correctly? Answer: K ________ 







In Task 2, you will be presented with a list of consumed medicines in a Zambian Rural Health 
Centre (RHC), as well as an estimate of the proportions (in %) of the costs of these medicines. 
Below we present you actual medicine consumption data from Lubwa RHC (catchment 
population: 9,500), Chinsali District, Muchinga Province, Zambia, in one month (Table 2). 
Please be aware that the distribution below represents an optimal allocation of health 
resources to Lubwa RHC based on the prevailing disease burden in the catchment area. 
 







In Task 2 we are asking you to make your own allocation decisions (choose your own 
percentages) to Lubwa RHC for the medicine items in Table 2, which could be the same as the 
optimal allocation in Table 2 or whatever you deem better. Note that your allocation may be 
randomly selected, actually bought and sent to Lubwa RHC in August 2019. 
Recall from Task 1 that there are two budgets for which we ask you to make your allocation 
decisions: Budget 1 and Budget 2. You can freely allocate between 0% and 100% of the 
respective budget to any of the five medicines on the list, with the restriction that all percentages 
for a given budget need to sum to exactly 100%. 
Let us explain how you can earn extra money in Task 2. In addition to the 50 Kwacha 
participation fee, you will have the opportunity to earn extra money, depending on your 
allocation decisions of medicines. There are two factors which influence your earnings: 
(1) First, your earnings depend on the size of Budget 2 – that is, the larger Budget 2 which 
you generated in Task 1, the more money you can potentially earn.  
(2) The more Metronidazole (Flagyl) you allocate to the RHC, the more money you will 
earn. 
Medication 
Percentage of Total Cost per 
Month 
Paracetamol 12% 
Oral Rehydration Salts 50 % 
Amoxil 21 % 
Piriton 3 % 
Metronidazole (Flagyl) 14 % 




The exact formula for your additional earnings is 
(𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 1)
4000
∗ % 𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑦𝑙𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 1 +
(𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 2)
4000
∗ % 𝐹𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑦𝑙𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 2 = 𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 
 
Example 1: Let’s assume that your Budget 2 is 2,000 Kwacha. If you allocate 10% of Budget 1 






∗ 20 = 2.5 + 10 = 𝟏𝟐. 𝟓 𝑲𝒘𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒂 
 
Example 2: Let’s assume that your Budget 2 is 3,000 Kwacha. If you allocate 70% of Budget 1 






∗ 20 = 17.5 + 15 = 𝟑𝟐. 𝟓 𝑲𝒘𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒂 
 
Important: At the end of all the sessions of this study, we will randomly draw one of the 
participants’ ID numbers. We will then actually buy and send the corresponding allocated 
medicine of both Budget 1 and Budget 2 to Lubwa RHC. The RHC is located in a rural area 
whose catchment population has very limited access to medical services. Your allocation choice 
will therefore have a real impact on the available medicine in Lubwa RHC. 
All participants will be invited via e-mail or SMS to watch this random draw. 
To this end, the research team will work closely with the Ministry of Health, to purchase the 
medicines on the list and donate them to the Lubwa RHC exactly as per the randomly chosen 
participant’s allocation decisions. An official letter from the Ministry of Health will be available 
for all participants to see at the notice board of the School of Public Health (UTH). 
This donation will be financed from research funds provided by German Academic Exchange 
Service (DAAD), Germany and the International Growth Centre (IGC). 
Exercise: Assume your Budget 2 is 2,000 Kwacha. In addition to the 50 Kwacha for participation, 
how much extra money will you earn if you allocate 40% of Budget 1 to Metronidazole (Flagyl) 
and 10% of Budget 2 to Metronidazole (Flagyl)? 
Please fill in the blanks:  
(                 )
4,000
∗ (             ) +
(                 )
4,000







General Instructions for the Participants 
 
 
You are now taking part in an economic and health-related study. Depending on your decision-
making and chance you can earn a substantial amount of money. For this, it is important that you 
read the following instructions carefully.  
The instructions you were given are exclusively for your private information and have to be given 
back after the study. During the study it is strictly forbidden to talk. If you have any questions, 
please raise your hand, and then one of the researchers will come to you and answer your questions 
in private. 
Please be aware that your mobile phone and all other electronic devices have to be switched off. 
Any violation of these rules will lead to your exclusion from the study and from any payments. 
All your decisions in the study are made anonymously. No other participant will be able to match 
your decisions with your identity. 
For your participation in the study you will get a guaranteed show-up fee of 50 Kwacha. Any 
additional payments depend on chance and your own decision-making. 
There will be two decision-making tasks in this study, Task 1 and Task 2. These two tasks are 
interrelated and a budget that you generate in Task 1 will be carried over for the decision-making 
in Task 2. There is a chance that your decision in Task 2 will result in an actual, real allocation of 
medicine to a Rural Health Centre, so we ask you to pay close attention to the following 
instructions. 
After all participants have made their decisions, we will ask you some questions in a questionnaire. 








There are two budgets in this study, Budget 1 and Budget 2. In Task 2 you will use these two 
budgets to allocate actual medicine to a real rural health centre: Lubwa Rural Health Centre in 
Chinsali District, Muchinga Province. 
Budget 1 is always fixed at 1,000 Kwacha. 
However, you are able to determine the size of Budget 2 in this Task 1. 
Task 1 involves a sample Health Information Aggregation 1 (HIA.1) form. In completing the 
HIA.1 form, you will be asked to sum the entries in each row of the form and enter the total 
into the respective grey-shaded boxes. 
Each correctly summed row of entries in the HIA.1 form will add 50 Kwacha to your Budget 
2. That is, the number of all correctly summed entries will determine your Budget 2. 
Example 1: If you fill in 15 grey-shaded boxes correctly, your Budget 2 will be 15*50 Kwacha = 
750 Kwacha. 
Example 2: If you fill in 41 grey-shaded boxes correctly, your Budget 2 will be 41*50 Kwacha = 
2050 Kwacha. 
In the example in Table 1, the correctly summed row total is 2+6+3=11. This one correctly 
summed row would add 50 Kwacha to your Budget 2. The more rows you sum correctly in the 
given time, the greater will be your Budget 2. 
Table 1. Short Sample HIA.1 Form. 
  OPD First Attendance 
DIAGNOSES Under 1 year 1-5 years 6+ Years Total 
          
NOTIFIABLE DISEASES         
Acute flaccid paralysis 2 6 3 11 
Cholera 23 10 22  
… … … …   
 
Each participant will be given exactly 8 minutes within which to complete as many summations 
as she/he likes and can manage. 
Exercise: 
Question 1: How large will Budget 1 be if you sum 19 rows correctly? Answer: K ________ 







In Task 2, you will be presented with a list of consumed medicines in a Zambian Rural Health 
Centre (RHC), as well as an estimate of the proportions (in %) of the costs of these medicines. 
Below we present you actual medicine consumption data from Lubwa RHC (catchment 
population: 9,500), Chinsali District, Muchinga Province, Zambia, in one month (Table 2). 
Please be aware that the distribution below represents an optimal allocation of health 
resources to Lubwa RHC based on the prevailing disease burden in the catchment area. 
 







In Task 2 we are asking you to make your own allocation decisions (choose your own 
percentages) to Lubwa RHC for the medicine items in Table 2, which could be the same as the 
optimal allocation in Table 2 or whatever you deem better. Note that your allocation may be 
randomly selected, actually bought and sent to Lubwa RHC in October 2018. 
Recall from Task 1 that there are two budgets for which we ask you to make your allocation 
decisions: Budget 1 and Budget 2. You can freely allocate between 0% and 100% of the 
respective budget to any of the five medicines on the list, with the restriction that all percentages 
for a given budget need to sum to exactly 100%. 
Let us explain how you can earn extra money in Task 2. In addition to the 50 Kwacha 
participation fee, you will have the opportunity to earn extra money, depending on your 
allocation decisions of medicines. There are two factors which influence your earnings: 
(1) First, your earnings depend on the size of Budget 2 – that is, the larger Budget 2 which 
you generated in Task 1, the more money you can potentially earn.  
(2) The more Amoxil you allocate to the RHC, the more money you will earn. 
Medication 
Percentage of Total Cost per 
Month 
Paracetamol 12% 
Oral Rehydration Salts 50 % 
Amoxil  21 % 
Piriton 3 % 
Metronidazole (Flagyl) 14 % 
 Total: 100% 
66
 
The exact formula for your additional earnings is: 
(𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 1)
4000
∗ % 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑙𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 1 +
(𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 2)
4000
∗ % 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑙𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 2 = 𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 
 
Example 1: Let’s assume that your Budget 2 is 2,000 Kwacha. If you allocate 10% of Budget 1 






∗ 20 = 2.5 + 10 = 𝟏𝟐. 𝟓 𝑲𝒘𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒂 
 
Example 2: Let’s assume that your Budget 2 is 3,000 Kwacha. If you allocate 70% of Budget 1 






∗ 20 = 17.5 + 15 = 𝟑𝟐. 𝟓 𝑲𝒘𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒂 
 
Important: As mentioned earlier, at the end of all the sessions of this study, we will randomly 
draw one of the participants’ ID numbers. We will then actually buy and send the corresponding 
allocated medicine of both Budget 1 and Budget 2 to Lubwa RHC. The RHC is located in a 
rural area whose catchment population has very limited access to medical services. Your allocation 
choice will therefore have a real impact on the available medicine in Lubwa RHC. 
All participants will be invited via e-mail or SMS to watch this random draw. Afterwards, we will 
inform all other participants via e-mail or SMS of the exact allocation of medicines (in %) 
of the randomly drawn participant, if an allocation from this session is drawn. 
To this end, the research team will work closely with the Ministry of Health, to purchase the 
medicines on the list and donate them to the Lubwa RHC exactly as per the randomly chosen 
participant’s allocation decisions. An official letter from the Ministry of Health will be available 
for all participants to see at the notice board of the School of Public Health (UTH). 
This donation will be financed from research funds provided by the German Academic Exchange 
Service (DAAD), Germany. 
Exercise: Assume your Budget 2 is 2,000 Kwacha. In addition to the 50 Kwacha for participation, 
how much extra money will you earn if you allocate 40% of Budget 1 to Amoxil and 10% of 
Budget 2 to Amoxil? 
Please fill in the blanks:  
(                 )
4,000
∗ (             ) +
(                 )
4,000




ID Number  
 
The following statements concerning the importance of professionalism for health professionals 
in Zambia, are taken from the Health Professions Council of Zambia, Professional Code of Ethics 
and Discipline: Fitness to Practice (2014). 
• A health professional should allocate available resources to the promotion of good 
medical practice and the maintenance of such health practitioner’s professional 
competence. 
• A health professional should undertake to discharge his/her professional duties diligently 
and in a manner that best considers the welfare of the patient/client. 
• A health professional should observe proper standards of personal behaviour, not only 
in professional activities, but at all times. 
• A health practitioner is required to uphold honest behaviour at all times. 
• Health practitioners are expected to behave in ways acceptable for the conduct of their 
profession. 
• A health practitioner should not only choose but shall also be seen to be choosing the 
drug, appliance or goods which, in his/her independent professional judgement and 
having due regard to economy, will best serve the medical/health interest of his/her 
patient/client. 
• The professional relationship between the health practitioner and his/ her patient/client 
depends on trust and the assumption that the health practitioner will act in the best 
interests of the patient/client.  
In light of the above, you are requested to compose one sentence, in your own words, reflecting 














General Instructions for the Participants 
 
 
You are now taking part in an economic and health-related study. Depending on your decision-
making and chance you can earn a substantial amount of money. For this, it is important that you 
read the following instructions carefully.  
The instructions you were given are exclusively for your private information and have to be given 
back after the study. During the study it is strictly forbidden to talk. If you have any questions, 
please raise your hand, and then one of the researchers will come to you and answer your questions 
in private. 
Please be aware that your mobile phone and all other electronic devices have to be switched off. 
Any violation of these rules will lead to your exclusion from the study and from any payments. 
All your decisions in the study are made anonymously. No other participant will be able to match 
your decisions with your identity. 
For your participation in the study you will get a guaranteed show-up fee of 50 Kwacha. Any 
additional payments depend on chance and your own decision-making. 
There will be two decision-making tasks in this study, Task 1 and Task 2. These two tasks are 
interrelated and a budget that you generate in Task 1 will be carried over for the decision-making 
in Task 2. There is a chance that your decision in Task 2 will result in an actual, real allocation of 
medicine to a Rural Health Centre, so we ask you to pay close attention to the following 
instructions. 
After all participants have made their decisions, we will ask you some questions in a questionnaire. 








There are two budgets in this study, Budget 1 and Budget 2. In Task 2 you will use these two 
budgets to allocate actual medicine to a real rural health centre: Lubwa Rural Health Centre in 
Chinsali District, Muchinga Province. 
Budget 1 is always fixed at 1,000 Kwacha. 
However, you are able to determine the size of Budget 2 in this Task 1. 
Task 1 involves a sample Health Information Aggregation 1 (HIA.1) form. In completing the 
HIA.1 form, you will be asked to sum the entries in each row of the form and enter the total 
into the respective grey-shaded boxes. 
Each correctly summed row of entries in the HIA.1 form will add 50 Kwacha to your Budget 
2. That is, the number of all correctly summed entries will determine your Budget 2. 
Example 1: If you fill in 15 grey-shaded boxes correctly, your Budget 2 will be 15*50 Kwacha = 
750 Kwacha. 
Example 2: If you fill in 41 grey-shaded boxes correctly, your Budget 2 will be 41*50 Kwacha = 
2050 Kwacha. 
In the example in Table 1, the correctly summed row total is 2+6+3=11. This one correctly 
summed row would add 50 Kwacha to your Budget 2. The more rows you sum correctly in the 
given time, the greater will be your Budget 2. 
Table 1. Short Sample HIA.1 Form. 
  OPD First Attendance 
DIAGNOSES Under 1 year 1-5 years 6+ Years Total 
          
NOTIFIABLE DISEASES         
Acute flaccid paralysis 2 6 3 11 
Cholera 23 10 22  
… … … …   
 
Each participant will be given exactly 8 minutes within which to complete as many summations 
as she/he likes and can manage. 
Exercise: 
Question 1: How large will Budget 1 be if you sum 19 rows correctly? Answer: K ________ 







In Task 2, you will be presented with a list of consumed medicines in a Zambian Rural Health 
Centre (RHC), as well as an estimate of the proportions (in %) of the costs of these medicines. 
Below we present you actual medicine consumption data from Lubwa RHC (catchment 
population: 9,500), Chinsali District, Muchinga Province, Zambia, in one month (Table 2). 
Please be aware that the distribution below represents an optimal allocation of health 
resources to Lubwa RHC based on the prevailing disease burden in the catchment area. 
 
Table 2: Percentages of Costs per Month for Five Consumed Medicines, Lubwa RHC. 
 
In Task 2 we are asking you to make your own allocation decisions (choose your own 
percentages) to Lubwa RHC for the medicine items in Table 2, which could be the same as the 
optimal allocation in Table 2 or whatever you deem better. Note that your allocation may be 
randomly selected, actually bought and sent to Lubwa RHC in August 2019. 
Recall from Task 1 that there are two budgets for which we ask you to make your allocation 
decisions: Budget 1 and Budget 2. You can freely allocate between 0% and 100% of the 
respective budget to any of the five medicines on the list, with the restriction that all percentages 
for a given budget need to sum to exactly 100%. 
Table 3 below shows the percentage of women with knowledge of Oral Rehydration Salts (ORS) 
and the percentage of children with diarrhoea actually given ORS. This information is reported 
both generally for Zambia as well as for Muchinga province, the province where Lubwa RHC is 
located. The table reveals that while the percentage of women with knowledge of ORS seems to 
point to it being a good treatment option for diarrheal diseases, the percentage of children with 
diarrhoea actually given ORS is lower than the national average and seems to point to a need for 
more ORS to be provided. 
Medication Percentage of Total Cost per Month 
Paracetamol 12% 
Oral Rehydration Salts 50 % 
Amoxil 21 % 
Piriton 3 % 
Metronidazole (Flagyl) 14 % 
 Total: 100% 
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Table 3: Knowledge and Use of ORS: Zambia and Muchinga province 
 
Percentage of women 
with knowledge of ORS 
packets 
Percentage of children with 
diarrhoea given ORS 
Muchinga province 95% 51% 
Zambia 97% 64% 
Source: Central Statistical Office 
Now, let us explain how you can earn extra money in Task 2. In addition to the 50 Kwacha 
participation fee, you will have the opportunity to earn extra money, depending on your 
allocation decisions of medicines. There are two factors which influence your earnings: 
(1) First, your earnings depend on the size of Budget 2 – that is, the larger Budget 2 which 
you generated in Task 1, the more money you can potentially earn.  
(2) The more Amoxil you allocate to the RHC, the more money you will earn. 
The exact formula for your additional earnings is 
(𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 1)
4000
∗ % 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑙𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 1 +
(𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 2)
4000
∗ % 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑙𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 2 = 𝑌𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 
Example 1: Let’s assume that your Budget 2 is 2,000 Kwacha. If you allocate 10% of Budget 1 






∗ 20 = 2.5 + 10 = 𝟏𝟐. 𝟓 𝑲𝒘𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒂 
Example 2: Let’s assume that your Budget 2 is 3,000 Kwacha. If you allocate 70% of Budget 1 






∗ 20 = 17.5 + 15 = 𝟑𝟐. 𝟓 𝑲𝒘𝒂𝒄𝒉𝒂 
Important: At the end of all the sessions of this study, we will randomly draw one of the 
participants’ ID numbers. We will then actually buy and send the corresponding allocated 
medicine of both Budget 1 and Budget 2 to Lubwa RHC. The RHC is located in a rural area 
whose catchment population has very limited access to medical services. Your allocation choice 
will therefore have a real impact on the available medicine in Lubwa RHC. 
All participants will be invited via e-mail or SMS to watch this random draw. 
To this end, the research team will work closely with the Ministry of Health, to purchase the 
medicines on the list and donate them to the Lubwa RHC exactly as per the randomly chosen 
participant’s allocation decisions. An official letter from the Ministry of Health will be available 
for all participants to see at the notice board of the School of Public Health (UTH). 
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This donation will be financed from research funds provided by German Academic Exchange 
Service (DAAD), Germany and the International Growth Centre (IGC). 
Exercise: Assume your Budget 2 is 2,000 Kwacha. In addition to the 50 Kwacha for participation, 
how much extra money will you earn if you allocate 40% of Budget 1 to Amoxil and 10% of 
Budget 2 to Amoxil? 
Please fill in the blanks:  
(                 )
4,000
∗ (             ) +
(                 )
4,000
∗ (             )  = (          ) + (       ) =            (𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠) 
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Chapter 3
Comparing the Productivity of
Performance-based and
Unconditional Financial




Despite health programmes providing performance-based financial incentives to health-
care providers being a popular policy approach, evidence documenting their effectiveness
relative to alternative types of financial incentives, remains scarce. This study compares
infant birth outcomes in districts of Zambia where healthcare providers were randomised to
receive either performance-based financial incentives, unconditional financial transfers, or
conducted business as usual during the Results Based Financing pilot. It uses a Difference-
in-Differences design and four waves of nationally representative Demographic and Health
Survey data. Results reveal that performance-based and unconditional financial incentives
have remarkably similar effects on birth outcomes. Benefits are concentrated in babies of
women at higher risk of bearing low birthweight children. Triple difference and Regression
Discontinuity results are qualitatively similar. The findings imply that unconditional fi-
nancial incentives, which are more cost-effective, can also be an effective tool in improving
child health outcomes.
Keywords: Infant birth weight; Difference-in-differences; Unconditional and performance
based financial incentives
JEL Codes: I15, I12, J13
3.1 Introduction
Poor maternal and child health outcomes, particularly in low income developing coun-
tries, have propelled efforts to improve maternal and child health to the very top of the
global development agenda. This is exemplified by specific commitments made in the Sus-
tainable Development Goals (SDGs), such as reducing neonatal and under five mortality
to no more than 12 and 25 deaths per 100,000 live births by 2030 (United Nations, 2016).
In a quest to achieve this ambitious developmental agenda, health programmes involv-
ing the provision of performance-based financial incentives to healthcare providers have
emerged as a common policy tool. Informed by insights from principal-agent theory, an
inherent assumption within this policy response has been that paying healthcare providers
based on their performance is a superior work effort solicitation approach, relative to other
types of financial incentives. However, despite the popularity of this approach, evidence
documenting the effectiveness and sustainability of performance-based financial incentives,
particularly relative to alternative types of financial incentives, remains scarce.
This study investigates whether paying healthcare providers performance-based finan-
cial incentives is more effective in improving infant birth outcomes relative to paying
unconditional financial incentives in the context of a low income developing country, Zam-
bia. It exploits the district randomised rollout of the Results Based Financing (RBF)
programme in Zambia and utilises multiple rounds of Demographic and Health Survey
(DHS) data to estimate Difference-in-Differences (DD), Regression Discontinuity (RD)
and Triple-Difference (DDD) models. Results reveal that improvements in birthweight
and the probability of a low birthweight birth owing to the two types of financial incen-
tives, are comparable. Owing to this fact, unconditional financial incentives, which are less
costly, are found to be more cost-effective. Comparable gains in the quality of Antenatal
Care (ANC) owing to the two types of financial incentives, are identified as a potential
channel driving the results.
Like other low income developing countries, Zambia has continued to grapple with
poor maternal and child health outcomes. For example, approximately 27 infants per
1,000 live births die within the first 28 days after birth. Similarly, Zambia has among the
highest rates of maternal mortality worldwide, with approximately 278 women dying while
carrying and delivering their babies per 100,000 live births. Approximately 10% of infants
are born with low birthweight (Zambia Ministry of Health and IFC, 2019). Among other
factors, these maternal and child health outcomes have been linked to an unavailability of
essential medicines and medical supplies as well as low levels of motivation of healthcare
providers (Zambia Ministry of Health, 2017; Friedman et al., 2016). A leading policy
response has come in the form of health programmes that have involved performance-based
financial incentives being paid to healthcare providers. One such programme is the Results
Based Financing (RBF) programme, with an estimated $385.6 million being committed
for its implementation during the SDG (and their predecessor Millennium Development
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Goals, MDGs) implementation period.1 In this vein, the Zambia RBF pilot project was
implemented between 2012 and 2014. The ZRBF pilot aimed to enhance the quality of
maternal and child healthcare provision and increase provider morale, effort and ultimately
productivity primarily through the provision of performance-based financial incentives to
healthcare providers. This implies that during the ZRBF pilot, healthcare providers in
randomly selected Zambian districts received performance-based financial incentives based
on the achievement of pre-agreed targets on nine maternal and child health indicators,
including the provision of ANC visits to pregnant women. In-turn, healthcare providers in
yet another set of randomly selected districts received financial transfers independent of
their performance (unconditional financial incentives), while others received no financial
incentives at all and simply conducted business as usual (Shen et al., 2017; Friedman et al.,
2016).
Alternative insights from the theoretical and empirical literature, however, imply that
the productivity effects of the various types of financial incentives provided under the
ZRBF are a-priori unclear and are thus an open empirical issue. Standard principal-
agent theory in economics predicts that attaching an agent’s or worker’s compensation
directly to her effort ought to result in an increase in effort and thus productivity (Sap-
pington, 1991). However, evidence has revealed that such incentives can potentially have
unintended, distortionary effects, a phenomenon commonly known in the literature as mul-
titasking (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991), with similar distortion effects arising among
Zambian healthcare providers (Chibuye et al., 2021). Similarly, efficiency-wage theory in
economics asserts that workers granted above market clearing wages, that are uncondi-
tionally higher and independent of their effort may respond with a higher level of effort
(Akerlof, 1982). This implies that contrary to the policy rationale underlying RBF pro-
grammes, unconditional financial incentives may also induce work effort. This makes a
comparison of the productivity of the two types of financial incentives in improving health
outcomes an important undertaking with implications for the design of health programmes
involving the provision of financial incentives to healthcare providers and ultimately, the
achievement of the SDGs by 2030.
This study exploits the district randomised roll out of the ZRBF project to answer the
following question: when measured by increased birthweight and reduced low birthweight,
is it more productive to provide performance-based or unconditional financial incentives
to healthcare providers, relative to providing no incentives at all? The study utilises a DD
design, complemented with DDD and RD designs and four waves of nationally representa-
tive Zambia DHS data. Specifically, the study compares birthweight and the probability
of a low birthweight birth in districts in which healthcare providers were randomised to
receive performance-based or unconditional financial incentives to those districts in which
healthcare providers conducted business as usual. The study also explores the role of
the number, timing and quality of ANC visits, measured by the number of tetanus injec-
tions and whether or not a woman was weighed and had her blood pressure taken during
1https://www.rbfhealth.org/mission.
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pregnancy, as potential mechanisms driving the results.
To preview the results, the study finds that performance-based and unconditional fi-
nancial incentives to healthcare providers have comparable effects in improving infant
birth outcomes. Specifically, DD estimates suggest that birthweight increases by 32
grams in districts receiving performance-based financial incentives and by 45 grams in
districts receiving unconditional financial incentives. Similarly, while estimates suggest a
1.3 percentage-point reduction in the probability of a low birthweight birth in districts
receiving performance-based financial incentives, the same effect is 0.6 percentage-points
in districts receiving unconditional financial incentives. The comparability of these effects
implies that they are found to be statistically indistinguishable. However, none of the
above estimates are statistically significant. Furthermore, the study finds that improve-
ments in birthweight and low birthweight are concentrated in children born to women who
are at higher risk of bearing low birthweight children. This is evident from the fact that
estimates are larger and more statistically significant in these high impact sub-samples of
children born to women with either no education or only a primary education and women
younger than 20 years of age or older than 35 years of age. Indeed, estimates in these
sub-samples of children reveal increases in birthweight in both TU and TP districts of
between 29 and 207 grams and reductions in the probability of a low birthweight birth of
between 4 and 10 percentage points, respectively.
To investigate a channel potentially driving the above results, the study also shows
that improvements in the number and timing of ANC visits are mainly concentrated
in districts receiving performance-based financial incentives, with 0.4 more ANC visits,
conducted approximately 0.2 months earlier per pregnant woman, occurring in this group
of districts. However, the only dimension of ANC quality showing an improvement in
these districts is the probability of a woman having her blood pressure taken during
pregnancy, which increases by 6 percentage points. Similar effects are evident in districts
receiving unconditional financial incentives, with 0.3 more ANC visits conducted and
0.1 more tetanus injections being administered per pregnant woman and a 4 percentage
point increase in the probability of a woman being weighed during pregnancy. Thus,
while districts receiving performance-based financial incentives had a larger number of
earlier initiated ANC visits, the treatment may not have translated into commensurate
improvements in the quality of ANC visits.
One potential driver behind the pattern of results noted above could be multitasking
(Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). While healthcare providers received an explicit financial
incentive of $1.6 per ANC visit in performance-based districts, the quality of ANC was
only indirectly incentivised through a quality multiplier. Healthcare providers could have
thus focused more on the number of ANC visits, the aspect of their tasks directly attached
to the performance-based financial incentive. An improvement in the number and timing
of ANC visits without a commensurate improvement in the quality of the ANC visits thus
implies that birth outcomes in performance-based districts did not improve any more than
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they did in unconditional districts.
A critical implication of the above findings is that the gap between the productivity of
performance-based financial incentives to healthcare providers relative to unconditional fi-
nancial incentives, may not be as large as previously thought. Indeed, back of the envelope
cost-effectiveness calculations actually reveal that performance-based financial incentives
would have to be at least 5 times more effective, i.e. increase birthweight by 758 grams on
average, an implausibly large increase, to achieve a level of cost-effectiveness comparable to
that achieved by the unconditional financial incentives. To make performance-based finan-
cial incentive programmes more effective, policymakers may have to incur additional costs
of directly incentivising the quality of healthcare provision. Alternatively, consideration
can be given to unconditional financial incentives to achieve comparable improvements in
such health outcomes. The above insights have profound implications for the design of
health programs involving provision of financial incentives to healthcare providers and by
implication, the achievement of the SDGs by 2030.
The study focuses on birthweight given the importance of this metric as an overall
indicator for infant health. Annually, an estimated 16% of all infants globally and an
estimated 10% in Zambia, are born with low birthweight (Ohlsson and Shah, 2008; Zambia
Ministry of Health and IFC, 2019). Infants born with low birthweight have been found
to be at a higher risk of stillbirth, to be more likely to require neonatal intensive care,
have worse education outcomes and developmental difficulties and to be at higher risk
of death, later in their childhood (Zambia Ministry of Health and IFC, 2019; Chibwesha
et al., 2016; Currie and Almond, 2011). Improvements in birthweight thus represent a
single poignant mechanism in the quest to improve other important child health and
developmental outcomes.
This study contributes to three strands of the literature. Firstly, the study contributes to
a growing literature on healthcare provider financial incentives by investigating the impact
of performance-based financial incentives on actual health outcomes - birthweight and low
birthweight. Most studies in this literature investigate the impact of these programmes
on indicators of health service provision and not health outcomes (Basinga et al., 2011;
Friedman et al., 2016; Bonfrer et al., 2014; Miller et al., 2012). Secondly, by comparing
the effectiveness of performance-based to unconditional financial incentives, this study also
contributes to an important growing literature comparing the effectiveness of alternative
mechanisms of delivering social programmes such as conditional relative to unconditional
cash transfers on health outcomes (Pega et al., 2017) and on education outcomes (Baird
et al., 2014). A related literature also compares the effectiveness of different incentive types
such as performance-based relative to unconditional transfers to schools on education out-
comes (Mbiti et al., 2019), winner-take-all contests relative to proportional rewards (Singh
and Masters, 2020), career relative to pro-social incentives in improving health outcomes
(Ashraf et al., 2020), performance-based relative to non-financial incentives (Ashraf et al.,
2014) and block grants relative to performance-based incentives to communities (Olken
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et al., 2014). Thirdly, by assessing the impact of an RBF programme on birthweight and
low birthweight, this study also contributes to a growing literature assessing the impact of
social programmes such as conditional cash transfers on birth outcomes (Amarante et al.,
2016; Cardona-Sosa and Medina, 2017; Almond et al., 2011; Hoynes et al., 2011, 2015).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 3.2 discusses literature related to
the study, section 3.3 presents the context in which the ZRBF pilot project was under-
taken. Section 3.4 presents the data and descriptive statistics while section 3.5 presents
the identification strategy and empirical framework utilised in the analysis. Section 3.6
presents the main results of the study, while section 3.7 presents back of the envelope
cost-effectiveness calculations. Section 3.8 presents various sets of robustness checks, while
section 3.9 discusses the results and also concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
A key underlying hypothesis this study seeks to investigate, is whether the use of
performance-based and unconditional financial incentives, relative to conducting business
as usual, can result in healthcare providers having more morale and exerting greater work
effort, with these effects, in turn, improving the quality of healthcare provision and ulti-
mately resulting in improvements in infant birth outcomes. To this end, an examination
of three aspects of the literature, may enlighten this investigation.
3.2.1 Literature on Incentivising Economic Agents
As noted above, principal-agent theory in economics predicts that attaching an agents
compensation directly to their effort results in an increase in the agents effort and thus
productivity (Sappington, 1991). This has been found to hold in private firms (Lazear,
2000). These insights have contributed to an expansion in the use of performance-based
financial incentives in the public sector in general and in the public health sector in partic-
ular. However, challenges identified with these incentives have encompassed multitasking
effects discussed above, but have also included observations of the financial incentives
not being large enough to induce meaningful change (Friedman et al., 2016; Gneezy and
Rustichini, 2000).
A growing literature has investigated the use of performance-based financial incentives
to healthcare providers in RBF programmes (Basinga et al., 2011; Friedman et al., 2016;
Paul et al., 2018; Bonfrer et al., 2014; Gage and Bauhoff, 2021). However, most studies use
indicators of health service provision and quality as opposed to actual health outcomes as
the main outcome variables of interest.2 Indeed, even the original impact evaluation of the
Zambia RBF, Friedman et al. (2016), falls within this category. This implies that there
is relatively less evidence regarding the effects of performance-based financial incentives
2Utilising indicators of health service provision as opposed to health outcomes in provider performance
contracts has been argued to have some advantages in the contract theory literature (see for example, the
discussion in Miller and Babiarz (2013)).
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on actual health outcomes on the supply-side. An exception is Gertler and Vermeersch
(2012) who examine the effects of performance-based financial incentives to healthcare
providers on child weight-for-age and height-for-age in Rwanda. Gertler and Vermeersch
(2012) find a 0.53 of a standard deviation gain in weight-for-age and 0.25 of a standard
deviation gain in height-for-age, respectively.3 However, in addition to not investigating
infant birthweight, the design of the Rwanda RBF programme leveraged by Gertler and
Vermeersch (2012) did not permit a comparison of performance-based and unconditional
financial incentive arms to a business as usual control, as conducted in this study.
Despite unconditional financial incentives being less emphasised in the literature inves-
tigating RBF programmes, economic theory suggests that they too can potentially have
work effort inducing effects. For example, the gift exchange hypothesis, emanating from
efficiency-wage theory mentioned previously, has been established empirically in labora-
tory settings (Fehr et al., 1993, 1998) as well as in field settings (Gneezy and List, 2006).
Similarly, the behavioural economics literature has built on these insights and revealed
that public sector workers in the health sector may be intrinsically motivated for instance
by the mission of the organisation (Besley and Ghatak, 2005) or may have other regarding
preferences such as altruism (Godager and Wiesen, 2013) and other pro-social preferences
(Lagarde and Blaauw, 2014) and may thus not even require financial incentives in order to
exert higher effort levels, enhance their productivity and improve health outcomes. The
above thus points to the importance of a comparison of alternative modes of financial
incentivisation of healthcare providers.
3.2.2 Literature on Health and Social Programmes
To appreciate the link between improvements in the quality of healthcare provision and
improvements in infant birth outcomes, an appraisal of a strand of the health economics
literature may be instructive. Indeed, this literature puts forth two main factors that
influence infant birthweight; the length of time spent in the mother’s body (gestational
length) and the rate at which the foetus grows while in the mothers body or a combi-
nation of both (Kramer, 2003, 1987). This implies that an infant may be born with low
birthweight, which refers to a birthweight less than 2,500 grams, either owing to an in-
sufficient amount of time being spent in the mothers body, termed a preterm birth or,
to a slower than normal rate of growth while in the mothers body, a phenomenon known
in the literature as Intra-Uterine Growth Restriction - IUGR. The primary cause of low
birthweight in developing countries has been identified to be IUGR, with the deficiencies
in IUGR being exacerbated by factors such as maternal age and education. Specifically
children born to women younger than 20 years of age or older than 35 years of age as
well as women with low levels of education may be especially at risk (Kramer, 2003).
This insight has resulted in social and development programmes with a focus on alleviat-
3Additional studies investigate the productivity of other types of financial incentives in improving
actual health outcomes in other settings. For instance, Singh and Masters (2020) and Singh (2015) assess
the productivity of winner-take-all relative to proportional payments in improving child weight-for-age
malnutrition in India. Similarly, Miller et al. (2012) assess the productivity of performance-based provider
incentives to school principals to reduce child anaemia in China.
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ing so-called modifiable factors causing IUGR, being emphasised in developing countries.4
These programmes have included components emphasizing the provision of higher quality
healthcare in general and ANC in particular and the improvement of maternal nutrition
Kramer (1987). Indeed, by facilitating both early identification and timely treatment of
potentially harmful conditions during pregnancy, high quality ANC has been argued to
be a key factor in alleviating the effects of IUGR and thus improving both gestational
length, the rate of foetal growth and by implication, birthweight (Kramer, 1987). Thus,
healthcare providers exerting greater work effort in the provision of healthcare in response
to different financial incentives, can result in higher productivity in the alleviation of mod-
ifiable factors causing IUGR and ultimately to improvements in infant health outcomes.
An examination of the ANC channel is thus critical in understanding any improvements
in infant birth outcomes.
Building on insights from the health economics literature, numerous social programmes
have focused on the demand side, using financial and non-financial incentives such as
conditional or unconditional cash and in-kind transfers to encourage the utilisation of
higher quality healthcare in general and ANC in particular, improve maternal nutrition and
by implication, all associated maternal and child health outcomes. Closer to the current
study, several studies have investigated the impact of such demand-side health programmes
on infant birthweight.5 Almond et al. (2011) and Hoynes et al. (2011) assess the impacts of
the Food Stamp Programme (FSP) and the Supplemental Programme for Women, Infants
and Children (WIC), respectively, on birthweight in the United States. Both studies utilise
DD designs and exploit the differences in the timing of receipt of the respective programmes
across US counties overtime. Almond et al. (2011) find an increase in birthweight for
infants exposed to FSP during the third trimester of pregnancy, of approximately 2 grams
for white and 5 grams for African-American infants. Similarly, Hoynes et al. (2011) find
that WIC participation increases infant birthweight by approximately 2 grams, with no
impact on the infant low birthweight. An inherent weakness of such studies that use a
DD design and exploit variation in the timing of treatment as a basis of identification, is
that the variance weighted nature of the two-way fixed effects DD estimator implies that
with many groups and time periods and heterogeneous treatment effects overtime, some
units might receive negative weights, resulting in bias in the computation of the two-way
fixed effects DD treatment effect estimator (De Chaisemartin and d’Haultfoeuille, 2020;
Goodman-Bacon, 2021).6 By relying on the randomised roll-out of the original ZRBF pilot
instead of variation in the timing of treatment across districts, this study is not plagued
by this potential bias.
4Some factors, while important determinants of IUGR, are, unfortunately, be less amenable to modi-
fication. These include maternal and paternal height and maternal psychological factors.
5Another set of studies, for instance, Hoynes et al. (2015) investigate the effects of non-health programs
such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), a U.S programme that utilises the tax system to provide a
refundable income transfer to low-income households with children, on birthweight, finding a reduction in
low birthweight of between 0.17 to 0.31 percentage points and an increase in mean birthweight of around
6.4 grams.
6Callaway and Sant’Anna (2020) proposes an alternative estimator robust to bias resulting from het-
erogeneity of treatment effects in DD designs with variation in the timing of treatment. The source of
exogenous variation this study relies on does not require the use of this estimator.
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3.3 Context and Program Description
Despite recording encouraging progress in the recent past, Zambia, like other low-income
developing countries, continues to face numerous health system challenges. These are
reflected in the fact that indicators of health status are disconcertingly high and the pace
of their improvement overtime has been lacklustre. For instance, as of 2018, the rate of
neonatal deaths,7 stood at 27 deaths per 1,000 live births, an increase from 24 deaths
per 1,000 live births in 2014. Similarly, under-age 5 mortality stood at 61 deaths per
1,000 live births, a decline from 75 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2014. The maternal
mortality ratio stood at 278 deaths per 100,000 live births, a decline from 398 deaths
per 100,000 live births in 2014, while approximately 10% of infants were born with low
birthweight (Zambia Ministry of Health and IFC, 2019). Factors that have been identified
as underlying the lacklustre performance of the Zambian health system include; a shortage
of appropriately qualified human resource, poor motivation of said human resource, often
manifesting in the form of high rates of absenteeism, lack of punctuality and low morale
as well as inconsistent availability of essential medications and medical supplies (Zambia




Figure 3.3.1: Districts by Treatment
In an attempt to improve the performance of the health sector, boost health outcomes
and improve progress towards the attainment of MDG four and five, the ZRBF pilot
project was implemented between April 2012 and October 2014. The RBF approach in-
volves a principal entity providing financial or in-kind rewards to an agent, contingent on
the agent achieving pre-specified targets (Friedman et al., 2016). The ZRBF pilot was
accompanied by an impact evaluation in which 30 districts in Zambia were randomised
7An infant death within the first 28 days after live birth.
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into three conditions; in ten districts, individual healthcare providers, their health fa-
cilities and their respective responsible district health administrations, were randomised
to receive performance-based financial incentives (TP). In another ten districts, health-
care providers were randomised to receive unconditional financial incentives (TU) and
in another ten districts, healthcare providers received no financial incentives of any sort
at all.8 The distribution of districts by treatment is shown graphically in figure 3.3.1.
The ultimate aim of the ZRBF pilot was to improve health outcomes by among other
things, increasing the productivity of existing healthcare providers. While this remained
the stated ultimate goal, in reality, the programme and impact evaluation instead only
focused on the indicators of healthcare utilisation selected for incentivisation. Among
the nine incentivised indicators of healthcare utilisation incentivised in TP districts, were
ANC visits.9 This implies that in TP districts, healthcare providers received $1.6 dollars
per pregnant women per ANC visit conducted and thus, were specifically incentivised to
increase utilisation of ANC, a key component in the improvement of infant birthweight.
Providers in TU districts on the other hand, unconditionally received increased financial
incentives and the remaining districts received no financial incentives to improve ANC
utilisation. This explicit incentivisation of ANC in TP districts and the lack thereof in
TU and control districts, implies that healthcare providers effort and morale, the quantity
and quality of ANC and in turn, birth weight and the prevalence of low birthweight, should
have improved much more in TP districts relative to both TU and control districts. It
is this hypothesized response to different types of financial incentives that this study sets
out to empirically investigate.
3.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The main data source used in this study is the Zambia Demographic and Health Survey
(ZDHS). Specifically, four waves of nationally representative ZDHS datasets over the years
1996, 2001 and 2007, before the ZRBF and 2014, at the end of ZRBF implementation, are
utilised. The DHS is a nationally representative household survey funded by the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented in collaboration
with national governments in over 90 developing countries. The survey collects indicators
on the health and nutrition of the population, with a specific focus on women aged 15-49
years old and their children.
8Healthcare providers in TP districts received both individual and health facility-level performance
contracts. Health facilities could utilise a minimum of 40% of their performance-based earnings to improve
healthcare provision within their health facilities. A maximum of 60% of their performance-based earnings
could be given to the individual healthcare providers, depending on their individual performance. Health-
care providers in unconditional districts were guaranteed to receive approximately 50% of the financial
incentives received by the TP districts, irrespective of their performance. Both TP and TU type districts
also received maternal and child health medical equipment to improve healthcare provision (Friedman
et al., 2016).
9The other incentivised indicators included; curative consultation, institutional deliveries by a skilled
provider, post-natal visits, full immunization of children aged at most one year, pregnant women receiving
three doses of malaria prophylaxis, the number of women using modern contraceptive methods, pregnant
women tested for HIV and the number of HIV positive pregnant women given anti-retroviral therapy
prophylaxis.
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Table 3.4.1: Baseline (2007) Means and Changes in Sample Characteristics
Variable TU TP Cons. Control P-value: ∆ TP = ∆ TU
Low birth weight 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.79
(0.27) (0.29) (0.29)
Birth weight (Grams) 3390.43 3243.51 3219.85 0.48
(735.60) (636.09) (645.09)
Multiple-births 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.04
(0.16) (0.22) (0.19)
Child aged U-3 0.26 0.28 0.26 0.06
(0.44) (0.45) (0.44)
Child Female 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.69
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Birth Order 3.40 3.40 3.28 0.92
(2.23) (2.29) (2.23)
Mothers age 34.93 34.49 34.51 0.25
(8.23) (8.06) (8.14)
Numb. ANC visits 4.08 4.08 3.97 0.80
(1.49) (1.53) (1.65)
Numb. HH members 6.19 6.59 6.66 0.03
(2.29) (2.88) (2.74)
Numb. Children aged U-5 1.50 1.60 1.49 0.04
(0.96) (1.02) (1.06)
Improved water 0.22 0.27 0.45 0.95
(0.41) (0.44) (0.50)
Female HH head 0.25 0.20 0.22 0.60
(0.44) (0.40) (0.42)
Age of HH head 41.69 41.80 41.80 0.58
(10.78) (11.44) (10.96)
Urban residence 0.16 0.13 0.41 0.24
(0.36) (0.34) (0.49)
Notes: This table shows means for TP, TU and consolidated control districts for sample characteristics at
baseline (2007). The p-values in column 4 are generated from linear regressions with each respective variable
in the row as the outcome variable regressed on a treatment indicator and year indicator interaction and dis-
trict fixed effects (standard errors are clustered at the district level). The p-values are generated from t-tests
of the difference between the TP and TU coefficients, where each coefficient measures the change in the out-
come between each treatment and the control group. The categorical variables not shown in the table are;
mothers highest level of education (primary across all treatments and control) and whether the woman has
currently/formerly or has never been in a marital union (currently in a union across treatments and control).
Birth order refers to the order in which a woman’s children are born, beginning from her first birth.
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The DHS survey collects information on a wide array of topics ranging from fertility,
maternal and child health, HIV/AIDS and nutrition.10 Specifically, the birth recode (BR)
of the various Demographic and Health Surveys is used in this study. The BR contains
information on the health status, including the birthweight, of each and every birth (child
born) to surveyed women. A recall period of five years is used as a point of reference
for each respondent in the survey. Combining the four ZDHS surveys, the final sample
of observations utilised for the main outcomes comprises observations on 15,365 children
born as singleton births, with non missing birthweight observations.11
Table 3.4.1 summarises baseline (2007) characteristics of the sample by treatment and
compares changes in these characteristics between 2007 and 2014, after treatment for the
full sample of observations.12 Columns 1, 2 and 3 in table 3.4.1 reveals that TP, TU and
the control districts were indeed quite similar at baseline. However, consolidated control
districts are somewhat more urban.
The p-values in column 4 of table 3.4.1 are generated from linear regressions with each
respective variable in the row as outcome variable, regressed on a treatment indicator and
year interaction and district fixed effects, with 2007 as the reference year and standard er-
rors clustered at the district level. The p-values are generated from t-tests of the difference
between the TP and TU coefficients, with each coefficient measuring the change in the
outcome between each treatment and the control group. Column 4 reveals that between
2007 and 2014, there are a few differences in sample characteristics between the changes in
TP districts relative to the control districts and changes in TU relative to the control dis-
tricts. Specifically, there are differences in the change in the proportions of children aged
under age-3, the number of household members, the number of children aged under age-5
as well as in the proportions of multiple births between TP and TU, respectively. Owing
to these differences, the main empirical analysis below controls for child (age, sex, birth
order), mother (age, highest level of education and whether she is currently/formerly/has
never been in a marital union) and household (number of household members, children
aged under age 5, age of household head and indicators for availability of an improved
water source, female headed household and urban residence) characteristics.
10https://www.dhsprogram.com/Who-We-Are/About-Us.cfm.
11The entire sample size across all four surveys comprises observations on 119,036 children. However,
72% of children in the sample have missing birthweights. This fact, does not represent a weakness of the
data source utilised but is a reflection of the underlying underdevelopment of the country as a whole, with
infants not being born in health facilities and thus not being weighed at birth. Table 3.A.1 in annex 3.A.1
shows that birthweight observations are equally likely to be missing across TU and TP treatments, a fact
which reduces the likelihood of bias in the analysis owing to missing birthweight observations.
12Consolidated control districts in table 3.4.1 combine both the 10 business as usual control districts
from the ZRBF as well as the remaining 42 districts not included in the ZRBF. Table 3.A.2 in annex 3.A.2
presents similar descriptive statistics for the 10 ZRBF control as well as TU and TP districts, revealing
that utilising the consolidated control districts does not bias the analysis. The sample used in the main




This study utilises a Difference-in-Differences (DD) design and exploits both the timing
of childrens’ births and the district-level randomised roll out of the original ZRBF pilot
(Friedman et al., 2016; Shen et al., 2017). Specifically, the study compares changes in
birthweight and the probability of low birthweight for children born after the start of the
ZRBF in April 2012 and those born before the start of treatment on this date. Treatment
is constructed as the interaction of two variables: The first variable is constructed to
represent an ’intensity’ of treatment in-utero,13 with the variable being equal to zero
for all children born before the start of treatment in April 2012, equal to one for all
children born nine months or more after the start of treatment and equal to the fraction
of the nine month in-utero period, spent under treatment for children born within nine
months of the start of treatment.14 The second treatment variable captures infants born to
mothers residing either in performance-based (TP) districts, unconditional (TU) district
or consolidated control districts.
The change in birthweight and the probability of low birthweight among these groups
of children is compared in the ten districts in which healthcare providers were randomised
to receive TP, the ten districts in which healthcare providers were randomised to receive
TU incentives and the remaining 52 districts, in which healthcare providers received no
financial incentives at all. The consolidated control group utilised in the main analysis
can thus be thought of as an ’expanded’ control group as it consolidates not just the
ten ’business as usual’ control districts included in the original ZRBF pilot, but also
includes the remaining 42 districts not included in the ZRBF pilot. The inclusion of the
42 additional districts permits an increase in statistical power of the current study and is
valid as long as the parallel trends identifying assumption, critical for the DD strategy,
discussed below, is fulfilled.15 Heterogeneity in the treatment effects overtime and across
districts, as well as the presence and size of negative weights, are assessed using the multiple
groups and time-periods estimator (De Chaisemartin and d’Haultfoeuille, 2020).
The effects of healthcare utilisation on health outcomes can be potentially plagued by
bias arising from non-random selection effects. By leveraging the randomised assignment
to treatment inherent within the ZRBF pilot, this study is able to identify the causal
13Modelling the intensity of treatment in this manner is motivated by the observation in the literature
that the timing of ANC in pregnancy is critical, with beneficial effects of ANC being largest, the earlier
ANC is initiated in pregnancy (see for instance the discussion in Dı́az and Saldarriaga (2019)).
14Each child’s date of birth is normalised relative to the start of treatment to equal the number of
months to/from April 2012. Thus, for an infant born one month after the start of treatment in May 2012,
intensity of treatment in-utero would be 0.11 (i.e. 1/9). Similarly, for an infant born eight months after
the start of treatment, intensity of treatment in-utero would be 0.89 (i.e. 8/9). Intensity of treatment
in-utero for children born nine or more months after the start of treatment equals one.
15Tables 3.A.2, 3.A.3 and 3.A.4 in annexes 3.A.1 and 3.A.2 present the descriptive statistics, birthweight,
low birthweight and ANC results respectively for the 30 ZRBF districts and show that while results are
robust to the exclusion of the 42 additional districts, they are less precisely estimated, owing to the analysis
only being based on 30 districts/clusters.
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effects of the two treatments on infant birth outcomes. By taking eligibility for treatment,
represented by infants being born to mothers residing either in TP or TU districts to be
equivalent to treatment, all estimates in the study thus represent an Intention to Treat
(ITT) estimate of the effects of TP and TU incentives on infant birth outcomes.
The key identifying assumption is that the difference in birthweight and the probabil-
ity of low birthweight of infants in TP districts, followed the same trend as in TU and
consolidated control districts in the years prior to treatment. In the absence of the two
treatments, outcomes would have continued following the same trend in TP and TU as
that in consolidated control districts between 2012 and 2014, were it not for the two
treatments. Any deviations from the parallel/common trends between 2012 and 2014 are
thus, interpreted as the causal effect of the two types of financial incentives. An approach
to the assessment of the plausibility of the parallel trends assumption in the literature,
which is by definition untestable, involves assessing pre-treatment treatment effects i.e.
assessing the significance of treatment coefficient estimates for the years preceding treat-
ment (Almond et al., 2011; Autor, 2003; Dı́az and Saldarriaga, 2019; Hoynes et al., 2011,
2015; Muralidharan and Prakash, 2017). In addition to the above, the plausibility of the
parallel trends assumptions can assessed by using the multiple groups and time period
(multiplegt) estimator of De Chaisemartin and d’Haultfoeuille (2020). Any unobservable
differences between the three types of groups are assumed to be time invariant. Observable
differences between the three types of groups are assumed to be captured by the inclusion
of observable time varying covariates shown in table 3.4.1, in the analysis. The analysis
also assumes that spillover effects among the districts randomised into the various treat-
ments are absent. This latter assumption is also plausible, given that treatment was only
assigned at the district level.
The primary DD analysis above is supplemented by two additional analyses. These
analyses both alter the control groups used and in so doing, rely on slightly different sources
of exogenous variation, relative to the DD analysis. The first analysis utilises a triple
differences (DDD) design. Specifically, the DDD analysis compares changes in birthweight
and the probability of low birthweight for those children aged at most three years old in
2014. This group of children, born during the ZRBF pilot projects implementation period
were potential beneficiaries during their in-utero period. However, the older cohort of
children aged over age-3 in 2014, were born before the ZRBF implementation period and
were thus, too old to benefit in-utero from treatment. The over age-3 cohort thus represent
a within-district control group leveraged in the DDD analysis. The outcomes for those
children aged at most and over age-3 in the years 1996, 2001, 2007, before treatment are
compared to those in 2014, after treatment. The differences in birthweight between these
two groups overtime in the ten districts in which healthcare providers were randomised to
receive TP and the ten districts in which healthcare providers were randomised to receive
TU, are compared to the change in the remaining 52 consolidated control districts, in
which healthcare providers conducted business as usual.
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The second secondary analysis utilises an RD design. This analysis complements the
DD and DDD analyses by relying on different identifying assumptions and a slightly
different definition of control group. This sub-analysis utilises the 2014 DHS dataset only
and exploits the five year recall period for all births captured in the DHS to compare
birthweight and the probability of low birthweight for those infants born on either side
of the qualifying date for the receipt of treatment: April 2012 (Friedman et al., 2016).
This analysis utilises date of birth as a running variable and is conducted separately
for TP and TU districts. The RD analysis also utilises a within-district control group:
children born on the non-qualifying side of the treatment threshold within each district.
This group of children thus experienced similar within-district conditions in-utero. A key
identifying assumption in this RD framework is that of continuity of the running variable,
which implies that each child’s date of birth is as good as randomly assigned within
a close neighbourhood of the treatment threshold (Hahn et al., 2001). This assumption,
requires that in a close neighbourhood of the treatment threshold, there is no possibility of
children’s dates of birth being systematically and precisely manipulated such that children
are more likely to be born after the qualifying threshold, relative to before this date or
vice versa.16
3.5.2 Estimation Strategy
The main DD estimating equation of interest is equation 3.1 below,
yirvt = β0 + β1TUr × Inti + β2TPr × Inti + γrDistr + λvByrv + δXit
+κrtDistr × yeart + εirvt (3.1)
yirvt represents each respective outcome of interest - birthweight or the probability of a
low birthweight birth for child i in district r, birth cohort v and DHS survey year t. TUr
and TPr are treatment status indicators equal to 1 if child i was born to a woman residing
in either an unconditional or performance-based district, respectively, with consolidated
control districts serving as the reference category. Inti represents the intensity of treatment
in-utero variable elaborated above. Some terms are omitted from equation 3.1, in order to
conserve space. The preferred and most conservative specification including both district,
Distr and birth cohort/year, Byrv fixed effects, is estimated. Some specifications assess
the robustness of the results to linear violations of parallel trends by including district by
survey year time trends, Distr * yeart. Xit are time varying child (age, sex, birth order),
mother (age, highest level of education and whether she is currently/formerly/has never
been in a marital union) and household (number of household members, children aged
under age 5, age of household head and indicators for availability of an improved water
source, female headed household and urban residence) characteristics, as shown in table
3.4.1. The main coefficients of interest in equation 3.1, capturing the causal effects of TU
and TP are β1 and β2, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the district level, the
16Figure 3.A.1 in annex 3.A.6, reveals the absence of heaping of observations immediately to the right
of the qualifying threshold for treatment, providing evidence supporting the plausibility of continuity of
the running variable around the threshold.
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level of treatment.
In order to investigate the channels driving effects for the main outcome variables, a
variant of Equation 3.1 is also estimated. In this case yirvt is the outcome of interest for
woman i, residing in district r, with a child in birth cohort v and in survey year t. The
outcomes of interest are the number of ANC visits, the timing of the first ANC visit, in
months and the quality of ANC, measured by the number of tetanus injections received
during pregnancy and indicator variables of whether the woman was weighed and whether
she had her blood pressure taken during pregnancy, respectively.
In addition to an analysis conducted on the full sample of observations using equa-
tion 3.1, a heterogeneity analysis of the effects of TP and TU on the main outcomes:
birthweight and the probability of low birthweight is also conducted for high impact sub-
samples of children. These high impact sub-samples of children are identified based on
their mothers age and education level. Specifically, a heterogeneity analysis of children
born to women with either no education or only a primary education and women younger
than 20 years of age and older than 35 years of age is conducted. Children born to women
with these characteristics have been identified as being at a higher risk of being born with
low birthweight and thus most likely to benefit, in-utero, from treatment (Hoynes et al.,
2015; Cardona-Sosa and Medina, 2017; Hoynes et al., 2011; Kramer, 1987; Amarante et al.,
2016).
yirvt = α0 + α1U3i × TUr × year2014 + α2U3i × TUr × year2001
+α3U3i × TUr × year1996 + α4U3i × TPr × year2014
+α5U3i × TPr × year2001 + α6U3i × TPr × year1996
+γrDistr + λvByrv + δXit + κrtDistr × yeart
+εirvt (3.2)
The DD analysis in equation 3.1 is complemented with a DDD analysis based on equa-
tion 3.2 above. All variables in equation 3.2 are as defined in equation 3.1, with the
exception of U3i which is an indicator for child i being aged under-age 3 in each survey
year, yeart, 1996, 2001, 2007 and 2014, respectively. Despite the ZRBF beginning in 2012,
2007 is taken as the baseline year in the DDD analysis, given that this is the earliest year
before the start of the ZRBF for which the DHS was conducted. 2007 thus serves as the
omitted reference category in this equation. Additional terms in this equation are also
omitted so as to conserve space. The coefficients of interest in equation 3.2, capturing the
causal effects of TU and TP are the respective 2014 coefficients α1 and α4.
yirv = β0 + ΣvΨvByrv × TUr + ΣvΘvByrv × TPr + γrDistr + δXi + εirv (3.3)
Additionally, pre-treatment treatment effects and the plausibility of the parallel trends
assumption are assessed using the event-study specification 3.3 above. Variables in this
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equation are as defined above, with the exception that the treatment status indicators,
TUr and TPr, are interacted with the birth year indicators Byrv. In this analysis, birth
year 2011 is the reference year, year -1, relative to which estimates are made. Birth
year 2012 is year 0, the ’event’ year in which treatment begins. Thus, this analysis runs
from event year -21, which is birth year 1991, before the start of treatment, to event
year 3, which is birth year 2014, after the start of treatment. Event-study estimates
from this equation are presented graphically in figure 3.5.1. The figure reveals that for
the years preceding treatment, coefficients on the pre-treatment treatment effects are not
statistically significant. This is true for mean birthweight in TU districts in panel A and
TP districts in panel B, as well as the probability of low birthweight in TU districts in
panel C and TP districts in panel D, respectively. This observation thus supports the
plausibility of the parallel trends assumption in this setting.17
RD estimates are based on equation 3.4.18 Equation 3.4 is similar to equation 3.1,
except that the former includes the running variable Tlapse, measuring child i ’s date of
birth normalised to equal the number of months before or after the start of the treatment
in April 2012. The function f(Tlapse) is a flexible function of the normalised date of birth,
estimated by polynomials of order J. Equation 3.4 is estimated separately for j = TU, TP,
respectively. The treatment indicators in this case equal one if child i is born after the
start of the treatment. An interaction term of the normalised running variable and the
treatment status indicator, f(T lapsei)× Trtj , is included in some specifications to allow
for differing slopes on either side of the threshold.
yirv = τ0 + τ1f(T lapsei) + τ2Trtjr + τ3f(T lapsei)× Trtjr
γrDistr + λvByrv + δXi + εirv (3.4)
Assuming a linear model, equations 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 can be estimated via linear regres-
sion, implemented via Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Local polynomial regression is used
to estimate equation 3.4, using robust bias-corrected estimation and data-driven band-
width selection procedures for each outcome as proposed in Calonico et al. (2014, 2017).
Higher order polynomials of the running variable are used in the analysis to account for
potential non-linearities. A triangular kernel, emphasising observations near the treatment
threshold, is also utilised. The continuity assumption is assessed using the discontinuity
in density testing procedure proposed in Cattaneo et al. (2020) and estimated using the
procedure proposed in Cattaneo et al. (2019).
17The robustness of the plausibility of the parallel trends assumption is further investigated using an
alternative approach, the multiplegt estimator in section 3.8.
18Given the potential for non-random selection effects of healthcare utilisation and the ITT nature of
the DD estimates noted above, the RD model in this case can be considered a fuzzy RD with one-sided
perfect compliance. Taken in this way, equation 3.4 is thus a reduced form equation estimated as a sharp
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Figure 3.5.1: Event Study Estimates
Notes: The figure plots event-study coefficient estimates and associated 95% confidence intervals based on
the event-study equation 3.3. Panels A and B show event-study estimates for birthweight in unconditional
and performance-based districts, respectively. Panels C and D show estimates of the probability of a low
birthweight birth in unconditional and performance-based districts, respectively. The estimates are calcu-
lated relative to event time -1, which represents birth year 2011 and run from event time -21, representing




DD estimates from equation 3.1 are presented in table 3.6.1. Each column in the table
contains results from a separate DD regression, with the dependent variable in each regres-
sion shown in the second row of the table. In columns 1-3, birthweight is the dependent
variable, while in columns 4-6, the low birthweight indicator is the dependent variable. All
regressions are based on the most conservative specification with both district and year
of birth fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the district level.19 The p-values
in row 5 are based on a t-test of the significance of the difference between each pair of
corresponding TP and TU coefficients in each respective column. Columns 1 and 4 show
estimates for mean birthweight and low birthweight, respectively, for the full sample ob-
servations. Columns 2, 3 and 5 and 6, in turn, contain DD estimates of the heterogeneous
effects of TP and TU on mean birthweight, in columns 2 and 3 and low birthweight in
columns 5 and 6, for the high-risk sub-samples of children, respectively.
The DD coefficient estimates in column 1 of the table reveal that relative to the change
in mean birthweight in control districts, the change in mean birthweight for the full sample
of children born in TU districts was 45 grams higher, post treatment. Similarly, mean
birthweight in TP districts was 32 grams higher, post treatment. Neither the TP nor the
TU coefficient is, however, statistically significant. Column 2 of table 3.6.1 contains DD
estimates of the heterogeneous effects of TP and TU on mean birthweight of children born
to women with either no education or only a primary education. Results reveal that the
change in mean birth weight of children in TU districts for this sub-sample of children was
103 grams higher, post treatment. In the case of TP districts, children born to this high
impact sub-sample of women had birthweight 29 grams higher on average, post treatment.
The TU coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level, while the TP coefficient is not
statistically significant.20 Presentation of the heterogeneous effects of TU and TP on mean
birthweight concludes in column 3 of table 3.6.1 which contains estimates for children born
to the high impact sub-sample of women aged at most 20 years old and those aged 35
years and older, respectively. Results reveal that the change in mean birth weight in TU
districts was 207 grams higher, post treatment for this sub-sample of children. Similarly,
mean birthweight in TP districts was 163 grams higher, post treatment in this sub-sample.
Both coefficient estimates are statistically significant at the 5% level.21
19DD estimates similar to those in table 3.6.1 but estimated with district by year fixed effects and not
district and birth cohort fixed effects are qualitatively similar to those in table 3.6.1 and are shown in table
3.A.9 in annex 3.A.5.
20A similar regression in column 1 of table 3.A.6 in annex 4.A.2 for the sub-sample of women with a
secondary education or higher reveals qualitatively similar but somewhat smaller coefficient estimates.
21A similar regression shown in column 2 of table 3.A.6 in annex 4.A.2 on a low impact sub-sample of
women older than 20 years and 35 years or younger, reveals qualitatively similar but somewhat smaller
TU and TP coefficient estimates, respectively.
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Table 3.6.1: Difference-in-Differences Estimates for Birthweight and low Birthweight.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
birth weight birth weight birth weight Low birth weight Low birth weight Low birth weight
Unconditional × Int 45.37 102.7** 207.0** -0.00617 -0.0433* -0.0998***
(42.25) (41.57) (94.88) (0.0180) (0.0226) (0.0359)
Performance-based × Int 32.18 28.57 162.5** -0.0134 -0.0351** -0.0993***
(29.34) (39.26) (69.47) (0.0114) (0.0143) (0.0264)
P-value Coef.(TP - TU) 0.785 0.156 0.696 0.722 0.736 0.990
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Sub(Educ) Sub(Age) Full Sub(Educ) Sub(Age)
Control Group Mean 3091.0*** 3249.9*** 3070.4*** 0.139*** 0.0911*** 0.160***
(46.77) (61.38) (69.45) (0.0202) (0.0252) (0.0352)
Observations 15365 9504 4409 15365 9504 4409
R2 0.050 0.051 0.079 0.016 0.019 0.034
Notes: The table shows DD estimates of the main (columns 1 and 4) and heterogeneous (columns 2 and 3; 5 and 6) impacts of unconditional and performance-
based financial incentives on mean birthweight and low birthweight for singleton births, for children in unconditional and performance-based districts, relative
to consolidated control districts. Infant birthweight is measured in grams, while low birthweight is an indicator variable for infant birth weight less than 2,500
grams. Each column shows a separate regression with some coefficients omitted to conserve space. The intensity (int) variable equals zero for all children
born before treatment (before April 2012), one for all children born nine months or more after the start of treatment and equals the fraction of the in-utero
(nine month) period, potentially spent under treatment for children born within nine months of the start of treatment. Heterogeneous effects are estimated
based on mothers education in column 2 and 5 (no education and only primary education) and mothers age in column 3 and 6 (mothers <= 20 and those
>35 years old). The preferred and most conservative specification, including both district and birth cohort fixed effects, is used in all regressions. Standard
errors, clustered at the district level, are in parentheses; p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Estimates of the impact of TU and TP on the probability of a low birthweight infant
in the main sample and the high impact sub-samples are shown in columns 4, 5 and 6 of
table 3.6.1, respectively. Column 4 of the table reveals that for the full sample of children,
the change in the probability of an infant being born with low birthweight in TU districts
reduced by 0.6 percentage points, while the same probability in TP districts reduced by
1.3 percentage points, post treatment. Estimates in column 4 for the probability low
birthweight are, however, not statistically significant. Column 5 of table 3.6.1 shows that
the probability of an infant being born with low birthweight in the no or at most primary
education sub-sample reduced by 4 percentage points, post treatment, both in TU and
TP districts. The TP coefficient is significant at the 5% level while the TU coefficient
is only significant at the 10% level.22 Similarly, column 6 of table 3.6.1 reveals that for
children born to the high impact sub-sample of women aged either at most 20 years old
or aged 35 years and older, the probability of an infant being born with low birthweight
reduced by approximately 10 percentage points in both TU and TP districts respectively,
post treatment. Both the TU and TP coefficients are statistically significant at the 1%
level.23
Several aspects of the DD results above are worth noting at this juncture. Firstly,
TU and TP coefficients are quite similar in size and thus, p-values of the significance
of the difference between them in row 5 of table 3.6.1 reveal that they are statistically
indistinguishable. Secondly, the results differ in important ways from some studies in the
social programme/cash transfer literature assessing infant health outcomes. Most papers
in this literature find more statistically significant effects of these social programmes on
mean infant birthweight and low birthweight births (Almond et al., 2011; Amarante et al.,
2016; Barber and Gertler, 2008; Hoynes et al., 2011, 2015). In the current study, similar
effects are mostly restricted to children in high impact sub-samples most likely to benefit
from treatment. The findings above may imply that when financial incentives are provided
to healthcare providers on the supply-side, the providers are still able to ensure that the
greatest productivity benefits in-terms of improved child health outcomes still accrue to
high impact subgroups of the population most likely to benefit from treatment.
As noted previously, the receipt of Antenatal Care (ANC) in pregnancy that is initi-
ated early and is of high quality is a key channel both in reducing the likelihood of low
birthweight and increasing birthweight. The ZRBF pilot thus included an explicit incen-
tivisation of ANC visits for healthcare providers in TP districts of $1.6, per woman, per
visit conducted, while similar performance-based financial incentives were absent in TU
and control districts. Thus, in order to gain further insights into the potential channels
driving the above results in table 3.6.1, an assessment of the impact of TP and TU on the
22A similar regression shown in column 3 of table 3.A.6 in annex 4.A.2 for the low impact sub-sample
of women a secondary education or higher, reveals qualitatively similar but somewhat smaller TU and TP
coefficient estimates, respectively.
23A similar regression shown in column 4 of table 3.A.6 in annex 4.A.2 on a low impact sub-sample of
women older than 20 years and 35 years or younger, reveals qualitatively similar but smaller TU and TP
coefficient estimates.
97
number, timing and quality of ANC visits, is warranted. To this end, table 3.6.2 below
presents estimates based on equation 3.1 for the full sample of observations.24
Column 1 of the table contains DD estimates with the number of ANC visits as outcome
variable while in column 2, the timing of the first ANC visit, in months, is the dependent
variable. In columns 3-5, estimates with the quality of ANC measured as; the number
of tetanus injections received during pregnancy, whether the woman was weighed and
whether she had her blood pressure taken during pregnancy, respectively, as dependant
variable, are shown. All regressions are based on the most conservative specification with
both district and year of birth fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the district
level. The p-value in row 5 is based on a t-test of the significance of the difference between
each pair of TP and TU coefficients in each respective column.
Column 1 of table 3.6.2 shows that relative to control districts pre and post treatment,
the change in the number of ANC visits in TU districts was 0.3 visits higher, post treat-
ment. In the case of TP districts, 0.4 more ANC visits were conducted, post treatment.
The latter effect in TP districts is significant at the 1% level, while the former effect in TU
districts is only significant at the 10% level. Column 2 of table 3.6.2 shows that the timing
of the first ANC visit was 0.04 months earlier in TU districts, post treatment. Similarly,
in the case of TP districts, the timing of the first ANC visit was 0.2 months earlier. Only
the latter effect in TP districts is significant at the 10% level.
Column 3 of table 3.6.2 reveals that 0.1 more tetanus injections were administered
to women during pregnancy in TU districts, post treatment. Similarly, in TP districts,
0.1 more tetanus injections were administered during pregnancy, post treatment. The
TU coefficient is significant at the 5% level while the TP coefficient is not statistically
significant. In column 4, we see a 3.7 percentage point increase in the probability of
a pregnant woman being weighed during pregnancy in TU and a 0.3 percentage point
increase in this probability in TP districts, post treatment. The TU coefficient is significant
at the 10% level while the TP coefficient estimate is not statistically significant.
Lastly, column 5 of table 3.6.2 reveals that the probability that a woman had her blood
pressure checked during pregnancy increased by 3.2 percentage, post treatment, in TU
districts. In the case of TP districts, this probability increased by 6 percentage points,
post treatment. The former effect in TU districts is not statistically significant, while the
latter effect in TP districts is statistically significant at the 5% level.
Several aspects of the results in table 3.6.2 are noteworthy. Firstly, the larger and
statistically significant coefficient estimates for performance-based districts in columns 1
and 2, are consistent with healthcare providers being provided with an explicit
24Similar estimates for the high impact sub-samples are shown in table 3.A.7 for the ’no or at most
primary education’ sub-sample of women and in table 3.A.8 for women younger than 20 years old or older
than 35 years old.
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Table 3.6.2: Difference-in-Differences Estimates for the Number, Timing and Quality of Ante-natal Care Visits: Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
num. ANC visits timing 1st ANC num. tetanus injections weighed blood pressure
Unconditional × Int 0.264* -0.0411 0.116** 0.0372* 0.0322
(0.147) (0.124) (0.0544) (0.0215) (0.0292)
Performance-based × Int 0.403*** -0.242* 0.131 0.00269 0.0602**
(0.128) (0.145) (0.0868) (0.0251) (0.0239)
P-value Coef.(TU - TP) 0.419 0.271 0.875 0.279 0.412
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Group Mean 3.353*** 4.641*** 1.738*** 0.896*** 0.715***
(0.133) (0.0689) (0.0425) (0.0100) (0.0182)
Observations 24073 23637 24262 16876 16872
R2 0.146 0.067 0.075 0.053 0.105
Notes: The table shows DD regressions of the number, timing and quality of Ante-natal Care (ANC) visits in unconditional and performance-
based districts, relative to consolidated control districts, for the full sample of observations. Each column shows a separate DD regression, with
some coefficients omitted to conserve space. The intensity (Int) variable is zero for all children born before treatment (before April 2012), one
for all infants born nine months or more after the start of treatment and is set to equal the fraction of the in-utero (nine month) period, spent
under treatment for children born within nine months of the start of treatment. The preferred and most conservative specification, including
both district and birth cohort fixed effects, is used in all regressions. Consolidated control districts are the reference category. ANC quality is
measured by the number of tetanus injections received by a women before giving birth, and dummy variables indicating; whether the woman
was weighed and had her blood pressure taken, respectively, during pregnancy. The regressions in columns 4 and 5 contain fewer observations
because in the ZDHS 1996, respondents were not asked about being weighed or having their blood pressure taken at ANC. Standard errors,
clustered at the district level, are in parentheses. p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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performance-based financial incentive of $1.6 per women per ANC visit offered in TP dis-
tricts during the ZRBF. The effect on the number of ANC visits in table 3.6.2, is consistent
with healthcare providers responding to this performance-based financial incentive with
greater effort and greater morale in the provision of ANC, with this effect extending to
providers encouraging women to not only attend more ANC visits, but also initiate these
earlier in pregnancy as seen in column 2. Rather interestingly, similar effects are also
evident in TU districts, despite healthcare providers in these districts only receiving un-
conditional financial incentives independent of both effort and the number of ANC visits
conducted. The effects on the number and timing of ANC visits in TP districts do not,
however, seem to translate into a corresponding increase in the quality of the ANC visits
as observed in columns 3 and 4 (as noted above, column 5 shows a statistically significant
effect of TP on the probability that a pregnant woman had her blood pressure checked
during pregnancy). This observation could be a reflection of the fact that the quality of
healthcare provision in TP districts was not directly incentivised but was only indirectly
incentivised through a quality multiplier. This observation, could thus explain the weak
improvements in both birthweight and low birthweight in table 3.6.1 above. Additionally,
as in table 3.6.1, the TU and TP coefficients are quite similar and thus virtually statis-
tically identical. This is evident from the p-values from t-tests of the significance of the
difference between these coefficients in row 5 of table 3.6.2.
The observation of a statistically significant effect on the timing of the first ANC visit
in TP districts is also in line with the findings of the original impact evaluation, which
found a statistically significant reduction in the timing of the first ANC of 0.4 months
relative to districts defined in the current study as TU districts (Friedman et al., 2016).
Estimates of the impact of TU and TP on the number, timing and quality of ANC in
the high impact sub-samples of women with no education or only a primary education
and those women aged 20 years old or younger or older than 35 years of age are presented
respectively in table 3.A.7 and table 3.A.8 in annex 3.A.4. Overall, both sets of estimates
are qualitatively similar to those in table 3.6.2 above and reveal gains in the number of
and timing of ANC visits in TP districts larger than those in TU districts.
3.6.2 Regression Discontinuity Estimates
As noted in section 3.5, this section complements the DD analysis with an RD analysis.
The RD analysis utilises date of birth as the running variable and exploits the 5 year recall
period for all births in the 2014 DHS to compare the birth outcomes of children born on
either side of the eligibility threshold for TU and TP treatment - April 2012. The analysis
is conducted separately for each treatment and utilises as the control group, children born
in the same district but on the ineligible side of the treatment threshold. The validity
of the RD design is based on the fulfilment of the continuity assumption (Hahn et al.,
2001). Figure 3.A.1 in annex 3.A.6, shows a histogram of the density of births around the
eligibility threshold with a superimposed local polynomial estimate of the density function
(Cattaneo et al., 2020, 2019). Both reveal the absence of an unusual clustering of births
100
on either side of the treatment threshold, supporting the plausibility of continuity of the
running variable around the threshold in this case.
Figure 3.6.1 graphically plots RD estimates based on equation 3.4 for birthweight in
panel A and the probability of a low birthweight birth in panel C for TU districts. Simi-
larly, panels B and D plot RD birthweight and low birthweight estimates for TP districts,
respectively. Given that the RD analysis utilises only 1 of the 4 waves of ZDHS data sets
utilised in the DD analysis and that the analysis is conducted separately per treatment,
the number of observations on either side of the cut off in each instance is thus, quite
limited. The RD results in figure 3.6.1 should thus, be interpreted with this consideration
in mind.
The analysis reveals broadly similar conclusions to those reached based on the DD
analysis in table 3.6.1. Specifically, panels A and B of figure 3.6.1 reveal an increase in
birthweight in TU and TP districts, respectively, at the eligibility threshold. Similarly,
panels C and D reveal a decrease in the probability of a low birthweight in TU and TP
districts, respectively, at the eligibility threshold.
3.7 Cost-Effectiveness
This section presents illustrative back of the envelope cost-effectiveness calculations
for the case of birthweight. Based on the original ZRBF pilot, the per-capita cost of
implementing TP was estimated at $7.91 while that of implementing TU was estimated at
$2.16 (Friedman et al., 2016). These cost estimates are combined with the DD birthweight
coefficient estimates from the sub-sample of children born to women aged less than 20 years
old or older than 35 years old in table 3.6.1. This sub-sample of children are noted to
experience increases in birthweight of 207 and 163 grams for TU and TP, respectively,
that are also statistically significant and thus, also potentially cost-effective (Mbiti et al.,
2019).
The results of the back of the envelope cost effectiveness exercise reveal that the cost
of increasing birthweight by 1 gram in TU districts is $0.010 while that in TP districts
is $0.049. This implies that unconditional financial incentives may be more cost effective
per gram of birthweight gained. Alternatively, for performance-based financial incentives
to be at least as cost effective as unconditional financial incentives, given their per-capita
cost of $7.91, they would need to increase birthweight by at least 758 grams on average, a
5 fold increase in birthweight. Such an increase seems implausible given that estimates in
the current study and the literature only range between 2 grams and 207 grams (Almond
et al., 2011; Amarante et al., 2016; Barber and Gertler, 2008; Cardona-Sosa and Medina,
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Figure 3.6.1: Regression Discontinuity Plots
Notes: The figure shows local polynomial RD estimates for birthweight and the likelihood of a low birth-
weight birth in TU districts in panels A and C and TP districts in panels B and D, respectively. The
horizontal axis plots the running variable, date of birth, normalised such that the treatment threshold,
April 2012, is at zero. Bias-robust estimation and data-driven bandwidth selection procedures for each
outcome as proposed in Calonico et al. (2014, 2017), are used. Gray dots are quantile-spaced within-bin
averages, mimicking the underlying variance of the data. Polynomials of orders 3, that account for po-




3.8.1 Original ZRBF Districts
As noted above, the original ZRBF pilot randomised 30 Zambian districts to either
receive TP, TU or conduct business as usual. As outlined above, the main analysis in this
study exploits the nationally representative nature of the ZDHS to include the 42 districts
that also continued to conduct business as usual, but were not included in the original
ZRBF. The analysis in this study thus compares the 20 TU and TP districts included in
the ZRBF to a consolidated set of 52 districts that conducted business as usual. While the
inclusion of the additional 42 control districts to the original 10 ZRBF control districts
potentially increases statistical power owing to treatment being assigned at the district
level, this could potentially result in bias if the 42 business as usual districts excluded in
the ZRBF are systematically different from those districts that were included. To assess
the potential of any such bias, the analysis in annex 3.A.2 is restricted only to the original
30 ZRBF districts. Table 3.A.2 presents descriptive statistics for these districts and reveals
quite similar characteristics to those presented in table 3.4.1 in section 3.4. However, while
41% of consolidated control districts are urban in table 3.4.1, table 3.A.2 reveals that only
21% of the ZRBF control districts are urban.
Tables 3.A.3 and 3.A.4 in annex 3.A.2 continue in this vein and present analyses for the
main outcomes as well as the channels of impact for the 30 ZRBF districts. Table 3.A.3
shows that coefficient estimates for birthweight and the probability of a low birthweight
birth, are qualitatively similar to those presented in table 3.6.1 in section 3.6. While
coefficients in the full samples are suggestive of improvements in birthweight and the
probability of a low birthweight birth, coefficients also become larger and more statistically
significant in the same high impact sub-samples of children as in table 3.6.1. Similarly
table 3.A.4 in annex 3.A.2 presents results for the channels of impact - the quantity and
quality of ANC for the 30 ZRBF districts. While results also share qualitative similarities
with those presented in table 3.6.2, the former are less precisely estimated owing to the
fewer observations and clusters (only 30) on which they are based.
Importantly, the discussion above thus reveals that the main results are robust to the
exclusion of the 42 business as usual districts not included in the ZRBF and their inclusion
does not introduce bias in the analysis. In-fact, the inclusion of the additional districts or
clusters and their corresponding observations only serves to increase the statistical power
and precision of the results presented in the main analysis.
3.8.2 Triple Difference Estimates
As noted in section 3.5, the DD analysis is also complemented with a DDD analysis,
estimated based on equation 3.2. Recall that the DDD specification in equation 3.2,
compares birthweight and the probability of a low birthweight birth of children aged
under age-3, with children aged over age-3 serving as an additional, within district control
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group, in TP and TU districts and consolidated control districts in the years 1996, 2001
and 2007, prior to treatment and in 2014, after treatment.
Results, presented in annex 4.A.2, are qualitatively similar to the DD results presented
in subsection 3.6.1 and the RD results in subsection 3.6.2, but are somewhat less precisely
estimated. Specifically, similar to the DD results presented in table 3.6.1, columns 1
and 4 of table 3.A.5 reveal insignificant effects of TU and TP on infant birthweight and
low birthweight, respectively, for the full sample of observations. Similarly, coefficient
estimates are larger and gain some statistical significance in the same high impact sub-
samples as those examined in table 3.6.1. Whereas all the mean birthweight coefficients in
the DD results in table 3.6.1 are positive, columns 1 and 3 of table 3.A.5, however, reveals
negative but insignificant coefficient for TU districts in the full sample of observations.
All other DDD and DD estimates for the main sample are qualitatively similar.
The lower precision in the DDD estimates may be due to several reasons, two of which
are discussed below. Firstly, with standard errors clustered at the district level, the level
of treatment, statistical power is closely connected to the number of district clusters: 72
in this case. This implies that the estimation of additional coefficients necessitated by the
DDD estimation with numerous sets of fixed effects, results in a loss of statistical power.
Secondly, the definition of the population potentially exposed to treatment as comprising
children aged at most 3 years old, as opposed to the intensity of treatment definition of
exposure to treatment used in the DD analysis, could imply that the treatment variable is
measured with a degree of measurement error in the DDD analysis, whereas no such error
arises in the DD analysis.
3.8.3 Parallel Trends
As noted in section 3.5, the validity of the crucial parallel trends assumption, whose
plausibility was established in figure 3.5.1, is further assessed using an additional approach
from the more recent Differences-in-Differences literature: the multiple group and time
(multiplegt) estimator.
As noted by De Chaisemartin and d’Haultfoeuille (2020), the multiplegt estimator (or
DIDM ) is useful in DD type settings in which there are many groups and time-periods
being assessed and it is suspected that the treatment effect of interest might not be con-
stant, but may actually vary across the different groups and time periods. In settings with
multiple groups and time periods, the conventional two-way fixed effects DD estimator
provides a weighted average treatment effect across all of the groups and time-periods
and the weights associated with some of these treatment effects may be negative. With
varying treatment effects across groups and time-periods, the presence of negative weights
may imply that when estimated, the conventional two-way fixed effects DD estimator may
turn out negative when in fact, all of the underlying average treatment effects themselves
are actually positive (De Chaisemartin and d’Haultfoeuille, 2020). The multiplegt estima-
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Figure 3.8.1: Pre-trends Test using the Multiplegt Estimator
Notes: The figure shows a test for parallel trends using the Multiplegt estimator proposed in De Chaise-
martin and d’Haultfoeuille (2020). It compares pre-treatment treatment effects in the combined treated
groups, TU and TP districts to consolidated control districts. Pre-treatment treatment effects are calcu-
lated for n-2 time periods, where n equals the total number of time periods (four survey years in this case).
Panel A shows estimates for mean birth weight while panel B shows estimates for low birthweight. Time
0 refers to the baseline year, 2007, while time -1 refers to the first pre-baseline survey year, 2001.
variability or heterogeneity over the groups and time-periods being examined.25
Given that the validity of the multiplegt estimator hinges on the plausibility of the
parallel trends assumption, it therefore presents an alternative test for the plausibility of
the parallel trends assumption, one that is exploited in the current analysis and presented
in figure 3.8.1. A test of the parallel trends assumption using the multiplegt estimator
amounts to comparing pre-treatment treatment effects in consolidated control districts
relative to TU and TP districts combined, the groups that change treatment status. The
estimator calculates the effects for n - 2 time periods, with n being the total number of
time periods. In the present case n equals the total number of survey years, four, implying
that n - 2 equals two (i.e. the survey years 2007 and 2001).
Panel A of figure 3.8.1 reveals insignificant pre-treatment treatment effects in the case
of birthweight while panel B reveals similar insignificant pre-treatment treatment effects
in the case of low birthweight.26 Thus, the observations based on the multiplegt estimator
seem to support the plausibility of the parallel trends assumption, a similar conclusion to
that reached based on figure 3.5.1 in section 3.6.
25An associated analysis to determine the presence of negative weights reveals that there are no negative
weights associated with the individual average treatment effects across the 3 groups and over the survey
years in the current analysis. This implies that the conventional two-way fixed effects DD estimator
is sufficient and the multiplegt estimator is therefore not used to calculate treatment effects during the
post-treatment period.
26Taking the case of birthweight for illustrative purposes, DIDpl,0M equals 75.73 (standard error of 75.62),
while DIDpl,−1M equals -108.53 (standard error of 114.31).
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3.9 Discussion and Conclusion
Similar to other low income developing countries, efforts to improve maternal and child
health outcomes in Zambia remain at the very top of the development agenda. A pop-
ular policy response has involved the implementation of health programmes providing
performance-based financial incentives to healthcare providers. However, despite the pop-
ularity of this approach, evidence documenting the relative effectiveness of performance-
based financial incentives to alternative types of financial incentives, remains scarce.
This study compares the relative effects on birthweight and the probability of a low
birthweight birth of performance-based (TP) or unconditional (TU) financial incentives
to healthcare providers. The study exploits the district randomised roll out of the orig-
inal Zambia Results Based Financing (ZRBF) pilot project, implemented between 2012
and 2014 in Zambia and compares those districts in which healthcare providers were ran-
domised to receive either TP or TU to control districts in which healthcare providers
conducted ’business as usual’. It utilises four waves of nationally representative Demo-
graphic and Health Survey (ZDHS) data and a Difference-in-Differences (DD) research
design, complemented with triple differences (DDD) and Regression Discontinuity (RD)
designs.
DD estimates of the study suggest that birthweight in TP districts increases by 32
grams while the probability of a low birthweight birth reduces by 1.3 percentage-points.
TU districts experience comparable improvements in infant birth outcomes with estimates
suggesting a 45 gram increase in birthweight and a 0.6 percentage-point reduction in the
probability of a low birthweight birth. However, these estimates are not statistically
significantly. The comparability of the gains in birth outcomes across the two sets of
treatments also implies that all estimates are statistically indistinguishable. The study also
examines birth outcomes in ’high impact’ sub-samples of children born to women identified
as being at higher risk of bearing low birthweight children. These are women with either
no education or only a primary education and women younger than 20 years of age or older
than 35 years of age. DD estimates in these sub-samples of children reveals both larger and
more statistically significant increases in mean birthweight in both TU and TP districts
of between 29 and 207 grams and reductions in the probability of a low birthweight birth
of between 4 and 10 percentage points, respectively. Overall, magnitudes of these TU
and TP coefficients are also remarkably similar and thus statistically indistinguishable.
Back of the envelope cost effectiveness calculations reveal that each gram increase in
birthweight is achieved at $0.049 for TP and $0.010 in the case of TU. Performance-based
financial incentives would thus have to be an implausible 5 times more effective i.e. increase
birthweight by 758 grams, to be as cost-effective as unconditional financial incentives.
The study also sheds light on a potential mechanism driving the above results - the
number, timing and quality of antenatal care (ANC) visits, measured by the number
of tetanus injections and whether a woman was weighed and had her blood pressure
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taken during pregnancy. During the ZRBF pilot, the number of ANC visits conducted by
healthcare providers was attached to an explicit performance-based financial incentive for
healthcare providers of $1.6 per woman per visit. DD estimates reveal that this explicit
incentivisation resulted in 0.4 more ANC visits occurring approximately 0.2 months earlier,
with the probability of a woman having her blood pressure taken during pregnancy also
increasing by 6 percentage points in TP districts. While the above effects in TP districts
are statistically significant, the corresponding effects in TU districts, are qualitatively
similar. Interestingly, estimates for the quality of ANC measured by the number of tetanus
injections and the probability a woman was weighed during pregnancy, are statistically
significant in TU but not in TP districts. The above implies that while TP resulted
in a larger number of earlier initiated ANC visits, it did not adequately translate into
commensurate improvements in the quality of ANC visits. This could thus account for
the comparable improvements in birthweight and low birthweight in TU and TP districts.
One potential driver behind the pattern of results noted above could be multitasking.
While healthcare providers received the above noted explicit financial incentive of $1.6
per ANC visit in TP districts, the quality of ANC in TP districts was only indirectly
attached to a performance-based financial incentive, through a quality multiplier. Health-
care providers could have thus focused on the number of ANC visits, that were attached
to the performance-based financial incentive, to the detriment of the quality of the ANC
visits. This narrative is consistent with the literature on multitasking in general (Holm-
strom and Milgrom, 1991) and with Zambian healthcare providers in particular (Chibuye
et al., 2021).This could thus explain why, even though coefficient estimates are suggestive
of improvements, the quality of ANC did not commensurately improve in TP districts.
An improvement in the number and timing of ANC visits without a commensurate im-
provement in the quality of the ANC visits thus implies that health outcomes such as
birthweight and low birthweight in TP districts did not improve any more than they did
in TU districts.
Results of this study would thus imply that where improvements in child health out-
comes such as birthweight and low birth weight are concerned, performance-based financial
incentives may not be as productive as previously thought. Similarly, unconditional finan-
cial incentives would also seem to achieve a comparable level of productivity. Because
the latter incentive type can be implemented at lower cost, they may actually be more
cost-effective. This finding differs from other studies in the literature such as Mbiti et al.
(2019), who find no impacts on student education outcomes of providing schools with un-
conditional transfers, positive impacts of providing performance-based financial incentives
to teachers and both positive and significant effects of providing both types of incentives
to schools.
One limitation of this study lies in the fact that the data source used, assembles multi-
round ZDHS data on 119,036 children in order to have 15,365 birthweight observations for
the full sample. Birthweight observations are, however, shown to be equally likely to be
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missing in both TU and TP districts overall and also for each of the respective survey years
included in the analysis, reducing the likelihood of bias in the analysis. The large number
of missing observations are, however, a reflection of the underlying underdevelopment of
the setting in which the study is conducted. However, it is precisely in such low income
resource constrained developing country settings that such evidence is most critical.
In order to improve health outcomes such as birthweight and low birthweight, policy-
makers thus have two choices: implementing performance-based financial incentive pro-
grammes and incurring additional costs of directly incentivising the quality of healthcare
provision or using more cost-effective unconditional financial incentives to achieve compa-
rable improvements in such health outcomes. The above insights, while emanating from a
programme implemented during the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) period with
the aim of achieving the original maternal and child health MDGs are quite relevant to
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3.A.1 Missing Birthweight Observations
Table 3.A.1: Missing Birthweight Observations by Treatment
Panel A
Treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cons. Control TU TP




Missing Birthweight (Year) Cons. Control TU TP P-value (TU-TP)
2014 .82 .83 .82 .773
(37,083) (6,037) (5,923)
2007 .84 .88 .87 .982
(16,788) (2,336) (2,244)
2001 .87 .94 .93 .982
(17,823) (3,060) (2,923)
1996 .87 .92 .93 .598
(20,310) (1,885) (2,624)
Notes: This table analyses the proportion of missing birthweight observations by consolidated control,
unconditional (TU) and performance-based (TP) treatments, first for the entire sample in panel A
and then by survey year in panel B (the number of missing observations are in parentheses). Panel A
of the table reveals that birthweight observations are equally likely to be missing in TU and TP treat-
ments (columns 2 and 3). Similarly, panel B reveals that birthweight observations are also equally
likely to be missing in TU and TP for each of the 4 survey years presented. This is clearly reflected by
the p-values in column 4 of panel B. The p-values are generated from a linear regression of a missing
birthweight indicator on a treatment and survey year indicator interaction and district fixed effects
(standard errors are clustered at the district level). The p-values are generated from a t-test of the sig-
nificance of the difference between the TP and TU coefficients and reveal that the null hypothesis that
the difference between the proportion of missing birthweight observations in TU relative to the consol-
idated control districts, is not significant to that between TP and consolidated control districts. This
implies that the missing birthweight observations are unlikely to result in bias in the main analysis.
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3.A.2 Original ZRBF Districts
Table 3.A.2: Baseline (2007) Means and Changes in Sample Characteristics for the 30
Original ZRBF Districts
Variable TU TP Cons. Control P-value: ∆ TP = ∆ TU
Low birth weight 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.956
(0.29) (0.29) (0.30)
Birth weight (Grams) 3368.45 3243.51 3199.37 0.380
(746.53) (636.09) (660.84)
Multiple-births 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.046
(0.16) (0.22) (0.18)
Child aged U-3 0.26 0.28 0.26 0.085
(0.44) (0.45) (0.44)
Child Female 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.673
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Birth Order 3.39 3.40 3.37 0.96
(2.23) (2.29) (2.30)
Mothers age 34.89 34.49 34.40 0.245
(8.15) (8.06) (8.14)
Numb. ANC visits 4.08 4.07 3.78 0.437
(1.52) (1.54) (1.69)
Numb. HH members 6.26 6.59 6.73 0.000
(2.29) (2.88) (2.78)
Numb. Children aged U-5 1.51 1.60 1.55 0.044
(0.97) (1.02) (1.02)
Improved water 0.23 0.27 0.37 0.688
(0.42) (0.44) (0.48)
Female HH head 0.24 0.20 0.20 0.965
(0.43) (0.40) (0.40)
Age of HH head 41.79 41.81 41.31 0.950
(10.90) (11.45) (11.13)
Urban residence 0.19 0.13 0.21 0.272
(0.39) (0.34) (0.41)
Notes: This table shows means for TP, TU and control districts for sample characteristics at baseline (2007)
for the 30 (10 per treatment) Original Zambia Results Based Financing (ZRBF) districts. The p-values in col-
umn 4 are generated from linear regressions with each respective variable in the row as the outcome variable
regressed on a treatment indicator and year indicator interaction and district fixed effects (standard errors
are clustered at the district level). The categorical variables not shown in the table are; mothers highest level
of education (primary across all treatments and control) and whether the woman has currently/formerly or
has never been in a marital union (currently in a union across treatments and control). Birth order refers to
the order in which a woman’s children are born, beginning from her first birth.
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Table 3.A.3: Difference-in-Differences Birthweight and Low Birthweight Estimates: 30 Original ZRBF Districts.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
birth weight birth weight birth weight Low birth weight Low birth weight Low birth weight
Unconditional × Int 41.48 38.49 145.3 0.0206 0.00172 -0.0952**
(71.33) (81.11) (106.5) (0.0235) (0.0310) (0.0445)
Performance-based × Int 42.80 10.36 118.6 0.00837 0.00493 -0.100***
(64.46) (76.98) (76.46) (0.0184) (0.0235) (0.0323)
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Sub(Educ) Sub(Age) Full Sub(Educ) Sub(Age)
Control Group Mean 3093.6*** 3301.6*** 3170.7*** 0.115*** 0.102** 0.124**
(86.53) (113.7) (96.53) (0.0333) (0.0387) (0.0481)
Observations 4119 2765 2999 4119 2765 2999
R2 0.048 0.055 0.076 0.022 0.030 0.043
Notes: The table shows DD regressions of the main and heterogeneous impacts of unconditional and performance-based financial incentives on infant birth-
weight and low birthweight for singleton births, for children in the in the 30 Original Zambia Results Based Financing (ZRBF) unconditional and performance-
based, relative to control districts. Infant birthweight is measured in grams, while low birthweight is an indicator variable for infant birthweight less than
2,500 grams. Each column shows a separate regression with some coefficients omitted to conserve space. The intensity-post variable is zero for all children
born before treatment (before April 2012), 1 for all children born 9 months or more after the start of treatment and is set to equal the fraction of the in-utero
(9 month) period, (potentially) spent under treatment for children born within 9 months of the start of treatment. Heterogeneous effects are assessed based
on mothers mothers education in column 3 (no education and only primary education) and mothers age in column 4 (mothers <= 20 and those > 35 years
old). The preferred and most conservative specification, including both district and birth cohort fixed effects, is used in all regressions 2007, the baseline
year for the analysis, is also the reference year in the regressions. Standard errors, clustered at the district level, are in parentheses; p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, **
p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 3.A.4: Difference-in-Differences Full Sample Estimates for Ante-natal Care Visits: 30 Original ZRBF Districts.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
num. ANC visits timing 1st ANC num. tetanus injections weighed blood pressure
Unconditional × Int -0.188 0.0559 0.256*** 0.00977 0.0428
(0.153) (0.144) (0.0600) (0.0242) (0.0317)
Performance-based × Int 0.0282 -0.255 0.228*** -0.0116 0.0691**
(0.133) (0.159) (0.0789) (0.0292) (0.0303)
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Group Mean 3.353*** 4.526*** 1.645*** 0.890*** 0.709***
(0.134) (0.101) (0.0657) (0.0210) (0.0350)
Observations 7216 7019 7261 5658 5657
R2 0.098 0.066 0.075 0.048 0.088
Notes: The table shows DD regressions of the number, timing and quality of Ante-natal Care visits in the 30 Original Zambia Results Based Fi-
nancing (ZRBF) unconditional unconditional and performance-based, relative to control districts. Each column shows a separate DD regression,
with some coefficients omitted to conserve space. The intensity (Int) variable is zero for all children born before treatment (before April 2012),
1 for all infants born 9 months or more after the start of treatment and is set to equal the fraction of the in-utero (9 month) period, spent under
treatment for children born within 9 months of the start of treatment. The preferred and most conservative specification, including both district
and birth cohort fixed effects, is used in all regressions. Consolidated control districts are the reference category. ANC quality is measured by
the number of tetanus injections received by a women before giving birth, and dummy variables indicating; whether the woman was weighed
and had her blood pressure taken, respectively, during pregnancy. The regressions in columns 4 and 5 contain fewer observations because in the
ZDHS 1996, respondents were not asked about being weighed or having their blood pressure taken at ANC. Standard errors, clustered at the
district level, are in parentheses. p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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3.A.3 Triple Difference and Low-Impact Sub-sample Estimates
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Table 3.A.5: Triple Difference Birthweight and Low Birthweight Estimates.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
birth weight birth weight birth weight Low birth weight Low birth weight Low birth weight
TU × 2014 × U3 -71.96 120.5 7.830 -0.0139 -0.125*** -0.206**
(169.3) (132.0) (264.6) (0.0682) (0.0411) (0.102)
TP × 2014 × U3 113.6 244.1** 289.8 -0.0177 -0.0634* -0.0580
(106.6) (94.22) (250.5) (0.0354) (0.0377) (0.0849)
TU × 2001 × U3 -139.4 49.76 205.0 0.0642 0.0346 -0.197
(129.7) (153.3) (492.0) (0.0824) (0.0839) (0.287)
TP × 2001 × U3 86.02 250.7 -36.16 -0.0607 -0.138*** 0.0905
(115.0) (202.7) (326.6) (0.0473) (0.0500) (0.0973)
TU × 1996 × U3 93.09 159.3 -316.3 -0.0553 -0.140 -0.111
(187.1) (216.1) (196.4) (0.103) (0.120) (0.0772)
TP × 1996 × U3 70.34 3.377 24.97 0.0558 0.0973* 0.129
(152.1) (221.6) (230.1) (0.0449) (0.0490) (0.111)
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Group Mean 3046.7*** 3129.2*** 2988.3*** 0.0978*** 0.0798* 0.227***
(79.39) (111.8) (104.0) (0.0356) (0.0457) (0.0587)
Observations 15365 9504 4409 15365 9504 4409
Notes: The table shows DDD regressions of the main and heterogeneous impacts of performance-based and unconditional financial incentives on infant
birthweight (columns 1-3) and low birthweight (columns 4-6) for singleton births, for children aged under 3 years old in unconditional and performance-
based districts, relative to children aged above 3 years old in consolidated control districts. Each column contains a separate DDD regression (some
coefficients are omitted to conserve space). Heterogeneous effects are assessed based on mothers education in columns 2 and 5 (no education and only
primary education) and mothers age in columns 3 and 6 (mothers <= 20 and those > 35 years old). 2007, the baseline year for the analysis, is also the
reference year in the regressions. Standard errors, clustered at the district level, are in parentheses; p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 3.A.6: Difference-in-Differences Birthweight and low Birthweight Heterogeneous Estimates: Low Impact Sub-samples.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
birth weight birth weight Low birthweight Low birthweight
Unconditional × Int 58.96 73.15* -0.00837 -0.0256
(95.84) (42.38) (0.0281) (0.0167)
Performance-based × Int 70.82** 40.67 -0.0344 -0.0292**
(33.03) (30.99) (0.0213) (0.0119)
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Sub(Educ) Sub(Age) Sub(Educ) Sub(Age)
Control Group Mean 2967.8*** 3110.1*** 0.126*** 0.131***
(85.29) (46.66) (0.0373) (0.0205)
Observations 6160 15734 6160 15734
R2 0.062 0.049 0.032 0.016
Notes: The table shows DD regressions of heterogeneous impacts of unconditional and performance-based finan-
cial incentives on infant birthweight and low birthweight for singleton births, for children in unconditional and
performance-based districts, relative to consolidated control districts. Infant birthweight is measured in grams,
while low birthweight is an indicator variable for infant birthweight less than 2,500 grams. Each column shows
a separate regression with some coefficients omitted to conserve space. The intensity-post variable is zero for all
children born before treatment (before April 2012), 1 for all children born 9 months or more after the start of
treatment and is set to equal the fraction of the in-utero (9 month) period, (potentially) spent under treatment
for children born within 9 months of the start of treatment. Heterogeneous effects are assessed based on moth-
ers mothers education in columns 1 and 3 (secondary education or higher) and mothers age in columns 2 and 4
(mothers > 20 and those < 35 years old). The preferred and most conservative specification, including both dis-
trict and birth cohort fixed effects, is used in all regressions. Standard errors, clustered at the district level, are in
parentheses.; p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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3.A.4 High-Impact Sub-sample ANC Estimates
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Table 3.A.7: Difference-in-Differences Estimates for Ante-natal Care Visits: Women with No or Only a Primary Education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
num. ANC visits timing 1st ANC num. tetanus injections weighed blood pressure
Unconditional × Int 0.226 -0.0940 0.141** 0.0280 0.0490
(0.169) (0.130) (0.0605) (0.0271) (0.0411)
Performance-based × Int 0.399*** -0.226 0.139 0.00329 0.0773**
(0.140) (0.167) (0.0983) (0.0305) (0.0313)
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Group Mean 3.763*** 4.398*** 1.744*** 0.889*** 0.686***
(0.0975) (0.0722) (0.0436) (0.0142) (0.0223)
Observations 17488 16998 17608 11622 11617
R2 0.112 0.073 0.077 0.053 0.097
Notes: The table shows DD regressions of the number, timing and quality of Ante-natal Care visits in unconditional and performance-based dis-
tricts, relative to consolidated control districts, for the high impact sub-sample of women either with no education or only a primary education.
Each column shows a separate regression with some coefficients omitted to conserve space). The intensity-post variable is zero for all children
born before treatment (before April 2012), 1 for all infants born 9 months or more after the start of treatment and is set to equal the fraction of
the in-utero (9 month) period, spent under treatment for children born within 9 months of the start of treatment. ANC quality is measured by
the number of tetanus injections received by a women before giving birth, and dummy variables indicating; whether the woman was weighed,
had her blood pressure taken, was told about complications and received iron tablets/syrup, respectively, during pregnancy. The regressions in
columns 4 and 5 contain fewer observations because in the ZDHS 1996 and 2001, respondents were not asked about being weighed or having their
blood pressure taken at ANC. Standard errors, clustered at the district level, are in parentheses. p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 3.A.8: Difference-in-Differences Estimates for Ante-natal Care Visits: Women Aged 20 Years Old or Less or Older Than 35 years of Age.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
num. ANC visits timing 1st ANC num. tetanus injections weighed blood pressure
Unconditional × Int 0.134 0.0588 0.0783 0.0587** -0.00326
(0.171) (0.150) (0.0831) (0.0292) (0.0555)
Performance-based × Int 0.410*** -0.201 0.203* -0.00485 0.0377
(0.147) (0.144) (0.112) (0.0361) (0.0410)
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Group Mean 3.287*** 4.707*** 1.750*** 0.861*** 0.726***
(0.166) (0.0960) (0.0605) (0.0176) (0.0263)
Observations 7668 7454 7706 5563 5561
R2 0.140 0.076 0.091 0.055 0.101
Notes: The table shows DD regressions of the number, timing and quality of Ante-natal Care visits in unconditional and performance-based dis-
tricts, relative to consolidated control districts, for the high impact sub-sample of women aged 20 years old or less or older than 35 years of age.
Each column shows a separate regression with some coefficients omitted to conserve space). The intensity-post variable is zero for all children
born before treatment (before April 2012), 1 for all infants born 9 months or more after the start of treatment and is set to equal the fraction
of the in-utero (9 month) period, spent under treatment for children born within 9 months of the start of treatment. The preferred and most
conservative specification, including both district and birth cohort fixed effects, is used in all regressions. 2007, the baseline year, is also the
reference year in all regressions. Consolidated control districts are the reference category. ANC quality is measured by the number of tetanus
injections received by a women before giving birth, and dummy variables indicating; whether the woman was weighed, had her blood pressure
taken, was told about complications and received iron tablets/syrup, respectively, during pregnancy. The regressions in columns 4 and 5 contain
fewer observations because in the ZDHS 1996 and 2001, respondents were not asked about being weighed or having their blood pressure taken
at ANC. Standard errors, clustered at the district level, are in parentheses. p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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3.A.5 Difference-in-Difference Birthweight and Low Birthweight Esti-
mates: District by Year Time-Trends
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Table 3.A.9: Difference-in-Differences Birthweight and Low Birthweight Estimates: District by Year Fixed Effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
birth weight birth weight birth weight Low birth weight Low birth weight Low birth weight
Unconditional × Int 38.12 106.5*** 231.4*** 0.00194 -0.0414** -0.0908***
(39.08) (36.84) (77.90) (0.0185) (0.0159) (0.0319)
Performance-based × Int 58.74* 76.23** 229.3*** -0.00978 -0.0352** -0.111***
(34.30) (37.86) (83.28) (0.0158) (0.0150) (0.0349)
District by year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Sub(Educ) Sub(Age) Full Sub(Educ) Sub(Age)
Control Group Mean 3231.7*** 3437.8*** 2639.3*** 0.0417** 0.0269 0.152***
(38.97) (51.30) (64.43) (0.0158) (0.0238) (0.0303)
Observations 15365 9504 4409 15365 9504 4409
R2 0.055 0.056 0.091 0.019 0.024 0.048
Notes: The table shows DD regressions of the main and heterogeneous impacts of unconditional and performance-based financial incentives on infant birth-
weight and low birthweight for singleton births, for children in unconditional and performance-based districts, relative to consolidated control districts. Infant
birthweight is measured in grams, while low birthweight is an indicator variable for infant birthweight less than 2,500 grams. Each column shows a separate
regression with some coefficients omitted to conserve space. The intensity-post variable is zero for all children born before treatment (before April 2012), 1
for all children born 9 months or more after the start of treatment and is set to equal the fraction of the in-utero (9 month) period, (potentially) spent under
treatment for children born within 9 months of the start of treatment. Heterogeneous effects are assessed based on mothers mothers education in column
3 (no education and only primary education) and mothers age in column 4 (mothers <= 20 and those > 35 years old). All regressions include district by
year fixed effects. 2007, the baseline year for the analysis, is also the reference year in the regressions. Standard errors, clustered at the district level, are in
parentheses.; p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Figure 3.A.1: Density of Running Variable at Treatment Threshold.
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Chapter 4
Public Sector Compensation and
Rural-Urban Gaps in Service
Delivery: Evidence from Zambia
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Abstract
This paper studies the effect of unconditional wage increases in rural health facilities on
staffing levels. First, we document large differences in access to and utilization of health
services between rural and urban areas in the context of our study, Zambia. Second, we
leverage a spatial discontinuity in the eligibility for a rural hardship allowance to estimate
the causal effect of the resulting wage increase on health facility staffing levels. We find
that the unconditional wage increase of 20% induced by the allowance leads to a 51%
increase in the number of health workers in health facilities eligible to receive it. Our
findings thus illustrate the poignancy of unconditional hardship allowance schemes as a
policy tool in addressing inequalities in access to high quality health workers between rural
and urban areas in low income developing country settings.
Keywords: Inequality, Health, Financial Incentives, Development.
JEL Codes: l1, l14, D04.
4.1 Introduction
Rural areas of developing countries are often characterised by low levels of access to
public services. A particular concern is the absence of qualified personnel for service
delivery in these areas. Both the quantity and the quality of key service delivery agents,
such as health workers and teachers, is typically much lower than in urban areas.1 While
the rigidity of the wage structure in the public sector limits the ability of governments
to attract workers to locations with less desirable working conditions, hardship allowance
schemes have emerged as a common policy tool to address staffing inequalities. These
schemes offer unconditional wage supplements for working in rural areas. Despite their
popularity, evidence on their effectiveness remains limited, especially in the health sector.2
This paper studies the effect of a rural hardship allowance scheme on health facility
staffing in Zambia. First, we document large differences in access to and utilization of
healthcare services between urban and rural areas. Second, we exploit a spatial disconti-
nuity in the eligibility for the hardship allowance to estimate its causal effect on facility
staffing levels. The allowance scheme implies a 20% higher pay for health workers sta-
tioned at facilities more than a predetermined distance from the respective district capital.
Comparing facilities on either side of the eligibility threshold, we find that the allowance
leads to a 51% increase in the number of health workers in eligible facilities.
Poor health outcomes have long been attributed to health worker shortages in Zambia
(Ferrinho et al., 2011; Herbst et al., 2011; Zambia Ministry of Health, 2017). Large work-
force deficits in rural areas, where some facilities have no qualified staff at all, are associated
with particularly low levels of health (Zambia Ministry of Health, 2011). As a mitigation
strategy, the Zambian government provides an unconditional salary supplement of 20%
over the basic salary to health workers stationed in rural areas. This supplement, known
as the rural hardship allowance, is paid to workers at health facilities located outside a
pre-specified radius from their respective district capital, where the radius depends on the
government’s classification of the remoteness of a district.3 The aim of the allowance is to
compensate workers for the inconveniences associated with a lack of modern amenities in
far flung rural areas.4
This study utilises a spatial fuzzy regression discontinuity design within districts to de-
termine whether the unconditional salary increase induced by the rural hardship allowance,
results in an increase in health workers in rural health facilities. More specifically, we es-
timate the causal effect of the rural hardship allowance on the number of health workers
1See Dussault and Franceschini (2006) or Lemiere et al. (2011) for a documentation of this phenomenon
in the health sector. See Figueiredo Walter (2020) for evidence of staffing inequalities across public primary
schools in low-income countries.
2We discuss the related literature in detail below.
3The radius is larger in more urban districts. Details are discussed in section 4.2.
4Health workers have been noted to especially shun rural areas owing to factors such as a general
lack of social and economic infrastructure and amenities and fewer opportunities for training and income
supplementation in rural areas (McCoy et al., 2008).
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stationed at a health facility, comparing staffing levels of facilities on either side of the
eligibility threshold. Additionally, we evaluate the impact of the allowance on the quality-
adjusted number of health workers, as measured by the total facility wage bill, excluding
allowance payments.
To preview our results, we find that the probability of the payment of the hardship
allowances increases by 71 percentage points at the eligibility threshold, from a baseline
probability of 20% among ineligible facilities near the threshold. Assessing the impact of
the allowance on staffing levels among facilities eligible to receive the allowance reveals
that the number of health workers increases by 51%, while the quality-adjusted number
of health workers increases by 50%. Instrumenting the payment of the allowance with
eligibility for the allowance among facilities near the threshold, we estimate that the
allowance increases the number of health workers by 80% and the quality-adjusted number
of health workers by 86% among eligible facilities that actually receive the allowance.
This paper primarily speaks to an emerging literature on the role of financial incentives
for recruitment and retention of public sector employees. Existing evidence is largely in
line with our findings, showing that financial incentives can help the state bridge staffing
gaps between more and less attractive locations. For example, Dal Bó et al. (2013) ran-
domize wage offers to community development agents across Mexican municipalities and
document that higher wages reduce the recruitment gap between more and less developed
municipalities. Similarly, hardship allowances have been shown to increase the quality of
teachers at less attractive schools in multiple contexts, notably in Peru (Neilson et al.,
2021), the Gambia (Pugatch and Schroeder, 2014) and Uruguay (Cabrera and Webbink,
2020). In Zambia, however, Chelwa et al. (2019) do not find evidence of a significant effect
of the rural hardship allowance scheme on school staffing levels and teacher characteristics
in rural schools. In contrast to the existing literature, this paper focuses on the health
sector and documents a substantial effect of higher wages on staffing levels in rural health
facilities - even though the examined allowance scheme does not appear to succeed at
closing staffing gaps between urban and rural schools in the same setting.
A second strand of literature this paper is related to is concerned with health workers’
preferences over job attributes, typically leveraging hypothetical discrete choice experi-
ments to derive wage differentials required to compensate for unattractive job attributes
(de Bekker-Grob et al., 2012). Of particular relevance for this paper is the work by Prust
et al. (2019) in the Zambian context. They elicit preferences over rural and urban positions
while varying other job attributes, including salary (a base salary and a 20%, 25% and
30% rural allowance, respectively), among 474 current and future health workers. The re-
sults from their experiment suggest that hardship allowances can increase the acceptance
of rural positions. The hypothetical and non-incentivised nature of participant responses
as well as the underlying convenience sample of health workers and students, however,
cast doubt on the external validity of their quantitative estimates for actual job take up
decisions among the population of health workers. This paper circumvents these concerns
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by leveraging administrative data from the universe of public health workers in Zambia to
study de facto health facility staffing levels.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 4.2 provides background
information on the Zambian healthcare system and the rural hardship allowance scheme.
Section 4.3 outlines the data sources used in this paper and provides descriptive statis-
tics. Section 4.4 explains the estimation strategy, while section 4.5 presents the results.
Robustness checks are documented in section 4.6 and section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Background
4.2.1 The Rural-Urban Gap in Health Service Provision
Despite Zambia being listed as one of the most urbanised countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa, the majority of the country’s population, approximately 60%, still reside in rural
areas. However, it is rural areas that continue to suffer the adverse effects of a rural
’development deficit’ that encompasses a lack of access to basic economic infrastructure,
such as roads and electricity, and also extends to basic social services (Zambia Ministry of
National Development Planning, 2017). This is well exemplified by rural-urban inequalities
in access to health services, which remain large. Figure 4.2.1, which utilises data from
the 2018 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS), illustrates these inequalities (Zambia
Ministry of Health and IFC, 2019). Panel A of the figure shows the proportion of urban and
rural women respectively, who report having access to a skilled health worker at delivery,
where a skilled health worker is defined as either a Medical Doctor, Nurse, Midwife,
Clinical Officer or Community Health Assistant.5 Similarly, panel B of figure 4.2.1 shows
the proportion of urban and rural women respectively, that report delivering their babies
from a health facility. Panel A reveals that while 93% of urban women report having been
assisted by a skilled health worker at delivery, only 75% of rural women report having
similar access to a skilled health worker at delivery. Similarly, panel B reveals that while
93% of urban women report delivering their babies in a health facility, only 78% of rural
women report having similar access to a health facility at delivery. The relatively limited
access to health services in rural areas implies that rural women are forced to develop
coping strategies, which may include turning to informal channels. This is illustrated in
figure 4.A.1 in annex 4.A.1, which reveals that 21% of rural women report having been
assisted by a friend, relative or traditional birth attendant during delivery. In the case
of urban women, however, only 6% report having received similar assistance during the
process of delivering their babies.
The above exercise, while being only descriptive and illustrative, is certainly poignant.
This is because it serves to highlight the nature of the rural-urban inequalities in access to
5Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 3, aims to, ”Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for
all at all ages.” Increasing the proportion of births attended by skilled healthcare workers is among the


























Figure 4.2.1: Rural-Urban Access to a Skilled Health Worker and Health Facility during
Delivery
Notes: This figure plots the proportion of women with access to a skilled healthcare worker and to a health
facility at delivery in rural and urban areas respectively. A skilled healthcare worker is defined as either a
Medical Doctor, Nurse, Midwife, Clinical Officer or Community Health Assistant. The figures shown are
the authors calculations based on data from the 2018 Demographic and Health Survey.
health services that the provision of the rural hardship allowance to health workers aims
at addressing.
4.2.2 The Zambian Healthcare System
The Zambian healthcare system comprises four tiers or levels of care. The highest tier
comprises level-3 hospitals that are at the apex of the health system, providing the highest
level of care and catering for the most complex of disease conditions. These are followed
by level-2 and then by level-1 hospitals, respectively. Urban and rural health centres and
health posts comprise the lowest and most basic level of care, providing mainly health
promotion, disease prevention and basic curative services. The health system is based on
a referral system, whereby more complex cases, that cannot be handled by health centres
and health posts, are referred to level-1, then level-2 and finally, to level-3 hospitals.
Hospitals are located in urban areas while health posts are typically located in rural areas.
Health centres can be found throughout the country, in both urban and rural areas. As of
2017, Zambia had a total of 2,933 health facilities, comprising eight level-3 hospitals, 34
level-2 hospitals, 99 level-1 hospitals, 1,839 health centres and 953 health posts (Zambia
Ministry of Health, 2017).
The government is the main provider of healthcare in Zambia and the largest employer
of health workers, owning and operating approximately 90% of health facilities at all levels
of the healthcare system under the Ministry of Health (MoH). Health workers are officially
employed by the Zambian civil service but are managed by the MoH and are deployed to
locations of critical need at recruitment. Upon confirmation of their employment status in
the Zambian civil service, health workers, like other civil servants, are eligible to initiate a
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transfer process, whereby they can potentially be reassigned to other health facilities (pos-
sibly in another location) upon approval of their transfer request. Rural-urban dynamics
in this process are such that health workers are first deployed to health facilities in rural
areas, independent of their preferences, owing to the greater need in such areas. However,
evidence suggests that due to hardship concerns many workers quickly initiate the process
of requesting for transfers to health facilities in urban areas (Cross and Baernholdt, 2017;
McCoy et al., 2008).
The policy goal of the Zambian MoH is to ensure adequate numbers of well trained
health workers, equitably distributed nationwide to meet the health needs of the popu-
lation. The human resource situation reached crisis levels, with only 43% of the World
Health Organisation (WHO) recommended staffing levels of 2.28 health workers per 1,000
of the population, as recently as 2010. In response to this, the National Training Opera-
tional Plan and the National Human Resources for Health Strategic plan were implemented
between 2011 and 2016. Efforts were focused at numerous levels including opening of new
training institutions, training of more health workers and their recruitment into the civil
service and the establishment of a Community Health Assistant (CHA) cadre. Despite
these efforts, the deficit of health workers still persists with only 68% of approved positions
being filled. Rural areas are especially disadvantaged in this regard owing to challenges
related to relatively lower health worker retention relative to urban areas (Zambia Min-
istry of Health, 2017).
4.2.3 The Rural Hardship Allowance Scheme
The rural hardship allowance in its current form was streamlined in 2010.6 It is ear-
marked for health workers stationed in health facilities outside a pre-specified radius from
the capital of their respective district. For this purpose, Zambian districts are classified
into four different categories. For the most urban category-A districts, health workers in
health facilities at least 30 kilometres (km) away from the district capital, qualify to re-
ceive the allowance in the form of an unconditional 20% supplement to their basic salaries.
For more rural category-B and C districts, health workers stationed in facilities at least
20 and 25 km, respectively, from their district capital are eligible to receive the same 20%
salary supplement. In the case of the most rural category-D districts, health workers in all
health facilities are eligible to receive the allowance. Figure 4.2.2 shows the distribution
of Zambian districts by category as well as each district’s respective capital. Figure 4.2.3
illustrates the distance-to-district-capital eligibility criteria for the case of Chipata district,
a category-B district.
The distance of each health facility from its respective district capital and thus eligibil-
ity to receive the allowance are determined firstly by the Office of the Surveyor General,
a department within the Zambian Ministry of Lands responsible for collecting Global
6For a further discussion on the background and evolution of the rural hardship allowance, see the








Figure 4.2.2: Categorization of Districts
Notes: This figure shows the categorization of Zambian districts for purposes of the rural hardship al-
lowance payment. Different categories are displayed in different shades of grey. District capitals are
marked by yellow circles.
Positioning System (GPS) coordinates of health facilities and district capitals. This in-
formation is then passed onto the Payroll Management Establishment Control (PMEC)
unit at the heart of the Zambian civil service, which is responsible for the management
of the payroll for all Zambian civil servants. Eligibility for receipt of the rural hardship
allowance is only partly determined by the GPS coordinates and district categorisation,
however, as health facilities judged as especially isolated owing to being separated from
their respective district capitals by natural barriers such as mountains or rivers, can be re-
classified as eligible to receive the allowance in the event they are deemed ineligible, based
on GPS coordinates alone (Chelwa et al., 2019). These classification and re-classification
dynamics are also evident in figure 4.2.3. In the figure, three health facilities are displayed
as receiving the allowance despite falling within the ’urban zone’ that is less than 25km
from the capital of Chipata district. This illustrates the type of ex-post reclassification
discussed above. However, as can be noted in the figure, these re-classifications are the
exception as opposed to the rule with health facilities that are outside the urban zone
actually being the majority of facilities that receive the rural hardship allowance.
4.3 Data
This study utilises several administrative data sets. The first data set is the Japan Inter-
national Cooperation Agency (JICA) health facility survey conducted in Zambia in 2017.
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Figure 4.2.3: Rural Hardship Allowance Eligibility and Receipt in Chipata district
Notes: This figure illustrates rural hardship allowance eligibility based on the distance-to-district-capital
eligibility criteria and actual receipt of the allowance for health facilities in Chipata district, a category-B
district.
The JICA facility survey collected data on 2,395 government owned or supported health
facilities at all levels of care in Zambia, with the aim of assessing health worker staffing
levels in these facilities. As noted in section 4.2, Zambia had a total of 2,933 health facil-
ities as of 2017, with approximately 90% being government owned or supported facilities.
This implies that the JICA survey contains data on approximately 82% of government
owned or supported health facilities at all levels of care in the country. The JICA survey
collected information on such aspects as facility infrastructure, including the number of in-
patient and maternal beds and a head count of the catchment population of each facility.
Additionally, the number, type, specialisation and gender of health workers stationed at
the facility was collected. The types of health workers listed are the following: Adherence
Officer, Clinical Officer, Community Health Assistant, Dental Therapist, Elimination of
Mother to Child Transmission (EMTCT) officer, Environmental Health Technician, Labo-
ratory Technologist, Medical Doctor, Medical Licentiate, Nurse, Nutritionist, Pharmacist,
Pharmacy Technician, Physiotherapist, Psycho-social Councillor, Public Health Inspector
or Radiographer. The specialisation of health workers list their specialty. Taking nurses
as a case in point, their specializations are listed as, for instance; Nurse-in-charge, Pub-
lic Health Nurse, Registered Nurse, Registered Diagnostic Nurse, Registered Ophthalmic
Nurse, Registered Paediatric Nurse, Registered Theatre Nurse, Registered Nurse Midwife,
Zambia Enrolled Nurse, Zambia Enrolled Nurse Psychiatry, Zambia Enrolled Nurse Mid-
wife or Zambia Enrolled Mental Health Nurse. Crucially for the purposes of this study,
the JICA survey also collected the GPS coordinates of each health facility.
The second data set is a de-identified individual-level extract from the health sector
Zambia civil service payroll from 2014. This unique data set, made available by the
Zambian government, contains information on the basic salary, allowances received and
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specialisation of Zambian civil service employees.
Combining the payroll data set and the JICA survey permits us to generate two health
worker related variables which serve as the main outcomes of this study. First, we simply
compute the total number of health workers at each health facility regardless of type or
specialisation. Second, we construct a quality-adjusted measure of health workers, the
total facility wage bill, by summing up monthly basic salaries (excluding any allowances)
received across all health workers within each facility.7 Assuming that differences in basic
salaries reflect differences in the quality of health workers, we can account for differences
in the positions and specializations of health workers between facilities this way. Again,
taking the case of nurses for illustrative purposes, a nurse listed as a Zambia Enrolled
Nurse Psychiatry, a Zambia Enrolled Nurse Midwife or a Zambia Enrolled Mental Health
Nurse has a higher qualification and earns a higher salary than a Zambia Enrolled Nurse.
Similarly, a Registered Nurse is more qualified than an Enrolled Nurse or any of its spe-
cialisations. Among Registered Nurses, in turn, more specialised nurses such as Registered
Diagnostic Nurses, Registered Ophthalmic Nurses, Registered Paediatric Nurses, Regis-
tered Theatre Nurses or Registered Nurse Midwifes are more qualified than Registered
Nurses and earn correspondingly higher monthly salaries. In this manner, we thus attach
the number, type and specialisation of all health workers listed at each facility in the JICA
survey to a monthly salary in the payroll data and compute the total monthly wage bill
for each health facility in our data set.
The third data set utilised contains the GPS coordinates of all district capitals in Zam-
bia. Combining the GPS coordinates of the district capitals and the GPS coordinates
of each health facility from the JICA facility survey, we compute the running variable,
distance between each facility and its respective district capital, measured in kilometres
(km). This, in turn, allows us to determine whether or not a given health facility falls
on the eligible side of the threshold to receive the rural hardship allowance, based on the
eligibility criteria discussed in section 4.2.
The fourth data set utilised is a list of all health facilities actually receiving the rural
hardship allowance in September 2020, obtained from the Payroll Management Establish-
ment Control (PMEC) unit and the Zambia Ministry of Health (MoH).8 Owing to the
absence of unique common facility identifiers across this data set and the JICA facility
survey, the two data sets are matched based on facility and district name. Following this
procedure, a total of 2,340 health facilities, whose eligibility status for receipt of the rural
hardship allowance is established based on GPS coordinates, are matched to the list of
health facilities actually receiving the allowance.
7We measure the total facility wage bill in Zambian Kwacha (ZMW). 1 USD is approximately equal
to 22 ZMW.
8PMEC is the government departmental unit responsible for maintaining the entire Zambian civil
service payroll, while MoH is responsible for the recruitment, deployment and management of all public
sector employed health workers in Zambia as discussed in section 4.2.
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For our analysis, we restrict the resulting sample of health facilities as follows. First, we
disregard all health facilities for which the JICA census is missing information on health
workers, leaving us with 2,123 facilities. Second, we exclude all facilities in category-D
districts since there is no variation in eligibility for the rural hardship allowance within
these districts. Third, we exclude all hospitals as they are few, almost exclusively located
in urban centres and provide more complex curative healthcare services than primary care
facilities, based on the referral system of healthcare provision (see section 4.2). Fourth,
we exclude health posts as they are rarely found in urban areas. This leaves a total of 755
health facilities comprised exclusively of health centres, the most common type of health
facility in Zambia found on both the eligible and ineligible side of the threshold. Thus, in
the discussion below, the term health facility will refer to health centres and our results
will only directly apply to this type of facility. Finally, we zoom in on the sample of health
centres located within 10km of the eligibility threshold on either side of the threshold
owing to the fact that the identification rationale of the RDD framework only applies
when comparing health facilities within a close neighbourhood of the eligibility threshold,
which are most likely to be similar, apart from falling on the eligible or ineligible side of
the threshold, respectively (Lee and Lemieux, 2010). This leaves us with a final sample of
171 health centres, utilised in the main analysis.
Table 4.3.1 below presents means of the outcome variables as well as characteristics
of the health facilities included in the sample. Column 3 contains the difference in the
means between eligible and ineligible facilities while the standard error in column 4 is the
standard error of the difference in the means. In the full sample (Panel A), there is a
significant difference in size between eligible and ineligible facilities, whether measured by
staffing levels, catchment population or the number of maternal beds. Urban facilities on
the ineligible side of the threshold are generally bigger. When restricting the sample to
facilities in the neighborhood of the threshold (Panel B), these differences largely disap-
pear, indicating that facilities in this sample are more similar. The likelihood of receiving
the hardship allowance, on the other hand, is significantly higher among eligible facilities
and the difference with ineligible facilities is actually larger in the restricted sample.
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Table 4.3.1: Health Facility Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (4)
Variable Eligible Ineligible Difference SE p-value
Panel A: Full sample
Health workers 4.32 14.97 10.65 1.22 0.00
Wage bill (ZMW) 13,993.39 50,002.87 36,009.48 4,215.18 0.00
Catchment population 9,512 20,407 10895 2,500 0.00
Maternal beds 2.68 3.30 0.61 0.37 0.10
In-patient beds 7.28 6.77 -0.51 1.60 0.75
Receive allowance 0.56 0.15 -0.41 0.03 0.00
Observations 481 274
Panel B: Within 10km
Health workers 4.20 4.90 0.70 0.69 0.31
Wage bill (ZMW) 13,224.16 15,892.74 2,668.58 2,348.63 0.26
Catchment population 11,963 8,368 -3,594 1814 0.05
Maternal beds 2.92 3.36 0.44 0.40 0.26
In-patient beds 8.58 6.90 -1.68 1.34 0.21
Receives allowance 0.69 0.20 -0.50 0.07 0.00
Observations 85 86
Notes: The table shows means of health facility characteristics for health facilities that are eligible
and ineligible to receive the rural hardship allowance, based on the distance-to-district-capital eli-
gibility criteria, respectively. Columns 1 and 2 show the means of each respective variable, while
column 3 shows the difference in the means. Columns 4 and 5 show the standard error and p-
value of the difference in the various means, respectively. Health facility refers to a health centre.
The sample is restricted to districts with health facilities on both the eligible and ineligible sides
of the threshold. Panel A shows characteristics for all facilities in the sample, while panel B is re-
stricted to facilities within a 20km bandwidth of the eligibility threshold (10km on each side of the
threshold). A health worker is defined as either an Adherence Officer, Clinical Officer, Commu-
nity Health Assistant, Dental Therapist, Elimination of Mother to Child Transmission (EMTCT)
Officer, Environmental Health Technician, Laboratory Technologist, Medical Doctor, Medical Li-
centiate, Nurse, Nutritionist, Pharmacist, Pharmacy Technician, Physiotherapist, Psycho-social
Councillor, Public Health Inspector or Radiographer. Health Facility wage bill refers to the total
monthly wage bill per health facility, measured in Zambian Kwacha, ZMW; 1 USD approximately
equals 22 ZMW. Catchment population refers to the headcount of the population in each health
facility’s catchment area. Receive allowance refers to the share of health facilities listed as actually




Identifying the causal effect of rural hardship allowance schemes on staffing levels is
challenging. Since hardship allowances are targeted to facilities in rural areas that lack
basic infrastructure, facilities at which such allowances are paid are by construction differ-
ent from facilities where such allowances are not offered. Hence, comparing staffing levels
between facilities where the allowance is paid and where not confounds the causal effect
of the allowance on staffing levels with other differences in determinants of staffing levels
between these two types of facilities.
This study utilises a spatial fuzzy regression discontinuity design (RDD) to estimate
the causal effect of the rural hardship allowance on health facility staffing in Zambia.
The rural hardship allowance in Zambia is administered in such a manner that health
workers stationed in health facilities outside a pre-specified threshold distance from their
district capital are eligible to receive it. This permits the estimation of an RDD model
within a close neighbourhood of the eligibility threshold, using the distance to the district
capital as the running variable and eligibility to receive the rural hardship allowance as
an instrument for receipt of the allowance (Hahn et al., 2001). A fuzzy as opposed to
sharp RDD is necessitated because crossing the eligibility threshold for the receipt of the
allowance increases the likelihood of receipt, but does not shift it from 0 to 1 for reasons
discussed in section 4.2.
A key identifying assumption of the RDD framework is that of continuity of all potential
determinants of the outcome of interest aside from the treatment studied within a close
neighbourhood of the eligibility threshold (Hahn et al., 2001). This implies that healthcare
facilities within a close neighbourhood of the threshold for receiving the allowance, but
on the non-qualifying side, are sufficiently similar to those on the qualifying side and
in this way, serve as a valid comparison group in identifying the causal effects of the
allowance. If the continuity assumption is satisfied, assignment to treatment, within a
close neighbourhood of the eligibility threshold, can be said to be as good as random
(Lee and Lemieux, 2010). Thus, any discontinuous ’jumps’ in outcome variables at the
threshold can then be attributed to the treatment (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008).
While the continuity assumption is by definition not testable, two aspects can support
its plausibility. The first is continuity of the density of health facilities along the running
variable at the eligibility threshold, which implies the absence of an unusually large clus-
tering of health facilities immediately to the right or left of the threshold for receipt of the
allowance. Practically, this latter point requires that it be impossible for health facilities
to precisely and systematically manipulate their GPS coordinates so as to fall immediately
to the right of the qualifying side of the threshold, when they should in actual fact not
(Lee and Lemieux, 2010). Precise and systematic manipulation of GPS coordinates is
highly implausible in our setting because the coordinates are measured, not by the health
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facilities themselves, but by the office of the Surveyor General under a different ministry,
as noted in section 4.2. To assess this aspect, figure 4.4.1 below shows a histogram of
the density of health facilities, plotted against the running variable, within a 20km band-
width of the treatment threshold. As is evident from the figure, an unusual clustering of
heath facilities directly to the right of the threshold is absent. Additionally, figure 4.4.1
also shows local polynomial estimates of the density function of health facilities against
the running variable, with bias-robust 95% confidence bands around the estimates, fol-
lowing the discontinuity in density testing approach9 proposed by Cattaneo et al. (2020)
and implemented using the procedure in Cattaneo et al. (2019). The local polynomial
estimates of the density function reveal a smooth curve through the treatment threshold.
Additionally, we employ the manipulation test based on Cattaneo et al. (2020, 2018), an
extension of the McCrary test (McCrary, 2008), which yields a bias-robust t-statistic of
0.2760, with a p-value of 0.7524, implying that we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no
manipulation of the running variable at the treatment threshold. The above thus further
supports the plausibility of the continuity assumption and alleviates concerns regarding a
systematic and precise manipulation of GPS coordinates or indeed even systematic health
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Figure 4.4.1: Health Facility Density around the Eligibility Threshold
Notes: This figure shows a histogram of the density of health centres, plotted against the running variable,
distance-to-district-capital, within a 20km bandwidth of the eligibility threshold. The superimposed curve
shows local polynomial estimates of the density function of health facilities against the running variable with
bias-robust 95% confidence bands proposed in Cattaneo et al. (2020) and estimated using the procedure
in Cattaneo et al. (2019).
9Manipulation testing procedures, such as McCrary (2008), require numerous data transformations
such as pre-binning of the data and the choice of other ’tuning’ parameters and might also suffer from
bias arising from density estimation at boundary points (Hahn et al., 2001). The discontinuity in density
testing approach proposed by Cattaneo et al. (2020), however, is robust to the above bias and allows
for fully data-driven discontinuity in density testing, that does not require data transformations and the
selection of tuning parameters, apart from the bandwidth.
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The second aspect that can support the plausibility of the continuity assumption, is the
continuity of observables unlikely to be affected by treatment at the eligibility threshold.
To assess this aspect, we examine the continuity of catchment populations, maternal beds
and in-patient beds at the threshold. Results from the estimation of RDD models, based
on equation 4.3 discussed in section subsection 4.4.2 below, are shown in table 4.A.1 in
annex 4.A.2. Results reveal no treatment effects of the rural hardship allowance on these
variables in all specifications, further supporting the plausibility of continuity around the
threshold in this setting.
4.4.2 Estimation Strategy
In equation 4.1 below, yi represents each respective outcome of interest; the stock of
health workers and the total facility wage bill, for health facility i. allowancei is an
indicator for whether health facility i is listed as actually receiving the rural hardship
allowance. distancei represents the running variable, the distance of each health facility
from it’s respective district capital in kilometers (km). As per the literature, we specify
this one-dimensional running variable such that distancei > 0 if health facility i falls on
the eligible side of the threshold for receipt of the allowance. h(distancei) is a continuous
function of the running variable, estimated by a polynomial of order J. districtv are district
fixed effects, included in all specifications and εi is the error term. However, as noted
above, β2 in equation 4.1 may potentially be biased owing to endogeneity arising from
non-random selection effects. To control for this, eligibility to receive the rural hardship
allowance, based on the distance-to-district-capital criteria and given by the indicator
eligiblei, is used as an instrument for receipt of the rural hardship allowance allowancei.
Equation 4.2 shows the corresponding first stage of the fuzzy RDD model (Hahn et al.,
2001).
yi = β0 + β1h(distancei) + β2allowancei + β3districtv + εi; distancei < |b| (4.1)
allowancei = γ0 + γ1g(distancei) + γ2eligiblei + γ3districtv + ωi; distancei < |b| (4.2)
yi = θ0 + θ1f(distancei) + θ2eligiblei + θ3districtv + τi; distancei < |b| (4.3)
Equation 4.3 represents the reduced form relationship between eligibility for the rural
hardship allowance and each respective outcome of interest, with θ2 being the coefficient
capturing the causal effect of eligibility (Intention-to-Treat), localised to the eligibility
threshold (Hahn et al., 2001). Equation 4.3 is estimated non-parametrically using local
polynomial estimation and inference procedures proposed in Calonico et al. (2014, 2017),
within a close neighbourhood of the eligibility threshold, distance < |b|.10 Specifically,
10As opposed to parametric estimation procedures, such as Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), non-
parametric bias-robust local polynomial regression estimation and inference procedures are argued to
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a benchmark local linear regression specification is estimated, where the flexible func-
tion of the running variable f(distancei), is specified as f(distancei) = δ1distancei +
δ2distancei ∗ eligi, including an interaction term of the running variable and eligibility
indicator. A second specification utilising a local polynomial regression specification is es-




i , with a third-order polynomial of the running
variable included to account for potential non-linearities in the underlying (unobservable)
regression functions being estimated.
yi = β0 + β1h(distancei) + β2 ̂allowancei + β3districtv + εi; distancei < |b| (4.4)
We follow the same non-parametric procedure to estimate the first stage (equation 4.2)
and an instrumental variables specification as shown in equation 4.4, where ̂allowancei
are residuals from equation 4.2. The resulting fuzzy RDD estimates from equation 4.4
are equivalent to Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) estimates for compliers at the
eligibility threshold, i.e. for those health facilities induced to receive the rural hardship by
being located on the eligible side of the threshold. All local polynomial regression specifi-
cations utilise a triangular weighting kernel, which assigns a larger weight to observations
closer to the threshold. The bandwidth |b| is chosen using two approaches. The bench-
mark specification uses a common bandwidth of 10km on each side of the threshold for all
outcomes in order to ensure results are comparable across outcomes. A second approach
involves estimating an optimal bandwidth for each regression specification using data-
driven procedures proposed in Calonico et al. (2014) and Calonico et al. (2017). Unless
otherwise stated, data-driven bandwidths are selected so as to minimise the mean squared
error (mse), which has been noted to be an ideal procedure for both point estimation and
inference purposes (Calonico et al., 2014, 2017). Another critical choice in RDD estimation
relates to bin selection. Unless otherwise stated, we utilise quantile-spaced bins that mimic
the variance of the underlying data. This bin selection procedure is recommended in the
literature as it minimises the effects of differences in between-bin variance, by choosing
the distance between bins such that an equal number of observations is included in each
bin (Calonico et al., 2014, 2017).11
4.5 Results
In order to assess the existence of a first-stage relationship between eligibility to receive
the rural hardship allowance, based on the distance-to-district-capital criteria and actual
receipt of the allowance, table 4.5.1 below shows estimates based on the first stage equation
4.2 above. The existence of this first stage relationship between eligibility and actual
receipt of the allowance, is an important first step in estimating the causal effect of the
be preferable in RDD settings, because they account for potential bias in coefficient estimates and their
associated confidence intervals, arising from estimation of unknown regression functions on either side of
the eligibility threshold (Calonico et al., 014a).
11Results presented below are robust to bin selection utilising an alternative, evenly spaced binning
procedure. This approach is less recommended in the literature, owing to the effects of between-bin
variance, given that the number of observations per bin varies under this procedure.
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rural hardship allowance on our outcomes of interest. To this end, estimates in column
1 of the table utilise a specification with a 20km bandwidth (10km’s on each side of the
eligibility threshold), a first-order polynomial of the running variable, distance-to-district-
capital, in kilometers (km) and an interaction term of the running variable and eligibility
indicator. Similarly, column 2 of the table contains estimates from a specification utilising
a 20km bandwidth, a third-order polynomial of the running variable and no interaction
term. Column 3 shows estimates utilising a specification with a first-order polynomial, a
data-driven 9.5km bandwidth on each side of the eligibility threshold and no interaction
term.
Column 1 of table 4.5.1 reveals that crossing the eligibility threshold, increases the like-
lihood of actually receiving the rural hardship allowance by approximately 64 percentage
points using a 10km bandwidth. Similarly, the more flexible specifications with a third
order polynomial and a data driven bandwidth in columns 2 and 3, reveal between 73 and
71 percentage point increases in the likelihood of receiving the rural hardship allowance
upon crossing the eligibility threshold, respectively. Table 4.5.1 also reveals sufficiently
large F-statistics in all specifications, indicating that eligibility, based on the district-to-
district-capital criteria, is a sufficiently strong instrument for receipt of the rural hardship
allowance. Figure 4.5.1, graphically plots the first stage, visually depicting the increase in
the likelihood of rural allowance receipt at the eligibility threshold.
With a sufficiently strong first stage relationship between eligibility and actual receipt
of the rural hardship allowance established, table 4.5.2 below presents reduced-form, ITT
estimates of the impact of rural hardship allowance eligibility, estimated using equation
4.3. Panel A of the table contains estimates of the impact of the rural hardship allowance
eligibility on the stock of health workers, measured as the natural logarithm of the number
of health workers per facility. Similarly, panel B presents reduced form estimates of the
impact of the rural hardship allowance eligibility on the total monthly facility wage bill.12
The estimates presented in column 1 of the table are based on a specification with a first-
order polynomial of the running variable, distance-to-district-capital, in kilometers (km),
a 20km bandwidth (10km on either side of the eligibility threshold) and an interaction
term of the running variable and eligibility indicator.
The estimates in column 2 are based on a specification with a third-order polynomial of
the running variable, a 20km bandwidth and no interaction term. Estimates in column 3
are based on a specification with a first-order polynomial of the running variable, different
data-driven, mean squared error minimising bandwidths for each outcome, chosen using
the procedure in Calonico et al. (2014, 2017) and no interaction term. Heteroscedasticity
robust bias-corrected standard errors and coefficient estimates, which are estimated with
the previously mentioned estimation procedures, are reported. All specifications include
district fixed effects.
12The total monthly wage bill per health facility is measured in Zambian Kwacha (ZMW). 1 USD is
approximately equal to 22 ZMW.
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Table 4.5.1: Receipt of Hardship Allowance: First Stage
Receives Hardship Allowance
(1) (2) (3)
Eligible 0.643*** 0.727*** 0.707***
(0.153) (0.214) (0.156)
Observations 171 171 157
Mean Ineligible 0.198 0.198 0.200
Bandwidth (km) 10 10 9.5
Polynomial 1 3 1
Interaction Yes No No
F-Statistic 14.10 13.37 18.71
Notes: The table contains estimates of the first stage re-
lationship between eligibility to receive the rural hardship
allowance, based on the distance-to-district-capital eligibil-
ity criteria and the likelihood of actually receiving the rural
hardship allowance as in equation 4.2 above. The dependant
variable in each column is an indicator for actual receipt of
the rural hardship allowance, while the regressors include
an indicator for eligibility to receive the allowance, based
on the district-to-district-capital criteria. Heteroscedastic-
ity robust bias-corrected standard errors, in parentheses and
coefficient estimates are shown. All specifications include
district fixed effects. Column 1 utilises a specification with
a first order polynomial of the running variable, a 20km
bandwidth (10km on each side of the eligibility threshold)
and an interaction term of the running variable and eligi-
bility indicator. Column 2 utilises a specification with a
third-order polynomial, a 20km bandwidth and no interac-
tion term. Column 3 utilises a specification with a first-
order polynomial a data-driven 9.514 km bandwidth on each
side of the eligibility threshold, selected using the proce-
dure in Calonico et al. (2014, 2017) and no interaction term;
p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Panel A of table 4.5.2 reveals that crossing the threshold for rural hardship allowance
eligibility, increases the number of health workers by approximately 57% using a 10km
bandwidth.13 Similarly, the more flexible specifications with a third-order polynomial and
a data-driven bandwidth in columns 2 and 3 respectively, reveal 41% and 51% increases
in the number of health workers per facility at the eligibility threshold. However, only the
coefficient estimates in columns 1 and 3 are statistically significant at the 5% level.
Panel B of table 4.5.2 reveals that crossing the eligibility threshold for the rural hardship
allowance increases the monthly wage bill per health facility by approximately 60% using
a 10km bandwidth. This same effect in the more flexible specifications ranges between
13To obtain this number, we transform the coefficient estimate θ̂2 using the expression exp(θ̂2) - 1. We
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Figure 4.5.1: Receipt of Hardship Allowance: First Stage
Notes: This figure plots the first-stage relationship between eligibility to receive the rural hardship al-
lowance, based on the distance-to-district-capital criteria (horizontal axis) and the likelihood of actually
receiving the allowance (vertical axis). The specification utilises a first-order polynomial of the running
variable with a 20km bandwidth (10km on each side of the eligibility threshold). All specifications utilise
a triangular weighting kernel. Grey dots are quantile-spaced within-bin sample means, mimicking the
variance of the underlying data.
47% and 50% in columns 2 and 3, respectively. However, similar to the estimates in panel
A, only the coefficient estimates in columns 1 and 3 are statistically significant at the 5%
level.
One noteworthy observation from the results presented above, is that the increases in
the quality-adjusted stock of health workers, represented by the monthly facility wage bill,
seem to be slightly larger than the corresponding increases in the stock of health workers.
This is especially evident when comparing the various sets of estimates in columns 1 and
2 of panels A and B, respectively, which are based on the same bandwidths and therefore,
the same samples of facilities. Figure 4.5.2 graphically plots these results, using a 10km
bandwidth and visually depicts the increase in the stock of heath workers and the facility
wage bill at the eligibility threshold.
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Table 4.5.2: Reduced Form Estimates of the Impact of the Rural Hardship Allowance
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Log Health Workers
Eligible 0.452** 0.340 0.413**
(0.200) (0.402) (0.199)
[0.571] [0.405] [0.511]
Observations 171 171 100
Mean Ineligible 1.26 1.26 1.21
Bandwidth (km) 10 10 7.2
Panel B: Log Monthly Wage Bill
Eligible 0.468** 0.386 0.404**
(0.196) (0.393) (0.198)
[0.597] [0.471] [0.498]
Observations 171 171 97
Mean Ineligible 9.314 9.314 9.272
Bandwidth (km) 10 10 7.1
Polynomial 1 3 1
Interaction term Yes No No
Notes: This table contains reduced form estimates of the impact of the rural
hardship allowance eligibility on the stock of health workers, in panel A and the
total wage bill per health facility, in panel B, respectively. The total wage bill
per health facility is measured by the natural logarithm of total monthly wage
bill per health facility in Zambian Kwacha ZMW; 1 USD approximately equals
22 ZMW. Heteroscedasticity robust bias-corrected standard errors, in parenthe-
ses and coefficient estimates are shown. Each column contains estimates from
a different regression specification. Column 1 shows a specification with a first-
order polynomial of the running variable, a 20km bandwidth (10km on each side
of the eligibility threshold) and an interaction term of the running variable and
eligibility indicator. Column 2 shows a specification with a third-order polyno-
mial, a 20km bandwidth and no interaction term. Column 3 shows a specifi-
cation with a first-order polynomial, different data-driven, mean squared error
minimising bandwidths, each estimated using the procedure in Calonico et al.
(2014, 2017) and no interaction term. The estimates in brackets are obtained
by transforming the coefficient estimate θ̂2 using the following approximation
exp(θ̂2) - 1. All specifications utilise a triangular weighting kernel and include
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(b) Facility wage bill
Figure 4.5.2: Health Facility Staffing (Reduced Form)
Notes: This figure shows the reduced form relationship between rural hardship allowance eligibility and
staffing per health facility. The health facility wage bill is measured by the natural logarithm of total
monthly wage bill per health facility (measured in Zambian Kwacha ZMW, with 1 USD approximately
equals 22 ZMW). In panel A, log health workers per facility is the outcome variable, while in panel B,
log monthly health facility wage bill is the outcome variable. Both figures display a specification with
a first-order polynomial of the running variable, distance-to-district-capital in Kilometres (km), a 10km
bandwidth on either side of the eligibility threshold and a triangular weighting kernel. Grey dots are
quantile-spaced within bin sample means, mimicking the variance of the underlying data.
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Table 4.5.3: Fuzzy RDD Estimates of the Impact of the Rural Hardship Allowance
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Log Health Workers
Rural 0.611* 0.825 0.590**
(0.348) (0.889) (0.279)
[0.842] [1.282] [0.804]
Observations 171 171 130
Mean Ineligible 1.262 1.262 1.262
Bandwidth (km) 10 10 10.002
Panel B: Log Monthly Wage Bill
Rural 0.634* 0.919 0.619**
(0.342) (0.886) (0.283)
[0.885] [1.507] [0.857]
Observations 171 171 129
Mean Ineligible 9.314 9.314 9.314
Bandwidth (km) 10 10 10.026
Polynomial 1 3 1
Interaction term Yes No No
Notes: This table contains Fuzzy RDD estimates of the impact of rural hardship
allowance receipt at the eligibility threshold, on the stock of health workers, in
panel A and the total wage bill per health facility, in panel B, respectively. The
total wage bill per health facility is measured by the natural logarithm of to-
tal monthly wage bill per health facility, measured in Zambian Kwacha ZMW;
1 USD approximately equals 22 ZMW. Heteroscedasticity robust bias-corrected
standard errors, in parentheses and coefficient estimates, are shown. Each col-
umn contains estimates from a different regression specification. Column 1
shows a specification with a first-order polynomial of the running variable, a
20km bandwidth (10km on each side of the eligibility threshold) and an inter-
action term of the running variable and eligibility indicator. Column 2 shows
a specification with a third-order polynomial, a 20km bandwidth and no inter-
action term. Column 3 shows a specification with a first-order polynomial, dif-
ferent data-driven, mean squared error minimising bandwidths, each estimated
using the procedure in Calonico et al. (2014, 2017) and no interaction term. The
estimates in brackets are obtained by transforming the coefficient estimate β̂2
using the following approximation exp(β̂2) - 1. All specifications utilise a trian-
gular weighting kernel and include district fixed effects; p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, **
p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Assessment of the impact of the rural hardship allowance continues in table 4.5.3. Specif-
ically, the table contains Fuzzy RDD, LATE estimates of the impact of rural hardship
allowance receipt at the eligibility threshold. Panel A of table 4.5.3 contains estimates
of the impact of the rural hardship allowance receipt at the eligibility threshold on the
number of health workers. Panel B presents estimates of the impact of the rural hard-
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ship allowance receipt at the eligibility threshold on the total facility wage bill.14 The
estimates in column 1 of the table are based on a specification with a first-order poly-
nomial of the running variable, distance-to-district-capital, in kilometers (km), a 20km
bandwidth (10km on either side of the eligibility threshold) and an interaction term of
the running variable and eligibility indicator. The estimates in column 2 are based on
a specification with a third-order polynomial of the running variable, a 20km bandwidth
and no interaction term. The estimates in column 3 are based on a specification with a
first-order polynomial of the running variable, different data-driven, mean squared error
minimising bandwidths for each outcome, chosen using the procedure in Calonico et al.
(2014, 2017) and no interaction term. Heteroscedasticity robust bias-corrected standard
errors and coefficient estimates, which are estimated with the previously mentioned esti-
mation procedures, are reported. All specifications utilise a triangular weighting kernel
and include district fixed effects.
Although qualitatively similar to the reduced form estimates presented above, the Fuzzy
RDD, LATE estimates in table 4.5.3 are generally larger than the former estimates, as
would be expected, given the need to account for the first stage in the Fuzzy RDD es-
timates. Specifically, column 1 panel A of table 4.5.3 reveals that receipt of the rural
hardship allowance at the eligibility threshold, results in an 84% increase in the number of
health workers. Similarly, the more flexible specifications in columns 2 and 3 respectively,
reveal increases in the number of health workers between 128% and 80%, respectively.
However, similar to the reduced form estimates shown above, only the Fuzzy RDD, LATE
estimates in columns 1 and 3 are statistically significant at the 10 and 5% levels, respec-
tively.
Panel B of table 4.5.3 reveals that receipt of the rural hardship allowance at the eligibility
threshold, results in an 89% increase in the total wage bill per health facility, using a 10km
bandwidth. The corresponding increases in the more flexible specifications in columns 2
and 3 are 151% and 86%, respectively. However, as with the estimates in panel A, only
the coefficient estimates in columns 1 and 3 are statistically significant, at the same 10
and 5% levels, respectively.
4.6 Robustness checks
4.6.1 Bandwidth Choice
The choice of bandwidth is perhaps the most important single choice in RDD estimation.
As noted above, the main analysis relies on a standard 10km bandwidth on each side of
the eligibility threshold, which is held fixed across all outcomes to facilitate comparability,
as well as different data-driven bandwidths chosen for each outcome, using the procedure
in Calonico et al. (2014, 2017). The data-driven bandwidths are generally between 7 and
10km on either side of the eligibility threshold.
14The total wage bill per health facility is measured in Zambian Kwacha (ZMW). 1 USD is approximately
equal to 22 ZMW.
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To demonstrate that results are robust to the choice of bandwidth, table 4.A.2 in annex
4.A.2 shows reduced form estimates for all outcomes, for different bandwidths between 5
and 15km. Estimates for the stock of health workers in panel A and the monthly wage
bill in panel B per facility all reveal qualitatively similar results as those in table 4.5.2.
Specifically, the estimates reveal larger coefficient estimates for shorter bandwidths. At the
same time, coefficient estimates become less statistically significant for shorter bandwidths
as the number of facilities in the sample shrinks.
4.7 Conclusion
Self-reinforcing structural inequality between urban and rural areas is a major concern
in many developing countries. Rural areas lack amenities valued by service delivery agents
and rigid wage structures in the public sector limit the ability of governments to compen-
sate these agents for the implied disutility from working in these areas. As a result, rural
areas lack qualified personnel for service delivery and access to public services remains
limited, thereby keeping the amenity value low and reinforcing existing rural-urban gaps
in public service delivery and ultimately development levels.
A common policy tool employed by governments in developing countries to break this
cycle of rural underdevelopment is the payment of salary supplements for working in
areas defined as rural, also referred to as hardship allowances. The simple idea is that
the allowance will compensate workers for the lack of access to amenities, such as basic
infrastructure and services and opportunities for training and career development, in rural
areas. The success of such schemes depends on the elasticity of labor supply in rural areas.
This paper evaluates the impact of paying a 20% salary supplement to health workers for
working in rural areas on staffing levels at rural health facilities in Zambia. To identify the
causal effect of the hardship allowance, we leverage a spatial discontinuity in the eligibility
for the allowance. We employ a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, comparing staffing
levels between nearby facilities on either side of the eligibility threshold. We find that the
probability of payment of the hardship allowance increases by 71 percentage points at the
eligibility threshold. At the same time, the number of health workers per health facility
increases by 51%. Instrumenting the payment of the allowance with eligibility among
facilities near the threshold, we estimate that the allowance increases staffing levels by
approximately 80% in health facilities receiving it at the eligibility threshold. Hence, the
allowance has a large effect on the availability of health workers in rural health facilities.
Similarly, we find that the allowance also results in large increases in the quality-adjusted
stock of health workers per facility. Assuming that differences in basic salaries reflect
differences in the quality of health workers, we proxy health worker quality by computing
the total facility wage bill received by health workers of various specialisations in each
facility.15 Our estimates reveal a 50% increase in the quality-adjusted stock of health
15We measure the total facility wage bill in Zambian Kwacha (ZMW). 1 USD is approximately equal
to 22 ZMW.
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workers per facility, with this estimate increasing to 86% once payment of the allowance is
instrumented with eligibility to receive the allowance. Thus, the rural hardship allowance
leads to increases in both the number of health workers per facility as well as their quality.
Furthermore, we find that increases in the quality-adjusted stock of health workers, as
measured by the monthly facility wage bill, are larger than the corresponding increases in
the number of health workers.
With 60% of Zambia’s population residing in rural areas, this finding is of particular
relevance in the context of our study. It indicates that salary supplements are indeed a
viable, although costly, option to ensure greater presence of high quality health workers
in rural areas.
What remains unclear is to what extent greater presence of high quality health workers
in rural areas can improve health service delivery and population health. If other com-
plementary inputs to service provision and health production are absent or demand for
health services is low, workforce increases may not translate into improvements in service
delivery and health outcomes, or effects could be muted. In ongoing work, we examine
this question by comparing service provision and recorded disease patterns between eligible
and ineligible health facilities near the threshold.
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4.A Appendices to Chapter Four












Figure 4.A.1: Assistance at Delivery: Friend, Relative or Traditional Birth Attendant.
Notes: This figure plots the proportion of women reporting being assisted by a fried, relative or tradi-
tional birth attendant during delivery in rural and urban areas respectively. The figures are the authors
calculations based on data from the 2018 Demographic and Health Survey.
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4.A.2 Placebo Outcomes and Bandwidth
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Table 4.A.1: Impact of the Rural Hardship Allowance on Placebo Outcomes
Log Maternal Beds Log In-patient Beds Log Catchment Pop
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Eligible 0.236 0.475 0.300 0.0309 0.494 0.0657 0.126 -0.232 0.0942
(0.235) (0.443) (0.209) (0.260) (0.481) (0.247) (0.243) (0.383) (0.204)
Observations 165 165 98 154 154 90 167 167 96
Mean Ineligible 0.990 0.990 0.899 1.704 1.704 1.700 8.845 8.845 8.846
Bandwidth (km) 10 10 7.5 10 10 7.8 10 10 7.3
Polynomial 1 3 1 1 3 1 1 3 1
Interaction term Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No
Notes: The table contains reduced form estimates of the impact of rural hardship allowance eligibility on placebo out-
comes: Maternal Beds, In-patient Beds and Catchment Population per health facility, respectively. Heteroscedasticity
robust bias-corrected coefficient estimates and standard errors, estimated using the procedure in Calonico et al. (2014,
2017), are shown (the standard errors are shown in parentheses). Within each panel, each column shows estimates util-
ising a different regression specification. Within each panel, columns 1, 4 and 7 show a specification with a first-order
polynomial of the running variable, a 20km bandwidth (10km on each side of the eligibility threshold) and an interaction
term of the running variable and eligibility indicator. Similarly, columns 2, 5 and 8 show a specification with a third-order
polynomial, a 20km bandwidth and no interaction term. Columns 3, 6 and 9 show a specification with a first-order poly-
nomial, different data-driven, coverage error rate minimising bandwidths, each estimated using the procedure in Calonico
et al. (2014, 2017) and no interaction term. All specifications utilise a triangular weighting kernel and include district
fixed effects; p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 4.A.2: Impact of Eligibility on Health Facility Staffing: Robustness to Bandwidth Selection
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Panel A: Log Health Workers
Eligible 0.441 0.405 0.423* 0.433* 0.446** 0.452** 0.456** 0.429** 0.407** 0.372* 0.346*
(0.268) (0.252) (0.241) (0.225) (0.210) (0.200) (0.199) (0.197) (0.195) (0.192) (0.190)
Panel B: Log Wage Bill
Eligible 0.430 0.426* 0.452* 0.459** 0.466** 0.468** 0.468** 0.438** 0.413** 0.375** 0.347*
(0.269) (0.252) (0.238) (0.220) (0.206) (0.196) (0.195) (0.194) (0.192) (0.190) (0.190)
Polynomial 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Observations 79 100 115 129 146 171 183 199 216 234 250
Bandwidth (km) 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Notes: The table contains reduced form estimates of the impact of rural hardship allowance eligibility on the stock of health workers, in panel A and the total wage bill
per health facility, in panel B, respectively. The total wage bill per health facility is measured by the natural logarithm of total monthly wage bill per health facility,
measured in Zambian Kwacha ZMW; 1 USD approximately equals 22 ZMW. Each column contains estimates from a similar regression specification, with different band-
widths between 5km and 15km. Heteroscedasticity robust bias-corrected coefficient estimates and standard errors, estimated using the procedure in Calonico et al. (2014,
2017), are shown (the standard errors are shown in parentheses). All specifications include district fixed effects. The specification shown utilises a first-order polynomial
of the running variable. p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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